Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China's Majority

Mullaney, Thomas S.; Leibold, James; Gros, Stéphane; Vanden Bussche, Eric

GAIA Books

Permalink: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/07s1h1rf

Keywords: Han, Critical race studies, Ethnicity, Identity

Abstract:
Addressing the problem of the ‘Han’ ethnos from a variety of relevant perspectives—historical, geographical, racial, political, literary, anthropological, and linguistic—Critical Han Studies offers a responsible, informative deconstruction of this monumental yet murky category. It is certain to have an enormous impact on the entire field of China studies.” Victor H. Mair, University of Pennsylvania

“This deeply historical, multidisciplinary volume consistently and fruitfully employs insights from critical race and whiteness studies in a new arena. In doing so it illuminates brightly how and when ideas about race and ethnicity change in the service of shifting configurations of power.” David Roediger, author of How Race Survived U.S. History


“A powerful, probing account of the idea of the ‘Han Chinese’—that deceptive category which, like ‘American,’ is so often presented as a natural default, even though it really is of recent vintage. . . . A feast for both Sinologists and comparativists everywhere.” Magnus Fiskesjö, Cornell University
“This collection of trenchant, penetrating essays interrogates what it means to be ‘Han’ in China, both historically and today. It will make a valuable and enduring contribution to our understanding of the uniqueness and complexity of Chinese history and culture. Dru Gladney, Pomona College

Constituting over ninety percent of China’s population, Han is not only the largest ethnonational group in that country but also one of the largest categories of human identity in world history. In this pathbreaking volume, a multidisciplinary group of scholars examine this ambiguous identity, one that shares features with, but cannot be subsumed under, existing notions of ethnicity, culture, race, nationality, and civilization.

Thomas S. Mullaney is a professor of history at Stanford University. James Leibold is senior lecturer and Asian studies program convenor at La Trobe University. Stéphane Gros is a research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Eric Vanden Bussche is a Ph.D. candidate at Stanford University.

Contributors: Uradyn E. Bulag, Kevin Carrico, Zhihong Chen, Tamara Chin, Mark Elliott, C. Patterson Giersch, James Leibold, Thomas S. Mullaney, Nicholas Tapp, Emma J. Teng, Chris Vasantkumar, and Xu Jieshun

Series: New Perspectives on Chinese Culture and Society, vol. 4

Copyright Information:

Copyright 2012 by the article author(s). This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Critical Han Studies
The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority
Edited by Thomas S. Mullaney, James Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche

Published in association with the University of California Press

“This deeply historical, multidisciplinary volume consistently and fruitfully employs insights from critical race and whiteness studies in a new arena. In doing so it illuminates brightly how and when ideas about race and ethnicity change in the service of shifting configurations of power.” DAVID ROEDIGER, author of How Race Survived U.S. History

“Offers a responsible, informative deconstruction of a monumental yet murky category. It is certain to have an enormous impact on the entire field of China studies.” VICTOR H. MAIR, University of Pennsylvania

“A great book. By examining the social construction of hierarchy in China, sheds light on broad issues of cultural dominance and in-group favoritism.” RICHARD DELGADO, author of Critical Race Theory: An Introduction

“This collection of trenchant, penetrating essays interrogates what it means to be ‘Han’ in China, both historically and today. It will make a valuable and enduring contribution to our understanding of the uniqueness and complexity of Chinese history and culture.” DRU GLADNEY, Pomona College

“A powerful, probing account of the idea of the ‘Han Chinese’—that deceptive category which, like ‘American,’ is so often presented as a natural default, even though it really is of recent vintage. . . . A feast for both Sinologists and comparativists everywhere.” MAGNUS FISKESJÖ, Cornell University

THOMAS S. MULLANEY is a professor of history at Stanford University. JAMES LIEBOLD is senior lecturer and Asian studies program convenor at La Trobe University. STÉPHANE GROS is a research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. ERIC VANDEN BUSSCHE is a Ph.D. candidate at Stanford University.

CONTRIBUTORS: Uradyn E. Bulag, Kevin Carrico, Zhihong Chen, Tamara T. Chin, Mark Elliott, C. Patterson Giersch, James Leibold, Thomas S. Mullaney, Nicholas Tapp, Emma J. Teng, Chris Vasantkumar, Xu Jieshun

New Perspectives on Chinese Culture and Society, 4
CRITICAL HAN STUDIES
The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority

Edited by
THOMAS S. MULLANEY, JAMES LEIBOLD, STÉPHANE GROS, and ERIC VANDEN BUSSCHE
Critical Han Studies
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE CULTURE AND SOCIETY

A series sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and made possible through a grant from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange

1. Joan Judge and Hu Ying, eds., Beyond Exemplar Tales: Women’s Biography in Chinese History
2. David A. Palmer and Xun Liu, eds., Daoism in the Twentieth Century: Between Eternity and Modernity
3. Joshua A. Fogel, ed., The Role of Japan in Modern Chinese Art
4. Thomas S. Mullaney, James Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, eds., Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority
The Global, Area, and International Archive (GAIA) is an initiative of the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, in partnership with the University of California Press, the California Digital Library, and international research programs across the University of California system.

University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu.

University of California Press
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

University of California Press, Ltd.
London, England

© 2012 by The Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Manufactured in the United States of America

21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (R 1997) (Permanence of Paper).
Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Critical Han Studies: Introduction and Prolegomenon 1
Thomas S. Mullaney

PART I. HAN AND CHINA

1. Recentering China: The Cantonese in and beyond the Han 23
Kevin Carrico

2. On Not Looking Chinese: Does “Mixed Race” Decenter the Han from Chineseness? 45
Emma J. Teng

3. “Climate’s Moral Economy”: Geography, Race, and the Han in Early Republican China 73
Zhihong Chen

4. Good Han, Bad Han: The Moral Parameters of Ethnopolitics in China 92
Uradyn E. Bulag

PART II. THE PROBLEM OF HAN ORIGINS

5. Understanding the Snowball Theory of the Han Nationality 113
Xu Jieshun
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Antiquarian as Ethnographer: Han Ethnicity in Early China Studies</td>
<td>Tamara T. Chin</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Han Joker in the Pack: Some Issues of Culture and Identity from the Minzu Literature</td>
<td>Nicholas Tapp</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PART III. THE PROBLEM OF HAN FORMATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hushuo: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese</td>
<td>Mark Elliott</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>From Subjects to Han: The Rise of Han as Identity in Nineteenth-Century Southwest China</td>
<td>C. Patterson Giersch</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Searching for Han: Early Twentieth-Century Narratives of Chinese Origins and Development</td>
<td>James Leibold</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Han at Minzu’s Edges: What Critical Han Studies Can Learn from China’s “Little Tibet”</td>
<td>Chris Vasantkumar</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Character List</td>
<td></td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td></td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The editors and authors wish to express their gratitude for the generous support of seven agencies, institutions, and departments. These are the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for Scholarly Exchange/American Council of Learned Societies, Stanford University Center for East Asian Studies, Stanford College of Humanities & Science Office of the Dean, Stanford Humanities Center, Stanford University Center for Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity, Stanford University Department of History, and the Hewlett Fund. We would also like to express thanks to all of the participants in the Critical Han Studies conference, the members of the Stanford University community who helped us make the conference a reality, and the editorial staff at GAIA and the University of California Press. In particular, we wish to thank Lydia Chen, Matthew Tiews, Julie Leong, Monica Wheeler, Stephanie Lee, Connie Chin, Albert Camarillo, Stephen Hinton, Steven Wheatley, Nathan MacBrien, and two anonymous reviewers. Finally, we would like to thank Jason D. Patent for his translation of the chapter by Xu Jieshun.
Encompassing more than 90 percent of the populations of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, “Han” is one of the largest categories of collective identity in the world. On the mainland, Han is understood to be a type of minzu, or ethnonational group, a categorical designation that places it alongside the country’s fifty-five other officially recognized minzu: the Zhuang, Yi, Uyghur, Bai, Tibetan, Miao, Lisu, and so forth. The category of Han, however, is of a size and constitution that sets it apart quite starkly from its “sibling nationalities.” First of all, it claims among its members some 1.2 billion people, making it roughly seventy-six times larger than mainland China’s next largest minzu, the Zhuang, and over four hundred thousand times larger than its smallest, the Lhoba. Whereas ethnic groups no doubt vary greatly in size, the incomparable immensity of Han—a category whose subethnic and geographic “branches” dwarf in size the population of some European countries—prompts us to reconsider the appropriateness of treating Han as the same type of collective identity as those with which it is normally compared. To compare Han to any given Non-Han minzu is in certain respects akin to comparing a phylum with a class, a class with an order, or an order with a family—that is, across entirely different taxonomic registers. Within China, Han is on a scale all its own, on par with such global categories as race, religion, and even continents.

The internal composition of the Han also raises questions as to its coherence as a single, unified category. Han encompasses eight immense speech communities—Guan (Mandarin), Wu, Yue, Xiang, Hakka, Gan, Southern Min, and Northern Min¹—which, although referred to as “dialects” (fangyan) in Chinese parlance, exhibit levels of mutual unintelligibility that would likely be treated as differences of language were they observed in the European context. As John DeFrancis has argued, the con-
cept of a singular Chinese language is an “abstraction” that contains a host of “mutually unintelligible forms of speech.” And as Jerry Norman has argued, “There is probably as much difference between the dialects of Peking [Beijing] and Chaozhou as there is between Italian and French; the Hainan Min dialects are as different from the Xi’an dialect as Spanish is from Rumanian.”

When we take these issues of scale and composition into account, the group now referred to in the singular as “Han” appears less like a coherent category of identity and more like an umbrella term encompassing a plurality of diverse cultures, languages, and ethnicities. Confronted with this tension between its putative unity and empirical diversity, then, one might expect Han to have long been the object of critical and deconstructive analysis, akin to that which scholars have brought to bear on national, racial, ethnic, and even continental categories. If categories of race constitute inventions; national categories, imaginations; and continents, myths, then surely we can expect the same of Han. However, with the exception of a very limited number of studies, which will be addressed forthwith, our expectation would not be met. The category of Han has in large part managed to pass through the epoch of deconstruction largely unscathed if not fortified. On the whole, the traditional understanding of Han continues to echo the highly questionable idea that, as Eric Hobsbawn has phrased it, China is “composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogenous.”

In an effort to conceptualize new approaches to the question of Han, some scholars have suggested looking outside of China for methodological inspiration and theoretical guidance. In particular, Critical Race Theory and Whiteness Studies have been invoked as potentially profitable sites of exploration, with scholars such as Dru Gladney, Stevan Harrell, and Susan Blum bringing into play an analogy of sorts between Han and White. While each of these scholars readily acknowledges the vast differences that separate these two categories of identity, and cautions us against facile or distorting comparisons, nevertheless there are certain concepts and methodological approaches that have been developed as part of the study of whiteness that encourage scholars of China to view the Han category in radically new ways. One family of concepts pertains, for example, to forms and phenomena of transparency, nonreflexivity, and dys-consciousness, central features of white self-conceptualization by which, as Barbara Flagg has argued, “whiteness attains opacity, becomes apparent to the white mind, only in relation to, and contrast with, the ‘color’ of non-whites.” Such concepts resonate powerfully with the practice of Han identity, one
that enjoys a powerful and hegemonic neutrality all its own. In many ways, the category of Han is, like that of white, “not only an identity, but the power to name and shape identities.” As Blum has shown, mainstream (Han) ethnic discourse has the power to designate certain Non-Han groups as more and less civilized, more and less dangerous, more and less exotic, and so forth, establishing a hierarchy in which each group is defined relationally to the Han apex. Whereas the Zhuang are often considered innocuous and more or less “just like Han,” for example, Islamic groups such as the Uyghurs are described and governed in far more aggressive and anxiety-ridden terms and methods. Moreover, these stereotypes have come to shape, not only Han perceptions and expectations of different Non-Han groups, but also the perceptions and expectations that different Non-Han groups maintain with regard to each other.

In an effort to initiate a conversation about this category of identity, the Critical Han Studies Conference and Workshop was organized by Thomas S. Mullaney, James Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche. Hosted at Stanford University in April 2008, the conference brought together more than fifty scholars from eight countries. This gathering was simultaneously a venue for the presentation of new scholarship and a workshop for conceptualizing a new interdisciplinary field of study. It was out of this academic collaboration that the present volume emerges, not so much as a microcosm of the conference, but rather as an initial wave of new scholarship on the Han category designed to define certain key issues and to help inspire further research. The eleven chapters featured in this volume represent the first step toward the creation of a new area of analysis, one provisionally titled “Critical Han Studies.”

To frame the overall volume, the balance of this introduction examines three thematic issues that factor heavily in the chapters herein: the relationship between the category of Han and those of China and Chinese, the origins of the Han category, and the historic formation of the Han category. While these three issues by no means exhaust the Han problem, nevertheless they constitute foundational questions with which any investigation of Han will have to grapple.

**HAN AND CHINA: THREE AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIPS**

“Is it possible to be Chinese without being Han?” This question, posed by Joel Thoraval in his 1980 article, “Is the Chinese Concept of Nation ‘Obscure’?” encapsulates the first issue we will engage with here: the relationship of the category *Han* to those of *China* and *Chinese*. There are at
least three ways in which Han and China are entangled: the long-standing commensuration between Han and “Chinese culture”; a similarly long-standing equivalence between Han and “the Chinese people”; and the intimate relationship between Han and the political-geographic concept of China. Each of these threads tugs at our analysis of Han, pulling us in directions that, if we are not chary, would make our examination of Han merely an examination of China by other means.

Han as Chinese Civilization. In 1952 Herold Wiens published his influential study *China’s March into the Tropics*, charting the history of the southward expansion of Chinese culture and civilization into the Jiangnan region and the present-day territories of southwest China. For Wiens, the “China” in his title is contrasted against a second category appearing in the subtitle of the book: *Non-Han-Chinese*. In 1967 Wiens republished his study under a slightly different title, one that made this connection between the categories of Han and Chinese more direct. Renamed *Han Chinese Expansion in South China*, Wiens’s inclusion of this new qualifier “Han” made explicit the first of the three conceptual pairings with which we are concerned here: namely, Han as “Chinese civilization,” “Chinese culture,” and the like. As Wiens explains, the term *Han-Chinese* in his study is “used to mean what Li Chi [Li Ji] has called ‘sons of the Yellow Emperor’; that is, descendants of the earliest Wei and Yellow River Chinese, and, more loosely, Chinese and people of China long assimilated to and identified with the Yellow River civilization.” Well aware that *Han* was not the relevant ethnonym for many of the groups encompassed by this definition, he goes on to explain:

It is noteworthy that the people who call themselves “Han-jen” [Hanren], or “Han people” are those living in North and Central China to whom the Han Dynasty appeared to have contributed most in the way of a glorious heritage. The Chinese of Ling-nan (Kuang-tung [Guangdong] and Kuang-hsi [Guangxi]) call themselves “T’ang-jen” or “T’ang people”, because it was during the T’ang Dynasty that orthodox Chinese culture most deeply transformed the people of this region. Our term Han-Chinese, in its specialized use here, will be applied to orthodox Chinese from the time of the Yellow Emperor down, and therefore, includes the pre-Han orthodox Chinese as well as the orthodox culture adherents in Ling-nan.

For Wiens, “Hanren” is a proxy, not only for all “orthodox Chinese” at a given moment in history, but all orthodox Chinese at all stages of history—even before the origination of the moniker “Hanren” itself. It is
at once a historically specific term (connected to the Han dynasty) and a transhistorical term that can be applied across the entire span of history from the second millennium B.C.E. to the present. The “Han” in “Han Chinese,” one might say, is redundant.

Since the publication of Wiens’s study, the use of the ethnonym Han has made deeper inroads into global discourse, both academic and popular. If travelogues at the turn of the twentieth century made only infrequent references to “Han” and absolutely none to “Non-Han”—preferring instead terms such as Chinese, Chinamen, and Celestials, on the one hand, and simply Non-Chinese on the other—those from recent years use the terms extensively. Far from detaching the category Han from that of Chinese, however, the overall effect has been to repackage “Chinese history” as “Han history.” In the reference work An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of China, for example, the entry for “Han” contains all the historical periods and personages traditionally associated with “Chinese history” more broadly. These include not only the Shang and Zhou dynasties but also twentieth-century periods and political formations such as the May Fourth Movement, the United Front, the Chinese Communist Party, and even post-Mao reforms. Suddenly, it would seem that everything from the Four Modernizations to the Tiananmen Square massacre has been ethnicized as Han. This commensuration of Han and Chinese has led to a virtual silence over the formation of Han identity as something apart from the overall discussion of “Chinese nationalism” more generally. As Dru Gladney has argued, “Few have questioned how the Han became the 91 percent majority in China,” with most “merely accepting the Han as representative of the Chinese in general.” One of the most vivid symbols we have of this commensuration is the linguistic term Hanyu. Although translated into English as “Chinese,” Hanyu translates more literally as “Han language,” precisely in the way that Baiyu translates as “Bai language,” Miaoyu as “Miao language,” and so forth. The fact that we so readily pair it not with a Han ethnocultural group but with China itself indicates the degree to which the connection between Han culture and Chinese culture has been naturalized.

The pervasiveness of the Han-Chinese identification obscures a host of issues, one of which is whether Han itself constitutes anything like a coherent category of identity in the first place. In the opening chapter of this volume, “Recentering China: The Cantonese in and beyond the Han,” Kevin Carrico questions this coherence through the example of regional identities below the surface of the Han, calling attention to an issue that few if any scholars have seriously addressed before: the simultaneously commonsense yet problematic location of the Cantonese within the Han.
Despite the fact that the Cantonese exhibit a host of cultural features that distinguish them from other subsets of the Han category, possess qualities that would seem to qualify them as a full-fledged minzu in their own right (shared territory, language, culture, and so forth), and have historically referred to themselves, as Carrico notes, as “Tang people” (Tangren/Tongyahn) rather than “Han people” (Hanren/Hohnyahn), their status as Han has been so thoroughly naturalized that it has failed to register as a problem in need of consideration. In the case of the Cantonese, then, the types of questions that Noel Ignatiev and Karen Brodkin ask of Irish American and Jewish American communities—namely, how each came to be considered part of the category White from which they were originally excluded—have simply gone unasked. No one has truly pursued the question of how the Cantonese became Han.

Despite their categorization as part of China’s majority, are the Cantonese fully Han? Posing this question, Carrico’s chapter furthermore considers the underexamined yet easily perceptible products of this uncertain or anomalous integration—the persistent tensions between unity and differentiation that characterize Chinese national, ethnic, and regional imaginaries, represented in his chapter by Northern imaginings of a “wild” South, Southern marginalization of a “backwards” North, and an emerging material enactment of Han homogeneity in Han clothing. By analyzing these centrifugal and centripetal tensions dwelling below the surface of a seemingly homogeneous Han, Carrico’s study resonates with the work of Emily Honig on the Subei people, a group that, although officially recognized as Han, remains subject to a host of prejudices that, under any other circumstance, we would expect to be called “ethnic discrimination.” However, by virtue of the shared minzu status of those discriminating and those being discriminated against, at best we are permitted to use altogether confusing terms like “intraethnic discrimination.” Like Honig’s work, Carrico’s chapter alerts us to the complex internal structure of the Han category, one in which certain subsets of the Han occupy the peripheries of the category—liminal positions that call into question our oversimplified Han/Non-Han dichotomy. Furthermore, Carrico’s chapter lends support to ongoing interventions made by Fred Blake, Dru Gladney, Jonathan Lipman, and Emily Honig, among others: namely, that it might be more accurate to think of “intra-Han” divisions and Han “subsets” in terms of ethnic difference and ethnic groups.

Han as the Bioracial Category of Chinese. To compound the complexity of its relationship with “China,” the category of Han is also frequently
commensurated with the biracial concept of the Chinese people or the Chinese race. In her chapter, “On Not Looking Chinese: Does ‘Mixed Race’ Decenter the Han from Chineseness?” Emma J. Teng explores the powerful yet largely unexplored biracial dimensions of the putatively ethnic Han category, weighing it against the category’s more frequently discussed cultural aspects. Teng focuses on the experiences of Eurasian individuals, so-called biracial figures, to ask the question: “Does the Eurasian disrupt conventional notions of Chinese identity, decentering the Han, or does this marginal figure simply help to define the center, establishing the ‘pure’ Han Chinese subject as the embodiment of quintessential Chineseness?”

As Teng demonstrates through her treatment of two prominent Eurasian women, Irene Cheng and Han Suyin, cultural factors such as proficiency in the Chinese language and the ability to navigate the complex and rule-governed playing field of Chinese familial relations weighed heavily in the experience of both women in their attempts to identify with their Chinese heritage. Both Cheng and Han made concerted efforts to perform Chineseness, a complex process that involved speaking Chinese, using Chinese names, attending Chinese schools, eating Chinese food, demonstrating loyalty to China, and other activities geared toward the acquisition of what Teng calls “Chinese cultural capital.” Assessing the powerfully cultural focus of such activities, Teng explains that we might conclude that “it is not necessary to ‘look Chinese’ to be Chinese.” Phenotype, it would seem, is trumped by “claims of cultural affiliation (demonstrated through practices such as clothing, ancestor worship, or even drinking green tea), language, hometown, and political allegiance.” All of this would lead us to conclude that Han, as well as the category Chinese with which it is so intimately connected, is fundamentally different from American conceptions of whiteness, insofar as “‘impurity’ does not automatically exclude one from we-group membership.”

As Teng proceeds to explain, however, the cultural dimensions of Han Chinese take us only so far, as evidenced by the experience of both Irene Cheng and Han Suyin. For both women, biological concepts of pure and impure blood factored heavily. Among the most important factors determining whether others accepted them as Chinese was that of paternal inheritance, that is, the central importance of whether one’s father was or was not Chinese. Despite her complete fluency in all things Chinese, for example, Han Suyin nevertheless encountered those who used her “foreign blood” as a means of excluding her (either wholly or partially) from the category with which she identified. She was, at the end of the day, a hunxue’er—a person of “mixed blood.”
The experience of the Eurasian, Teng concludes, demonstrates that the categories of Han and Chinese are not simply cultural and that the biology/culture dichotomy is a false one. For Teng, the “mixedness” of the Chinese Eurasian “only serves to underscore the importance of ‘blood’ and descent in defining group membership.” Moreover, Teng continues, “Chinese concepts of identity often implicitly link cultural inheritance to genetic inheritance.” Han is a fugitive concept, one that can retreat into biology when pursued from the side of culture, and can retreat into culture when pursued from the side of biology. It straddles the ethnoracial divide, and from this ambivalence derives an elusive resilience.

Han as the Political-Geographic Category of China. If the putatively ethnic category of Han has long been infused with a distinctly bioracial discourse, so too has it been intimately connected to the political-geographic concept “China.” Unlike the two relationships outlined above, however, this particular Han–China connection is not one of interchangeability or transference. On the contrary, the relationship between Han and the Chinese polity is one in which Han derives immense support from its association with Chinese state power, and at the same time finds itself closely monitored and even bound by this very same state power.

To understand the first half of this ambivalent relationship, one in which the category of Han derives resilience through its deep connections with the political-geographic concept of China, we are guided in this volume by Zhihong Chen and her chapter, “‘Climate’s Moral Economy’: Geography, Race, and the Han in Early Republican China.” Chen investigates the role that the discourse of environmental determinism played in the ethnoracial ideology of early twentieth-century Chinese social scientists and nationalists. Drawing on the work of two influential early geographers—Zhu Kezhen (1890–1974) and Zhang Qiyun (1900–1985)—Chen traces the links these and other thinkers drew between bioracial concepts of a Han Chinese people and the territory of China itself, through the bridging concepts of climate and topography. As Chen demonstrates, the discourse of environmental determinism was central to the racial discourse of Han. Chinese geographers drew upon notions of environmental “endowment” popularized by such figures as Robert DeCourcy Ward (1867–1931), with some portraying the “Yellow” Han Chinese race as superior to that of the “white” Euro-Americans in its natural capacity to settle in a wide variety of climates. Unlike the white race, some argued, the Han was endowed with the capacity to weather starkly different environments, ranging from the brutal cold of the northern steppe to the tropical zones of Southeast
Asia. Some nationalists took this idea as an omen of an Asian future, dominated by Han.

To the extent that Han derives political and symbolic power from its deep connection to the Chinese “geo-body,” so too is it bound and confined by this geo-body in ways that require our attention. The clearest way to witness such confinement is by considering what happens to the Han category when we try to take it beyond the political boundaries of either the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China, or to recently reacquired territories such as Hong Kong and Macau. In a word, it disappears. For example, were one forced to assign an ethnonymic term to American Chinatowns, urban enclaves with deep historical connections to traditionally “Han” areas of southeast China, the operative term would not be Han but Tang or Hua (we see this, for example, in the Chinese term for “Chinatown,” Tangren jie, or Tang People Street). In Vietnam, ethnically Chinese citizens are categorized, not as “Han” or as its Vietnamese analog, but rather under the rubric “Hoa” or “Hoa Kieu” (derived from the Chinese terms Hua and Huaqiao). In fact, nowhere besides mainland China and Taiwan does the term “Han” function as an ethnonymic designation. There exists no such thing as “overseas Han.” By contrast, the other categories with which “Han” is so often commensurated—such as “ethnic Chinese”—travels widely and freely across the globe. The same is true of related terms, such as “overseas Chinese” and the “Chinese diaspora.”

The strict political-geographic parameters of “Han” are further illustrated when we consider its counterpart, “Non-Han.” Whereas one might expect “Non-Han” to apply to any and all groups that are not Han—a category that would include not only Chinese minorities but also, let us say, Irish communities in New York—we find that it too is confined to the political territories of mainland China and Taiwan. As a person of mixed western European heritage, for example, I the author am not Han, but I am most certainly not Non-Han. Were I to identify with the identity of Non-Han, I would at the same time be identifying myself implicitly as a citizen of China or Taiwan, insofar as the political and ethnonational concepts are inseparable. By contrast, the category Non-Chinese—which, based on the simple principle of transitivity, theoretically should behave along the same lines as “Non-Han”—is not confined in the same manner. “Non-Chinese” can refer both to Non-Han Chinese minorities and to communities without any political or cultural connections to China.

To understand this second half of the ambivalent relationship between the category of Han and the political-geographic entity of China, we are
Thomas S. Mullaney

guided in this volume by Uradyn E. Bulag and his chapter, “Good Han, Bad Han: The Moral Parameters of Ethnopolitics in China.” As he argues, turn-of-the-century revolutionaries and post-imperial state builders had a troubled and tenuous relationship with the very idea of Han. Initially, revolutionaries fostered and employed it as a radical discourse by which to marshal support against the Manchu Qing. After the revolution, however, the imperatives of consolidation called for the attenuation if not neutralization of Han chauvinism and jingoistic fervor lest these alienate the many other groups in China who were both Non-Han and Non-Manchu (such as the Tibetans and Mongols).30

Following the revolution of 1949, which ushered in Communist rule on the mainland, CCP leaders maintained this vigilant concern over the threat of what they termed “Great Han Chauvinism” (modeled after the Russian-Soviet concept “Great Russian Chauvinism”). Indeed, it is fair to say that “Han Chauvinism” was considered equally if not more threatening to political stability than “Local Nationalism” (i.e., minority nationalism or separatism). As Mao articulated the problem in 1956: “We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich.”31 Confronted with this inescapable political reality—that wherever went China’s Non-Han peoples, so too went vast expanses of territory—the Chinese Communists adopted a posture that, at first glance, seems like an oxymoron: a vociferous opposition to Han hegemony, mounted and policed by a single-Party hegemonic political regime that, by any demographic measure one could imagine, was itself a Han regime. Not only were Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping all members of the Han nationality (as are Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao), but so too has the overwhelming majority of members of the National People’s Congress hailed from the country’s majority nationality.32 Was this not a contradiction in terms?

The Party’s answer to this, as Bulag explains, is in the negative, a stance that they are able to make by way of their invention of a novel ethnopolitical subject position: the “Good Han.” “Good Han” (hao Hanren) was part of what Bulag describes as the Party’s attempt to practice “good ethnicity”: a progressive, cosmopolitan, even transcendent type of Han ethnonational identity that stood apart from its perceived opposite, that of the “Bad Han” (huai Hanren). If “Bad Han” was the Han of assimilationism, bigotry, and chauvinism, “Good Han” was the Han of multinational camaraderie and multiculturalism, of mutual respect and collaborative development, and one that made possible a new form of political alliance: an alliance between
Good Han and Good Non-Han against a common set of politically refracted ethnic enemies, namely, the “Bad Han” or “Great Han Chauvinists” that would seek to make China a country of Han and the “Bad Non-Han” or “Local Nationalists” that would follow the path of “separatism” and “split-tism.” Despite the clear and long-standing complicity between “Han” and the political-geographic entity that is “China,” we can never lose sight of the ways in which the concept of Han has threatened (and continues to threaten) Chinese state stability. It is not a purely symbiotic relationship, insofar as the host is often at risk of being overtaken.

**ANCIENT HERITAGE VERSUS INVENTED TRADITION: THE ORIGINS OF THE HAN CATEGORY**

Having analyzed the ties that bind the category of Han to those of Chinese ethnicity, race, and polity, we turn now to consider Han as a category unto itself—one that, although intimately connected to China, cannot be understood simply as a proxy for China. In doing so, one of the central questions is that of Han origins. Did the category of Han as we understand it today originate in distant antiquity or in the recent past? Does it enjoy an ancient heritage, or is it an invented tradition? This pair of questions can be parsed further to ask: to what extent should we limit our investigation of the “Han minzu” to the specific components that form the compound: Han and minzu. Is it justifiable to seek Han origins avant la lettre, before “Han” was used to refer to, as Elliott phrases it in this volume, “a label for people who, by descent, language, and cultural practice, were recognized as Central Plains dwellers (or their descendants),” and before the rather recent neologism minzu? Is it fair to search through the annals of history in search of categories that “behave” in ways comparable to the modern-day Han, even if they are called Hua, Min, Neidiren, or otherwise? Or, on the other hand, must we place a certain emphasis on discourse, and set our threshold of similarity such that it disallows all but the precise terminological compound “Han minzu”?

In China, the most long-standing and dominant paradigm regarding Han origins is represented in this volume in the chapter by Xu Jieshun, “Understanding the Snowball Theory of the Han Nationality.” Xu, who is the founding director of the Han Nationality Research Center in Guangxi, has long argued on behalf of the antiquity of Han, tracing its origins to the distant recesses of the Chinese past—well before the terms minzu and Han existed or were used in the manner one sees in the contemporary period. In his chapter in this volume, which for many readers will likely
be the most conservative and perhaps controversial piece in the collection, Xu traces what he regards as the origins of Han over three periods. The first encompasses the Xia dynasty (21st c.–18th c. B.C.E.), the Shang dynasty (17th c.–1027 B.C.E.), and the Western Zhou (1122–771 B.C.E.). The second stretches from the Spring and Autumn period (772–476 B.C.E.) to the Qin (221–206 B.C.E.). The third is roughly coterminous with the Western Han (206 B.C.E.–9 C.E.). Dividing his narrative into this tripartite chronology, Xu describes the origins of Han as a process of accretion in which increasing numbers of groups undergo a process of sinicization and amalgamation. Xu Jieshun is not alone in advocating this theory. To the contrary, he has been careful to present himself, not as the originator of this idea, but merely as a vehicle for its elaboration. In particular, Xu cites the eminent sociologist and ethnologist Fei Xiaotong as his intellectual forebear, attributing the name of his theory—the “snowball theory of Han”—to an analogy first made by Fei Xiaotong.36

One of the key dimensions of Xu’s approach to Han is his highly permissive treatment of the term Han itself. Xu does not limit his examination of the “Han minzu” to either of the component terms minzu or Han (the first of which did not appear in Chinese until around the turn of the twentieth century, and the latter of which did not stabilize until the late imperial period). In the Xia, Shang, and Zhou, for example, Xu focuses primarily on the “Huaxia,” a category of identity he regards as the original nucleus of the later Han category. Xu assigns precise populations to the group at different phases of China’s imperial history: 80 million to 90 million in the early Tang; exactly 104,410,000 in the year 1109; 150 million in 1601; and 400 million in 1851.37

Whereas the snowball theory of Han has long enjoyed dominance in mainland Chinese scholarship, serious challenges have been raised. Kai-wing Chow has argued that the Han category of today is just over one century old, having originated in the discourse of antidynastic revolutionaries in the late Qing (1644–1911). Thoroughly disillusioned with the ailing Qing state—headed by Manchu rulers who had conquered the territories of China in the first half of the seventeenth century—radicals such as Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong openly proclaimed their goal of expelling the “barbarians” and restoring China to its rightful owners: the ethnic Chinese, newly conceptualized under the moniker “Hanzu.”38

Unlike Xu and Fei, then, Chow places particular emphasis on what Pierre Bourdieu has called the “symbolic power” of naming.39 For Chow, the neologism “Han minzu” is not a neutral or passive descriptor by which an already existing community was finally referenced but rather an active
ingredient in the formation of this community. For all their resemblance, "Hanmin" and other earlier categories were quite unlike that of "Han minzu," Chow argues, with the former categories being understood as highly malleable and which permitted the inclusion of members based on their ability to master certain cultural practices. By contrast, the new concept of Han minzu, or "Hanzu," exhibited the sort of biological essentialism and exclusionism characteristic of racial categories. Frank Dikötter has argued along similar lines, portraying late imperial revolutionaries as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei as having “reconfigured folk notions of patrilineal descent into a racial discourse which represented all inhabitants of China as the descendants of the Yellow Emperor.”

Dru Gladney has also made such claims, arguing that, while the “notion of Han ren (Han person) has clearly existed for many centuries . . . the notion of Han minzu (Han nationality) is an entirely modern phenomenon, which arose with the shift from Chinese empire to modern nation-state.”

Chow ties this conceptual invention to the political exigencies of the late imperial period, and most directly, to the activities of anti-Manchu/anti-Qing revolutionaries. The concept of Hanzu enabled anti-Manchu radicals to articulate a form of essentialized, unbridgeable difference between the Manchu ruling elite and the non-Manchu imperial subjects that was impossible to argue using the logic and terminology of either traditional, cultural notions of identity or recently imported Social Darwinist conceptualizations in which the world’s population was understood as a hierarchy of white, yellow, black, brown, and red races. The Manchus, as many scholars have observed, had in large part mastered the forms and vocabulary of traditional Chinese regimes, securing their legitimacy through an active patronage of, for example, Confucian ethics and the civil service exam. As such, their rule was difficult if not impossible to delegitimize using culture-based arguments. At the same time, other available avenues of revolutionary discourse—in particular the increasingly global concept of race war articulated in the Social Darwinism of Huxley and others—were similarly insufficient, due to the Manchu’s and Han’s common designation as members of the same “Yellow Race.” To articulate their anti-Manchu stance, Chow argues, the revolutionaries imagined into existence the novel, culturalist-cum-racial concept of Hanzu, a form of “Han racism,” designed to “undermine the reformists’ ground for continual support for the Manchu regime.”

Outfitted with this amalgamated idea of culture-race, Liang Qichao and others were able to articulate their opposition to Manchu rule as the cultural equivalent of racial struggle.

Here we arrive at an impasse, with one group of scholars arguing for
the ancient origins of Han and the other for quite modern ones—arguments articulated, as we have seen, via the former camp’s highly flexible treatment of discourse and the latter camp’s emphasis on the symbolic and causal power of language. In our attempt to navigate this highly polarized historiography, we are helped by two of the authors in this volume. First, in her chapter, “Antiquarian as Ethnographer: Han Ethnicity in Early China Studies,” Tamara Chin draws upon the insights of both sides of this debate to offer a bifocal analysis of Han origins. Through one lens, Chin focuses on the longue durée of Chinese history, employing the same ancient Chinese sources that one finds in the work of Xu Jieshun and his cohort. Through her second lens, however, Chin also investigates the history of discursive and epistemological paradigms through which, at different points in history, such questions of origin and ancient identity have been posed and answered. In particular, she examines classical studies, archaeology, and ethnology. Drawing insight and inspiration from Jean Comaroff, Chin argues on behalf of “a dialogic ethnographic relation between the observer and the observed” in which we focus, not exclusively on either discourse or practice, but on the relationship between “the antiquarian and the archive.” Scholars within the tradition of classical studies developed theories based on their own assumptions about cultural transformability, as well as on their own assumptions about what dimensions of experience did and did not constitute evidence worthy of analysis. In later periods, archaeologists and ethnologists developed still different theories of origin and ancient identity, ones grounded in their own particular sets of assumptions. As this bifocal analysis reveals, the question of Han origins can never be separated from its historical context and should always be considered as a function of a relationship between presents and pasts. In this respect, Chin does not refute so much as reconcile the observations of Fei Xiaotong and Xu Jieshun, on the one hand, and those of Kai-wing Chow and Dru Gladney, on the other.

A similarly bifocal approach is advocated by Nicholas Tapp in his chapter, “The Han Joker in the Pack: Some Issues of Culture and Identity from the Minzu Literature.” Like Kai-wing Chow, Dru Gladney, and others, Tapp emphasizes the significance of the modern provenance of the term minzu, proposing that this new concept “changes the nature of the playing field entirely”—a claim that is well supported when one considers the history of the term and its East Asian analogs (minzoku in Japan, minjok in Korea). In Japan, as Kevin Doak explains, the term minzoku underwent important and sometimes thorough transmutations, at one point used to legitimate the Japanese colonial empire and then, after 1945, repurposed by
scholars in an effort to distance the discipline of ethnology (*minzokugaku*) from the legacy of Japanese militarism. For turn-of-the-century Korean nationalists such as Sin Ch’aeho, the articulation and narrative elaboration of *minjok* represented what Andre Schmid has described as “the rediscovery of an objective unit that centuries of historians before him had failed to recognize,” and an entity without which history itself did not exist.\(^47\) In China, the term “*minzu*” was at the center of a fierce ethnopolitical struggle between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists over the essential nature of the Chinese nation.\(^48\) For all of these reasons, the history of the discourse of *minzu, minzoku,* and *minjok* constitutes a vibrant and highly contested conceptual terrain in its own right. These terms are not simply neutral nomenclature through which “real” histories were articulated. Rather, discourses of race and ethnicity, and in particular the historical vicissitudes of load-bearing concepts such as *minzu,* have to be considered in our analysis of the people and communities whose lives are being described and prescribed by such discourses.\(^49\)

While recognizing the significance of the neologism *minzu,* however, Tapp ultimately stands at a critical distance with respect to both Chow and Gladney. Rather than portray the emergence of *minzu* as a break with the past—as a discursive formation that completely displaced earlier modes of collective identity—Tapp argues that the fuller significance of *minzu* is the way in which it has formed the governing logic of a new ethnopolitical environment in which “prior forms of social difference rearrange themselves in relation to the new terms.”\(^50\) This new discourse of *minzu* permeates, fuses with, and in some cases entirely refashions on-the-ground cultural relations to the point where, as Tapp contends, “a new configuration of cultural identity and social difference is brought about, in which ethnic and minzu identity is almost inextricably intertwined.”\(^51\)

With such considerations in mind, then, the present volume represents an attempt to move beyond the binary “new Han” and “ancient Han.” For those who emphasize the centrality of discourse, this volume challenges us to engage seriously with the idea of Han *avant la lettre.* At the same time, it cautions us to avoid simplistic commensurations between “Han” and premodern categories of identity that bear some relation with it (e.g., Hua, Huaxia, Min). The same holds true for the category of *minzu,* a modern neologism whose historical significance is occluded when we commensurate it with earlier notions of collectivity (*zhong, lei,* etc.). Incorporating both approaches, then, the goal of a Critical Han Studies subfield is to take these premodern categories seriously while critically investigating their historical relationship to the contemporary category of Han.
CONVERGENCE VERSUS DIFFERENTIATION: 
THE PROBLEM OF HAN FORMATION

Closely connected to the problem of Han origins is the problem of Han formations. To understand the dominant paradigm of Han ethnogenesis, we must return once again to the chapter in this volume by Xu Jieshun. As noted above, Xu is among the most recent and prolific members of a long scholarly lineage, one that traces the origins of Han to the most distant recesses of the ancient past. Within this paradigm, Han ethnogenesis is understood as a multi-millennium process of aggregation (hence the image of an ever-rolling, ever-expanding snowball that is formed through its encounter with, and interiorization of, once exterior entities). Among Xu’s intellectual forebears, this same theory has been framed in slightly different terms, sometimes as “plurality and unity” (duoyuan yiti), other times as “integrated ethnic heterogeneity” (heji cuoza zhi zu), and elsewhere simply as “sinicization.” Specific terminology notwithstanding, such descriptions of Han ethnogenesis are based on the idea that Han possesses what Xu describes as the “rare ability to absorb”—a unique magnetism whereby, to borrow the language of one of Xu’s intellectual predecessors, increasing numbers of “you-groups” are gradually enveloped and made part of the ever-expanding Han “we-group” category.

Among those who argue on behalf of a more recent provenance of the Han category, we encounter a remarkably different set of paradigms, orientations, and commitments. One of the most important is the idea that, when examining the emergence, formation, and stabilization of a given identity, it is necessary to, as Fredrik Barth has framed it most succinctly, “shift the focus of investigation from internal constitution and history of separate groups to ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance.” As another scholar has framed it, identity is “essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group.” A set of people who, to an outsider, might appear to share a great deal in common linguistically, culturally, or otherwise can through acts of “ascription and identification” just as readily organize themselves into a multiplicity of communities. And for those who, from an exogenous perspective, might seem to differ markedly from one another, can just as readily converge upon a common identity. From this perspective, identity formation is a process that takes place “between and not inside” communities of people, with stable categories of identity being the products of interaction wherein selves and others form through simultaneous processes of identification and differentiation.

For scholars who regard ethnicity from this vantage point, the question
of Han ethnogenesis takes shape very differently than in the “magnetic Han” paradigm. Rather than ask, Who has been absorbed to create Han? the question becomes, In response or contradistinction to whom was Han first articulated as a relevant category? While scholars have proposed different answers to this question, nevertheless there exists a certain basic consensus: namely, that the category of Han has taken shape by means of a “default contrast with all other ethnic groups,” ⁵⁹ is a by-product of “internal orientalism,” ⁶⁰ and is a “residual category comprised of all those who were not barbarians.” ⁶¹ In this way, Han representation of non-Han groups “reflects the objectivizing of a ‘majority’ nationality discourse that parallels the valorization of gender and political hierarchies.” ⁶² Phrased differently, this approach views Han, one might say, as “Non-Non-Han”: a formation of selfhood achieved by means of the representation of one’s Other. ⁶³

As the reader no doubt gleans from these passages, this approach to Han draws heavily upon Edward Said’s seminal text Orientalism, applying Said’s analysis of the West/East binary to that of Han/Non-Han. In much the same way that Said’s Orientalists were, through their representations of the “Orient,” engaging in the formation of “a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans,” ⁶⁴ members of the Han majority are understood here as constituting their own identity by means of representing their imagined alter ego, the Non-Han. Whereas Han stereotypes may differ depending on the particular Non-Han group in question—with some groups being considered “colorful” and “harmless” (the Yi and Naxi) and others troublesome and “resistant” (Wa, Hui, and Tibetan)—nevertheless, all of these representations of minorities are, for scholars who advance this theory of Han, ultimately Han imaginings projected upon minority communities for the purpose of an inverted self-representation. ⁶⁵

In our attempt to navigate these competing views of Han ethnogenesis—one that portrays it as a long durée process of coagulation extending back many millennia, and the other locating it in a much more contemporary process of differentiation—we are guided by four of the contributing authors. Taken together, these chapters trace a long historical arc that in many ways reconciles, not only the opposing sides of the convergence-differentiation binary, but also the ancient-modern binary around which it is centered. In the first of these chapters, “Hushuo: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese,” Mark Elliott places the Barthian problematic familiar to the “new Han” or “Han as Non-Non-Han” school within a historical period more typically associated with the “ancient” or “magnetic Han” approach of Fei Xiaotong, Xu Jieshun, and others. Adopting Barth’s approach to boundary formation, Elliott poses the ques-
tion: “who is (or was) the Other to the Han Self?” The Other he has in mind is not a generic or transtemporal “Non-Han” identity, however, but rather the foundational Other, the first Other in contradistinction to which the category of Han began to take shape along the lines we now recognize as ethnic.

In his search for the original distinction, Elliott identifies as the most likely candidate the “Northern Other” around the time of the Wei dynasty (386–534), the “nomadic pastoralists living north of the central plains, in early times known in the Chinese language most familiarly as Hu, and by other names as well, such as Fan, Yi, and Lu.” He proposes that the use of “Han” in an ethnonymic rather than political sense—that is, as a community sharing certain perceived connections of language, culture, and so forth, rather than simply political subjects of a particular dynastic regime—was not an invention of those who would come to be designated as Han. Instead, Elliott argues that “Han was a Hu proposition” and that “the ethnic unity of the Chinese as seen in the adoption of Han to describe themselves is really more the product of repeated efforts to create and foster political unity than it is the source of that unity.”

Elliott does not permit his concern with origins to become a preoccupation, however, and is quick to point out that Han-as-ethnonym, while first proposed by the Hu, fell out of use in the centuries following. Displacing “Han” was the category “Hua,” which, like Han, was also not restricted to political subjects but designated a community of people conceptualized along linguistic, cultural, and genealogical lines.

In his chapter, “From Subjects to Han: The Rise of Han as Identity in Nineteenth-Century Southwest China,” C. Patterson Giersch picks up on the story of Han where Elliott leaves off, albeit in a different part of the empire and many centuries later. Building on his pathbreaking work on the southwestern-most corner of the empire in the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), Giersch shows how the category of Han came to be used by immigrant groups during the course of their competition with indigenous communities for economic resources. Originally, these communities had identified not as Han but as people of particular native places back in the Chinese interior. It was only when these native-place communities saw the strategic value of a pan-regional alliance that they began to employ “Han” in a broader, ethnonymic manner similar to that of the contemporary period, and the period outlined by Elliott. Taking account of both Elliott’s and Giersch’s insights, then, we begin to appreciate how the formation of a Han category at a given point in history did not ensure its even persistence through time. In Elliott’s historical period, we witness a time
before the inception of Han-as-ethnonym, its early formulation, and then its subsequent disappearance. In the later period examined by Giersch, we also witness a time when Han-as-ethnonym was not a salient category of collective identity, followed by its emergence under a very particular set of political and economic circumstances.

In his chapter, “Searching for Han: Early Twentieth-Century Narratives of Chinese Origins and Development,” James Leibold offers an analysis that in many ways connects the imperial periods addressed by Elliott, Giersch, and Xu and the post-imperial period examined by Gladney, Chow, and others. In the work of the early twentieth-century theorists addressed by Leibold, we begin to see the bridge between the inchoate collectivities that were invoked and abandoned situationally by the actors in Elliott’s and Giersch’s chapters and the more vociferously articulated, elaborated, and defended concept examined by those who emphasize the modern provenance of the Han category. The category that Leibold’s theorists were engaged in building was no longer a matter of temporary, political expediency—an way of marshaling greater forces for the purposes of expropriation. While no doubt still grounded in this network of political and economic relationships, in the early twentieth century the categories of Han, Hua, and others begin to take on much deeper symbolic meanings. In fleshing out what they saw as the essence of this category, the theorists in Leibold’s study were engaged in what might be termed the “ideological work” of fortifying the Han category.

At the same time, this emerging family of categories was by no means standardized, even at this late date. Leibold traces three forks in the road where theorists of this massive collectivity debated its attributes and arrived at different conclusions. Was it of foreign origin, or was it indigenous to the soil of modern-day China? Was it monogenic or polygenic? Was it singular or plural? In each case, the diversity of responses outlined by Leibold prompts us to view the early twentieth-century concept of Han as unstable, one that had yet to acquire a definite shape. At the same time, this diversity of conceptualizations of Han was undergirded by a shared and expanding consensus about the existence of some sort of massive category of collective identity, the contours of which coincided to a significant extent with the boundaries of the Han category as it is understood today. There was by this time, it seems, an imagined community in search of a name.

Finally, Christopher Vasantkumar encourages us to reconsider long-held assumptions regarding the unidirectionality and inevitability of Hanization, training his focus on subsets of the Chinese majority he describes
as culturally, linguistically, and regionally “out-of-place.” Centered in northwest China, Vasantkumar’s chapter, “Han at Minzu’s Edges: What Critical Han Studies Can Learn from China’s ‘Little Tibet,’” concentrates on those members of the Han who operate in social and cultural contexts where they constitute the minority, and where divisions between Han and Non-Han are far more ambiguous than in “China proper.” Inspired by the work of Robert Ekvall, Vasantkumar emphasizes the importance of examining cultural relationships “not just between people who would now be classed as members of separate minzu, but, compellingly, between peoples who would now be classed as members of the same ethnic grouping.” By doing so, the author argues, one finds “complex ways in which inter- and intra-minzu relations and distinctions result in the emergence of unstable blocs of sentiment, belonging and exclusion.” One such complex bloc is the important common ground Vasantkumar discovers between local Han and Tibetans, one founded positively via each community’s reliance on the local lingua franca of the Amdo Tibetan dialect, as well as negatively by means of their shared distrust and prejudice toward the local Hui community. As Vasantkumar argues, such common grounds would likely escape our analysis should we adhere to the strict, minzu-based model that prompts us to assume that “ethnic relations” always entails those relationships that obtain between the different, recognized minzu of the PRC. Vasantkumar’s fieldwork also highlights what he terms the “differences between local Han and their more urban(e) coethnics,” differences that derive from matters of economic class and region. As the author argues, there are strong cultural, even ethnic, differences between urban and rural Han, with the latter often being “lumped in with minorities in contradistinction to developed urbanites.” The study of Han therefore depends upon examining this category in situ rather than in abstraction.

The three issues examined here are central to the analysis of Han, but by no means do they exhaust the problematic in its entirety. There remain vitally important problems that will require our attention, not the least of which center on questions of gender, language, diaspora, and comparative studies of Han alongside other global majority and/or hegemonic categories of identity. The scope of any one volume is necessarily limited, however, and thus we leave this essential work to others. With these issues and caveats in mind, then, we now turn to the eleven studies that together comprise our exploration of this new domain of critical inquiry.
Anthropologists of China’s fifty-five minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu) have, over the last twenty years or so, often been confronted by accusations of impropriety—in the sense of divergence from accepted practice—the likes of which their counterparts who study the fifty-sixth minzu, the majority Han, have rarely been forced to confront. Even as scholars such as Patricia Berger, Pamela Crossley, Prasenjit Duara, Mark Elliott, James Millward, and Peter Purdue have foregrounded the degree to which the contemporary human landscape of the People’s Republic is the complex product of the transition from the Manchu-ruled Qing empire to a formally multinational but in practice Han-dominated nation-state, many anthropologists have remained wedded to Cold War-era notions of an isomorphism between Han culture and China.¹ Such visions of Chineseness as Hanness with local characteristics emerged in the context of research conducted by scholars such as G. William Skinner, Maurice Freedman, and Myron Cohen in the “residual Chinas”² that remained open to foreign fieldworkers after the fall of the Bamboo Curtain in 1949: Taiwan, the New Territories of Hong Kong, and the overseas communities of Southeast Asia, or the nanyang. By the time mainland China reopened to foreign anthropologists

---

CHINAS (IM)PROPER AND HAN OUT OF PLACE

11. Han at Minzu’s Edges

*What Critical Han Studies Can Learn from China’s “Little Tibet”*

Chris Vasantkumar

I have tried to maintain the gap I perceive between the certainty encompassed by experts’ designations of “racial” and the uncertainty or instability of deployments of the term by “natives.” Certainty established one day could dissolve the next. This instability in local readings of the racial leads me to suspect that people are provisional in their racial assessments in a way that is missed, overlooked, or underestimated by most social scientists.

John Hartigan Jr., *Racial Situations*
in the early 1980s, a disciplinary common sense had emerged that held that an essentialized vision of Chinese culture as primarily encapsulated in family structure, lineage organization, ancestor worship, and other traditional religious practices was the proper object of anthropological study.

When anthropologists returned en masse to the PRC in the 1980s they were confronted with a version of Chineseness, the multi-“ethnic” legacy of Qing state building, that bore very little resemblance to Cold War visions of essentialized (Han) Chinese culture. One of the consequences of this disjuncture for the nascent field of Chinese minority studies was a constant questioning of the fundamental appropriateness—the propriety, in other words—of such inquiries by more established sectors of the discipline. Indeed, the frosty response to anthropological studies of Chinese minority nationalities has become something of a recurrent trope in the various monographs that have emerged on the subject since the publication of Dru Gladney’s pathbreaking *Muslim Chinese* in 1991.

The following example from the introduction to Erik Mueggler’s superb ethnography, *The Age of Wild Ghosts*, is representative enough. Mueggler recounts some of the rejoinders leveled at his project by unnamed doyens of the China Studies establishment. “‘Why study a minority when we know so little about the Han?’ an eminent economic historian of China asked me,” he writes. “‘It’s all very interesting, but is it China?’ commented an ascendant anthropologist of China after a presentation on ritual in Zhizuo [his field site].” Mueggler suggests that this sort of suspicion about the appropriateness of studying China’s minority nationalities has been fostered by a sense that the study of any locale or people is relevant only insofar as it sheds light on an implicitly Han Chinese cultural whole. “Studies of people now identified as ‘minority nationalities,’ it is assumed, can make little contribution to this enterprise. These peoples are either culturally distinct and thus not ‘Chinese,’ or they are in the process of being ‘sinicized’ and thus neither reliable representatives of Chineseness nor very interesting on their own.”

Alongside this wariness regarding the ability of anthropological studies of minority nationalities to contribute to understandings of Chinese culture as a whole—the notion that only studies of the Han can contribute to knowledge of “China Proper”—there is also a parallel if less commented upon sense that the proper subject of anthropological studies of minority areas—of “China Improper” if you will—are minorities exclusively and not local Han who may happen to dwell in such regions. Compare Mueggler’s account with the following passage from Mette Hansen’s recent book, *Frontier People*, about Han settlers in minority areas.
Most Chinese ethnologists working in minority areas are concerned with minorities’ cultural practices, and when presenting and explaining my topic of research in minority areas, or to people engaged with local minority policy and research, I often met reactions of surprise as to why I would not rather choose to focus on a minority. Minorities, I was often told, were “interesting” because they had “rich and colorful customs” which were unlike those of the Han and unlike my own—in other words, they were not “modern.” One Han cadre explained [to] me that the Han “were nothing special” (mei shenme teshu de). One American anthropologist on the other hand laughingly said that he felt sorry for me having actually to do fieldwork among Han.8

At least two things should be readily apparent here. First, the division of labor between Han studies and minority studies that has historically shaped Chinese social science has to some degree been perpetuated in the practices of foreign scholars. Second, Han living in minority areas are the group that is rendered most invisible by the intersection of these disciplinary senses of propriety. Han in such places are, by virtue of their being out-of-place, unable to tell us anything about normative Hanness or Chineseness, nor can they be seen as contributing in any meaningful fashion to our understanding of minority places.9 This chapter seeks to both redress this invisibility of marginal Han in minority places and to argue for the importance of such interstitial groups to Critical Han Studies as an emergent intellectual project in no small part because they push us to reevaluate the usual forms of groupness (i.e., minzu) used to make sense of difference in contemporary China.

In this chapter I hope to accomplish two related but relatively distinct tasks: first, I seek to push China anthropology in general and Critical Han Studies in particular past a rigidly minzu-centric framework toward a more supple understanding of the textures and contexts of social difference in contemporary China that conceptualizes minzu as one of several crucial elements in composite, shifting, and situational constellations of social difference. Second, I want to bring recent work on the analytic dangers of abstract racial categories in the United States to bear on nascent projects of thinking through the racialness10 (or at least the minzu-ness) of the Han as an unmarked, majority category in the contemporary PRC. Doing so may help us avoid some of the more totalizing errors that have dogged Whiteness Studies in the United States. The element that binds these two projects together is an emphasis on the “local settings in which racial [and other intersecting] identities are articulated, reproduced, and contested.”11 This is not to suggest that minzu or race is inherently local12
but to note instead that translocal theories and practices of social difference are localized in particular ways; that accommodations with national policy or transnational terms are made on local among other terrains.

The balance of this chapter is divided into two parts. The first counterpoises John Hartigan Jr.’s recent work on whiteness in Detroit with ethnographic examples drawn from my fieldwork in northwest China. Read together, these different cases highlight the complex ways in which inter- and intragroup relations and distinctions result in the emergence of unstable blocs of sentiment, belonging, and exclusion. I focus particularly on how the processes by which local Han and Tibetans come to recognize common ground in their mutual distrust of the Hui simultaneously highlight the differences between local Han and their more urban(e) coethnics. The second half of the chapter employs a description of the sites and practices in which we can see the emergence of a tentative, ad hoc regional identity based on locally specific linguistic competence as an entry to an elaboration of a possible methodology for treating such emergent communities of sentiment or practice that goes beyond minzu-centric typologies to analyze the manifold factors of social difference that shape participation in new composite “units of common participation.”

THEORETICAL DIS-ORIENTATIONS: WHITENESS OUT OF PLACE

John Hartigan Jr.’s work on whiteness in Detroit has compelling resonances with my studies of quotidian interethnic interaction—of the Han, that is, as one minzu among many—in Xiahe, a small, primarily Tibetan, Han, and Hui town in Gansu Province’s Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Hartigan focuses on whites in a context where whiteness is not hegemonic: blackness is locally dominant. Hartigan is careful to note that “this is not to make the absurd assertion that whiteness is irrelevant in Detroit.” Instead, he suggests, “its operations do not possess a generically ‘unmarked’ or ‘normative’ character.” As a result, the out-of-placeness of whiteness, the markedness of the usually unmarked, highlights the degree to which normative, totalizing abstractions of black and white fail to capture the complex lived experience of what he calls the “racial-ness of whites,” not just in Detroit, but in America more generally. “Since whiteness assumes a static order of white dominance and black subordination,” he writes, “I find the racialness of whites to be a more relevant subject of inquiry.” For Hartigan, the move from whiteness to the racialness of whites is meant to denote a movement from static abstractions to
dynamic, lived, provisional workings out of social difference in particular contexts. The import of this shift is twofold: it bears both specifically on my own research in an out-of-the-way,¹⁹ minority-Han place on China’s northwest periphery and more generally on the matter of what the vicissitudes of whiteness as an analytic of social differentiation in America can teach scholars attempting to construct Critical Han Studies on an analogous basis. In place of static abstractions of Han and non-Han, Hartigan’s example suggests that sinologists might benefit from addressing the dynamic and disordered minzu-ness of the Han.

Hartigan seeks to trouble static, settled conceptions of racial categories in the United States, suggesting that “considering the specific circumstances of racial situations . . . can counter the allegorical tendencies that render people’s lives as abstractions, such as ‘white’ and ‘black.’”²⁰ I propose that heeding Hartigan’s suggestion may be of assistance in unpacking what Stevan Harrell has called the “‘thusness’ about Hanness that resists analysis or even data-gathering.”²¹ Harrell himself notes the parallelism between the categories in question: “Hanness is like Whiteness in the United States; it is an unmarked characteristic that can be delineated only in contrast to an ethnic other.”²² Yet Hartigan departs from Harrell’s formulation on two significant counts. Where the latter focuses specifically on intergroup distinctions in a primarily ethnic idiom, the former argues cogently for an attention, first, to class²³ and other forms of difference that are complexly entangled with ethnoracial²⁴ categories—attention, in other words, to composite idioms of intergroup distinction—and, second, to the role played by intra-racial distinctions in the constructions of notions of self and other, of marked and unmarked.

Ethnoracial forms of identification such as minzu are fundamentally not disentangle-able from other manifold axes of differentiation that co-occur in locally conditioned contexts. Yet, Hartigan laments, analysts of whiteness in the United States have been far too hasty to buy into the “abstract racial figures” that dominate thought on race in the United States, “condensing the specificities of peoples’ lives into strictly delimited categories—‘whites’ and ‘blacks,’ to name the most obvious.”²⁵ In place of these received abstractions, Hartigan argues for “grasping the instances and situations in which the significance of race spills out of the routinized confines of these absolute figures” in order to “begin to rethink the institutionalization of racial difference and similarity.”²⁶ In place of an uncritical use of received categories, he proposes an inductive method that “resist[s] the urge to draw abstract conclusions” about social categories.²⁷
While he refers to whiteness and blackness, his insights can be profitably extended to Hanness, which, Harrell reminds us, is besieged by similar sorts of conceptual absolutes. Adapting Hartigan’s project to the terrain of Han Studies involves replacing (or at least supplementing) efforts to “establish what makes Whiteness [Hanness] unique,” with attention to its heterogeneity and implication in larger matrices of social differentiation. In doing so we can prevent Critical Han Studies from being burdened with totalizing categories that overdetermine local instances of ambiguity. We can keep the categories from preforming the terrain of inquiry. If we fail in this endeavor we will not so much be analyzing as producing a particular vision of the topography of human difference in contemporary China.

In advocating this sort of approach, I am not suggesting that racialized abstractions like black and white, Han and minority, can simply be dropped from the picture. The local negotiation of racial, or minzu, meanings is itself shaped by the abstractions of received categories. The point, instead, is to note that these abstractions are not the only game in town and indeed that local social interactions can “reveal the wide gap between the clarity of racial [or minzu] abstractions and the often confusing contingencies of everyday life.” Anthropologists and other scholars of China would be well served to open their analyses to the possibility that much like race in Hartigan’s account, minzu “is negotiated through rhetorical identities and labels that hold ‘open an interpretive space in which everyday events are taken as a test of principles, and . . . “meanings” are asserted not in the certainty of an indicative mode that claims to fully represent objects but in the indeterminacy of the subjunctive mode of ‘as if.’” In such a situation, the “ability to think through or negotiate the significance of race [minzu] . . . develops out of recursive readings of events in everyday life. . . . [W]hat [one] find[s] out about race in one situation shapes how [one] engage[s] in subsequent social interactions.” In place of a hard-and-fast coherence of abstract categories, Hartigan proposes a situational and case-based approach to make sense of racial (and, by extension, minzu) discourses and processes.

Below, I present an extended treatment of what one might call “minzu situations,” which I then analyze with an eye toward the ways in which the contingencies of everyday life and of “local sociality” muddy the abstractions of received categories. Before I turn to an extended treatment of ethnographic examples, however, a further word about the local is in order. In Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, Stevan Harrell notes the following evolution in his understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and the local.
When I first wrote, in a very formulaic and simplistic manner about the specific local contexts of ethnic relations [“Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State”], I ended up by paraphrasing the former U.S. House Speaker Tip O’Neill, proclaiming that “all ethnicity is local.” Like O’Neill discussing politics, I suspect, I was speaking a half-truth to emphasize a point. All ethnicity is local, in the sense that every person who considers him or herself a member of an ethnic collectivity does so in the context of interaction in a local community. But at the same time, all ethnicity, like all politics, is not just local. People in the modern world of nation-states are members of nationally—and often internationally defined ethnic collectivities of which their local communities are a part, and the dialectical interaction between local, national and cosmopolitan discourses is what shapes their lives as ethnic citizens of modern nations.\(^{34}\)

I dwell on this point at length because I want to be very careful to emphasize in my discussion of the contingencies and complications of Hanness and other minzu-nesses on local terrain that I am conceptualizing the local not as characterized by separation from the wider world but as signaling particular instances of the localization of thoughts, practices, and institutions that exist and circulate simultaneously on a multiplicity of spatial scales. As Harrell notes later in *Ways of Being Ethnic*, “ethnic identity and ethnic relations for the Han communities around Liangshan are compounded of local, everyday relations between themselves and their minzu neighbors, mixed with their ideological connection to that billion-strong constructed entity known as the Han people.”\(^{35}\) Hanness and other minzu-nesses are negotiated dialectically in the context of particular articulations between local and more-than-local frameworks—at the intersection, in Andersonian terms, of imagined and face-to-face communities.\(^{36}\) Indeed, a salient feature of the minzu situations I detail below is the way in which local and translocal frameworks do not simply crosscut but actively short circuit each other such that the factors that shape comities between Han and Tibetans in Gannan are used by cosmopolitan Han from elsewhere as evidence of their fundamental difference from and superiority to both minority nationalities and their own peasant coethnics. Local inter-minzu comities in other words can be productive of (and be products of) translocal intra-minzu distinctions. With this caveat in mind, I now turn to ethnographic examples of minzu situations in and around Gannan.

**LOCAL ENMITIES AND COMITIES**

First, a comment on the nature of these ethnographic examples. Below I present multiple incidents in succession with a minimum of intervening
I do so for a number of reasons. First, I defer more formal discussion of each incident in order to, as Hartigan puts it in the epigraph to this chapter, “maintain the gap I perceive between the certainty encompassed by experts’ designations of ‘racial’ and the uncertainty or instability of deployments of the term by ‘natives.’” Second, rather than immediately “cooking” these relatively “raw” ethnographic moments into familiar, formalized abstractions, I want to let the contours of locals’ racial understandings emerge through an accumulation of detail, piling multiple cases up against each other to give the reader a sense of the confluences and divergences of local minzu situations.

One evening in mid-November 2003, I was sitting in an Internet café on the main street in Xiahe, talking, in Mandarin, to the Han laoban (boss) and a Tibetan policeman, both in their early to mid-twenties, both fluent in Amdo Tibetan (though only the latter was able to read it). They were asking me about studying Tibetan in America, and I told them that in most instances what was taught was not the Amdo but the Lhasa dialect. In response to this, the laoban observed, “When we speak [Amdo dialect], Lhasa people can understand a little bit, but when they speak we cannot understand at all.” He and the policeman both agreed that Amdo-ge is the “Mandarin (putonghua, lit., “common language”) of this region. After this discussion, I turned to e-mail, and the policeman watched the laoban play a medieval quest–themed game. After a few minutes, two foreigners came in and promptly left in a huff when they weren’t able to be seated next to each other (because one of the computers wasn’t working properly). Before they stormed out, they asked in Chinese, “Why are all Chinese people no good?!?” (Wei shenme suoyoude Zhongguoren buxing?!).

Naturally this prompted the laoban and the police officer to try to figure out where these impatient foreigners were from. Despite my protestations that they in fact had been speaking Spanish to each other, after some deliberation the cop and the laoban reached the conclusion that they had to be Israelis. From there, my attention waned, though I was vaguely aware that the conversation had turned to Arabs, Palestine, and Arafat. Eventually, the cop turned to me, drew my attention, and whispered conspiratorially, “The Hui are the ones we Tibetans dislike the most” (Women Zangzu zui bu xihuan de shi Huizu). When queried as to why, his reply was to the point: “Religious differences” (zongjiao butong).

Around the same time, I discussed intermarriage and other aspects of interethnic relations with Wenhe, a Han hotel caretaker married to a Tibetan woman.
CV: How did your parents react to your wanting to marry Drolkar? Did you have any trouble?

WH: At first they were opposed, my father especially, but I said, “Hanzu are people, and Tibetans are people too! We’re basically the same.” Eventually my family welcomed her, but by that point, my father had died.

CV: Would it have been possible for you to marry a Hui?

WH: No, not at all! Han marrying Tibetans is very common, but both Han and Tibetan steer well clear of such interactions with the Hui.

CV: Why?

WH: Because of religious differences: Han are Daoist, Tibetans are Buddhist, Hui are Muslim. You could even marry a Christian but not a Hui.

CV: Why not?

WH: Well, for starters they are different from us—we don’t have culture. We aren’t worldly wise. Their brains on the other hand are sharp (Women meiyou wenhua, meiyou jianshi. Tamen naozi hao). And . . . they don’t eat pork! The Han eat pork. Do you eat pork? [You eat pork, don’t you?]

CV: Yes, of course I eat pork. But you have Hui friends, don’t you?

WH: Yes.

CV: Well, what are they like?

WH: They’re okay, I guess, but their hearts are all about money. Money is their real friend (Qian shi tamen de pengyou). They are like Easterners in the sense that they will swindle you (qipianle ni) and then act as if nothing happened. Han and Tibetan aren’t like that: friendship comes before money.

Later, we shifted to talking about Iraq and the terrible stories of American soldiers dying every day. And he talked about China being peaceful:

America seems so violent, but China is peaceful. To keep it this way it is important to have a Han ruler. All the emperors and chairmen have been Han, and that is important because we Han (women da Hanzu; lit., “us folks of the great Han nationality”) are honest (chengshi) and treat all people the same. Now if you had a Hui in charge [as was the case in the warlord era of the early twentieth century] they would put the Hui first and everyone else second. Some minority nationalities are fierce or hard to deal with (lihai) because their brains are so simple (jiandan). They just do as they please and only listen to authority when it suits them (suibian bu ting hua).
CV: I’m surprised you feel such enmity towards the Hui. Where does that all come from?

WH: Well, they are fierce: in 1923 when my grandfather was young, they came down from Linxia and killed many Han. And nowadays they make a killing in business.

Xiao Liao is a Han teacher in his mid-twenties who originally hails from near Linxia—the center of Islamic culture in Gansu. Linxia and its environs are places that Xiahe Tibetans experience with uniform discomfort: cultural differences and Hui hard-sell commercial tactics combine to inculcate a powerful dislike. Xiao Liao on the other hand thinks of Linxia as home. Still, he could confirm the powerful social strictures that keep Han and Zang separate from the Hui. The village where his family currently lives is split roughly fifty-fifty between Han and Hui, and the relationship between members of the two minzu is “peaceful.” The Hui there don’t celebrate Spring Festival (Chunjie); “They have their own New Year.” Even though the relationship between minzu is peaceful, intermarriage between Han and Hui simply does not happen. When queried as to why not, he replied, “They have their own way of life. They don’t eat pork.” And it’s hard to overcome the weight of custom—the long tradition of Han marrying Han. “Even a very modern person” would find it too hard to contemplate. Xiao Liao had been teaching English and Chinese at the Tibetan middle school in Xiahe for over a year (in fact he attended Gansu College of Technology at the same time as Teacher Dorje) and had gained some insight into local conditions. I asked him about Han-Tibetan intermarriage in Xiahe, and he said examples were “very few,” but he was quick to add that Han and Tibetan life is very similar. “We both believe in Buddhism,” he said. The only difference is the extent or depth of belief (i.e., Tibetans believe more).

Dorje, a Tibetan primary school teacher in a nearby village, described a similar sense of “religious comity” between Tibetans and local Han, though he qualified this observation with the suggestion that despite such a convergence, intergroup boundaries remain difficult to overcome. Still, relations between Han and Tibetans were far more amicable than those between Tibetans and Hui. Teacher Dorje told me that in the town where he grew up, in nomad country, there used to be several Hui families who ran restaurants. When they spoke they sounded just like Tibetan nomads. They even looked like nomads. Now his hometown is purely Tibetan; once transportation improved, the Hui moved to larger population centers. He
had a friend he went to school with who was Hui. His family moved to Labrang (i.e., Xiahe) a while back. In places with small populations, minzu are often schooled together because it would be too difficult logistically to set up parallel school systems for such a small number of people.

We talked more about Hui–Tibetan relationships. On an individual basis, Hui are fine and can even be pleasant: Lao Ma, who runs the shop that backs onto the Drolkar Guesthouse, for example, is a good guy: “Whenever I go to buy something, he is always joking.” Problems arise in Teacher Dorje’s estimation when you have to deal with people on a collective basis because of “religious differences.” With regard to religion, Tibetans and Han are the same: both are Buddhist. But the Hui have their own thought (sixiang) and habits (xiguan). As a result there is room for misunderstanding. There is no attempt at conversion, but still there is little understanding on either side. Interestingly, this rhetoric of clear differences in thought (and in kinds of thought) and habit as the basis for the failure of intergroup communication is strikingly similar to that used by Han urbanites to explain the backwardness of Tibetan nomads and nomad places.

In terms of the connections between the Han and Tibetans, the differences are less pronounced. Still, very few people have any understanding that can cross the boundaries between communities. When I ask about differences within the Tibetan community, Dorje plays them down—“First is religion”—as all Tibetans here are, by definition, Buddhists. This in turn goes a long way toward promoting unity. True, there is linguistic difference between Lhasa and Amdo and small differences in the style of local dress that the educated eye can pick out as marking place of origin. Customs can differ slightly as well, but the differences in his opinion are certainly less pronounced than the similarities. I ask about differences, here in Xiahe, between city folk and nomads, and he says people who live in the cities are more “with it” (bijiao xianshi) and relatively Hanified (bijiao Hanhua), whereas the lives of herdsmen have not changed that much. I ask whether life is better in Xiahe or Lanzhou, and without hesitation he says Lanzhou, because facilities and technology are both superior, as are educational opportunities.

**INTRAETHNIC DISTINCTIONS ON TRANSLOCAL TERRAIN: PEASANTS, MINORITIES, AND COSMOPOLITANS**

Seventy years ago Ekvall noted, “The Chinese of the border country—possibly influenced by the religious fervor of the Tibetans—appear more
religious minded than their fellow countrymen” in areas closer to China “proper.” This seems to be true to some extent even today. Thus while Han (and Tibetan) informants from southeastern Gansu were often quick to signal the shared beliefs of Han and Tibetan, Han from metropolitan areas outside the region distinguished themselves from minorities (and, by extension, from their peasant coethnics) in a different manner—stressing the ability of the Han to transcend the local or ethnic beliefs that imprisoned less enlightened others. Often these comments incorporated both religious and dietary elements.

On the train returning from Shanghai to Lanzhou, I met a graduate student at the Gansu Social Science Institute who said the Hui, as a shop owning class, are “China’s Jews” (Zhongguo de Youtai ren): “They don’t eat pork for religious reasons just like the Tibetans don’t eat fish for religious reasons. Us Han, we don’t have any religion, so we can eat anything.”

These comments echoed the words of two high-level administrators at Lanzhou University who at a dinner hosted by my local adviser had this exchange in the course of a discussion of minority life in Gansu.

A: “All Hui believe in Islam, all Tibetans believe in Buddhism. Us Han, we’re free to believe whatever we want—”

B (interrupting): “Or disbelieve whatever we want.”

Further, even when educated Han discuss matters that in a minority context would be mapped as “religion”—such as burnt offerings as an effective means of mediating between the material and spirit realms—they will gloss these with different terms. During one of my stints in Lanzhou around the time of Qingming jie (Tomb Sweeping Day), I was walking with a Han academic colleague whose father had recently died. As we were crossing the street he pointed to a store we had just passed and noted that it was selling money that people burn to send to their relatives in the other world. “I just sent some to my father the other day; it’s a good way of connecting the two worlds,” he commented. After sitting through so many conversations between educated Han about how they are free to disbelieve whatever they want, I was astounded by his statement but hid my surprise well enough to ask, “Is this practice considered religion (zongjiao) or culture (wenhua)?” He replied that it’s neither but instead is folk custom (minsu). The occasional dabbling in (Han) folk culture, however, does not seem to imperil the cosmopolitan status of the educated (Han) urbanite. By contrast, minorities and Han peasants are much more likely to find themselves imprisoned by essential notions of their irrational proclivities.
This distinctive sense of the cosmopolitan freedom of the Han extends to matters of diet. One day in February 2004, on my way to a friend’s home in rural Qinghai, I was given a lift in a truck in which one of the other passengers was an extremely garrulous fellow who proceeded to harangue me about the glories of the Maoist era, the coming class war, and laterally the minzu-scape of northwest China and the world in general: “You know, the great Han people (da Hanzu) are China’s most ancient people (zui guluao de minzu). We go all the way back to the Tang and the Song!” Of course, he is himself Han; his family’s laojia (ancestral home) is Kaifeng in Henan Province. His parents came out west to Qinghai in the 1950s to work in the oil fields and will return to Henan when they retire. At a certain point he turned to the topic of the worst (zui xiade) minzu.

“I’ll tell you: the worst minzu in the world has to be the Muslims (yisilan minzu, “Islamic nationalities”). All the places they run outside of China are poor; the people have nothing to eat because all they care about is making war. Also, they don’t eat pork!” We pass a boy with a large dog on a leash.

The driver, who had remained silent until now, says, “Some dog!”

The Henanese fellow retorts, “Looks tasty!” He pauses to think for a moment and continues, “You Americans don’t eat dog, huh?”

“No, not so much.”

“Well, we Han eat whatever meat we want.”

At this, the driver jokes, “It’s almost unseemly to eat that way” (chide tai luan le).

The knife of dietary distinctions cuts both ways. On the one hand, it can imprison minorities in irrational beliefs and practices. On the other hand, it can free the Han from the constraints of localized or particularistic folk culture (fengsu) or superstition and hence allow them to be fully realized, cosmopolitan members of Chinese society. Or at least this is how it can work in theory. In practice this freedom is curtailed by economic constraints and regional particularities such that only urban Han are truly cosmopolitan enough to break free of the shackles of tradition.

**ANALYSIS**

It is useful at this point to contrast the sorts of distinctions, both inter- and intraethnic, drawn by Han from urban areas to those made by their rural coethnics. Where the latter are keen to emphasize their commonalities with local Tibetan populations, stressing among other things their
shared belief in Buddhism and the relative ease of intermarriage compared with similar unions with Muslims, urban Han draw more absolute lines between the prison of minority superstition and the cosmopolitan ease of metropolitan life. Urban Han usually frame distinctions between cosmopolitanism and rural idiocy in ethnic terms. In many pronouncements concerning religious, dietary, and other restrictions, urban Han distinguish between the ability of Han in general to transcend local particularisms and minorities’ inabilitys to do the same. By virtue of being Han, their argument runs, we can eat what we want, we can believe what we choose, whereas non-Han are subject to the dictates of tradition, dietary prohibitions, or religious proscription.

Yet it also seems clear that pronouncements of cosmopolitan freedom have not only ethnic but also regional and class components. That is, poor and/or rural Han are as likely as not to be lumped in with minorities in contradiction to developed urbanites. The same sorts of classlike processes that have pushed some Han into marginal lives on the grasslands are brought into articulation with subtle indices of Quality (suzhi), and with the topography of official development schemes that map people and places in terms of their relative advancedness and backwardness (fada and luohou, respectively). As a result, understanding these pronouncements solely in minzu-centric terms fails to capture the composite constellations of social difference actually being mobilized. Comments about disbelief and access to strange epicurean delights index not just minzu boundaries, traditionally construed, but a whole series of allied but shifting elements of larger constellations of social difference. Ethnicity is not the only axis of belonging and exclusion.

Further, on a local basis, marginal Han may see themselves as more effectively disempowered by their location on terrains of class and region than empowered by their minzu locations. The behindness that local Han feel so acutely is composed of a complex amalgam of regional, moral, and economic assumptions. A framework that would seek to understand all Hanness from a notion of original Han privilege clearly would obscure more in this instance than it would reveal. Further, rather than subsume all other modes of differentiation within a notion that minzu is what really matters, it is incumbent upon scholars of China in general and of Critical Han Studies in particular to expand our analytic compass beyond the narrow confines of official minzu categories. In doing so it becomes clear that Han/non-Han distinctions are not merely about minzu. Such an approach pushes us to attend not just to received abstractions but also to emergent forms of belonging and exclusion, constellations of social differentiation in
which *minzu* may or may not centrally figure. It is to one such emergent form to which this chapter now turns.

**LOCAL COSMOPOLITANISMS AND TRANS-MINZU CONTEXTS**

During my fieldwork in Xiahe conducted episodically between 2003 and 2007, I noticed that something interesting was going on in terms of a local refiguring of metropolitan language ideology. If one looked closely, one could see a regional speech community that transcends ethnic identification coalescing around the Amdo dialect of Tibetan (Chinese, *Anduohua*; Tibetan, ‘*A-mdo-skad*’). In this refiguring, Amdo Tibetan may be circumscribed geographically and marked in important ways by class inequality (in some ways it is the shared language of the poor), but it has come to mirror Mandarin, the national language, in at least one important way: it is relatively open in terms of its possible constituencies. To be able to speak Amdo dialect is to be marked as a local.\(^43\) Many (but not all) individuals who deem themselves “locals,” whether Hui Muslim storekeepers, Han hoteliers, laborers, and waiters, or Tibetans of various stripes, can speak Amdo dialect and almost all outsiders cannot. Or at least this is what locals liked to tell me. Yet I think it is important to take their claims seriously because they can help undo romantic nationalist notions of China (i.e., of the fifty-six *minzu* living together in harmonious and distinctly non-hierarchical bliss) and begin to provide critical perspective on the sort of politics of the national-linguistic possible that conspires to prompt local Han to say things like, “Hearing our Amdo Tibetan dialect spoken makes me feel at ease” (Ting women *anduo zangyu juede hen shufu*).

Recall the conversation with the Tibetan policeman and the Han Internet café manager in which both agreed that “Amdo dialect is the *Putonghua* of this region.” As readers of this chapter will likely be aware, *Putonghua*, the official term for Mandarin, means “common speech.” What we generally call “Mandarin Chinese” (and is often termed *hanyu*, or the language of the Han, in everyday speech), then, is officially ethnically unmarked. In theory, as a national language, it is open to all who can master it.\(^44\) In practice, many on China’s margins often speak it as a second language or not at all. While it is explicitly the language of technology, tourism, and development and has colonized these aspects of local Tibetan vocabulary, it does not always serve as the basis for quotidian interaction. That is to say, common speech is not held equally in common by all its potential speakers. A language ideology in which there is a one-to-one mapping
between “the Chinese language” and the Chinese nation-state conceals what Michael Silverstein has called “everyday plurilingualism.”

The prevalent language ideology of China in the era of the “Harmonious Society” (hexie shehui) is one that seeks to eliminate the barriers presented to communication by recondite topolects (fangyan, lit., “place or locality speech,” so termed because place rather than ethnicity is the salient axis of differentiation). In most mappings of these topolects, speaking infra-standard versions of Chinese is the primary cause for developmentalist concern. Minority languages rarely figure in such schemas but are at least afforded some measure of legitimacy by virtue of their association with valorized forms of (consumable) traditional culture. Further, almost invariably, minority languages are assumed to be the particular province of minorities, left unspoken by Han. The many (but not all) fangyan that are mapped as substandard versions of Mandarin on the other hand are thought to be “hard to listen to” (hen nanting), as well as emblematic of an overabundance of particularism that can only stand in the way of unfettered communication across distances in contemporary China. But on a basic level, both minority languages and substandard Mandarin are not thought to be potential bases for communication between multiple constituencies. In contrast to Putonghua, which is thought to be productive of an ethnically unmarked public, minority languages and Mandarin topolects are thought to be imprisoned within their particular settings, unable to speak across boundaries of ethnicity or place.

This, then, is precisely why the suggestion that Amdo Tibetan is to some degree the Putonghua of the region is so provocative. Such a claim highlights the degree to which “local” languages can be productive of particular, situated, discrepant cosmopolitanisms that exist in tension with official mappings of ethnically marked and unmarked spaces. Further, it suggests that an overreliance on minzu-based typologies that take for granted the ways in which official categories carve up marginal populations can potentially obscure tentative but real movements toward “units of common participation,” based as much on the flows across ethnic and other boundaries as on the maintenance of those boundaries. This is emphatically not to say that all locals get along or that this emergent sense of an Amdo dialect–based regional speech group opens up some sort of utopian space for the reworking of cultural domination. Rather it is to foreground the need to attempt to understand the warm feelings some Han and Hui profess toward a Tibetan language. It is to question the primacy of the relationship between one language and one people by attempting to push the national and regional landscapes of social difference beyond minzu politics.
To illustrate the form such trans-minzu contexts may take, I present the example of the Labrang Monastery Restaurant (since closed), which occupied a prime space at the eastern edge of the eponymous monastery during my stay from summer 2003 to spring 2004. If one ventured across its threshold on a cold autumn or winter night, as I came to be in the habit of doing, one would have been confronted by a scene illegible under a minzu-centric lens. One would have been greeted and seated by a Han waiter from Khajjar near Hezuo; one would have dined on qingzhen (Muslim) noodles prepared by a Hui cook from Linxia (who would sit and eat with the staff and chat with the customers when he was finished for the night but might perhaps quarrel with their television viewing choices, especially if they involved pairs figure skating); and when one rose to settle one’s accounts, one’s bill would be tabulated by a middle-aged Tibetan from Ganjia. The clientele consisted almost entirely of Tibetan nomads who conversed with the staff almost exclusively in Tibetan. As Gombo, one of the regular customers was wont to say, “We have all three minzu here.”

This is not always how things happen in Gannan: there is certainly tension and a fair amount of mistrust between members of different minzu, just as there is between city folks and pastoralists, and so on. Yet we, as anthropologists of China, and of Hanness, have to adjust our expectations so that this vision of Han, Hui, and Tibetan working together, eating together, and communicating in Amdo dialect, as rare and ephemeral as it may be, is intelligible within our understandings of how China works. The larger question then becomes how best to go about doing so. The approach I suggest is a mixture of old and new. I bring Max Gluckman’s notion of “social situation” into articulation with a modified version of Meyer Fortes’s “units of common participation.” I supplement these with a latent post-Marxist emphasis on the manifold, powered nature of the axes of social difference that enable and constrain contexts of commingling, conceptualizing social conjunctures as “consisting of multiple axes of oppression which create blurred, shifting, contextual boundaries between dominant and subordinate.”

**THEORETICAL REORIENTATIONS: FROM MINZU POLITICS TO “UNITS OF COMMON PARTICIPATION”**

Let us pause here to consider the ways in which dominant Cold War-era anthropological approaches to China—especially those shaped by the influence of Maurice Freedman—were modeled on mainstream structural-functionalist work on Africa, on the lineage paradigm in particular. Even
when the barriers to foreign research in the People’s Republic started to crumble in the 1980s, the new projects and concerns that resulted from the new research (minorities studies among them) have had to reckon with the legacies of the Cold War. Where totalizing models derived in no small part from Freedman’s classic work on the lineage system have proved problematic to apply in studying the PRC as a “unified, multi-ethnic state,” I suggest that another model of inquiry derived from the African contexts of British social anthropology can help us to reenvision the study of China, Chineseness, and the Han in important ways. By departing from Gluckman’s work on social situations and from early efforts to understand “culture contact” in colonial Africa rather than from more orthodox structural-functionalist genealogies, we can formulate an approach to the peoples of China that takes as its focus the situated interrelationships between the members of multiple groups, ethnic and otherwise, that crosscut, refigure, or reinforce the boundary work that shapes contemporary Chinese society.

Thus in place of recent studies that have taken official ethnic categories, their limits and their productivities, as their central focus, I argue for the usefulness of revisiting older ways of making sense of social situations that took as their purview the complex interrelationships between groups freighted in studies of culture contact. Early anthropological studies of culture contact in Africa emerged out of the colonial milieu of the 1930s, replacing an exclusive focus on African social systems with an a posteriori attention to a composite colonial landscape. Where first-generation anthropologists had scrupulously expunged all vestiges of Western influence from their accounts, this new work on culture contact took the confrontations and compromises of colonialism as its purview. For the purposes of this chapter, two key texts from this period are Max Gluckman’s analysis of social situations and Meyer Fortes’s description of units of common participation. A method inspired by Gluckman’s analysis of the social situation that presented itself at the Malungwana drift one morning in 1938 does not seek to police the borders of identity and difference but rather to trace them, to tease out their disjunctures and intersections. Thus the object of study is not some Uber-Chineseness (whether cast as culture or society) that can be discovered to varying degrees in “Chinese” populations; instead, the point is to construct provisional and limited understandings of what Chineseness (and laterally Hanness) can mean in particular social situations. Thus Freedman’s observation about the overseas Chinese, that “countries contain and condition their Chinese,” can be expanded to the PRC itself.

Here, Fortes’s notion of units of common participation can be of use.
“To study culture contact as a dynamic process,” Fortes writes, “the anthropologist must work with communities rather than customs. His unit of observation must be a unit of life and not of custom—a village, a town, a settlement, a unit of common participation in the everyday political, economic and social life.” This focus on units of common participation rather than on presumptively shared customs or traits has relevance even today for the anthropology of Chinese nationalities. Where Fortes seems to be predisposed to favor certain normative kinds of community (i.e., the village) as being a priori worthy of study, I seek to open up the notion entirely by allowing units of common participation to emerge in the context of field research.

In place of a fixation on the cultural stuff that marks populations as distinctly “Chinese,” anthropologists of contemporary China would do well, whether they study minorities, the Han, or both, to pay attention to the units of common participation—now no longer conceived in exclusively geographic or communitarian terms—that bring together (or compel apart) members of diverse groups, ethnic or otherwise, in Chinese society. Precisely by attending to these sites of flows across the boundaries of collective identity that a more culturalist paradigm would identify as delimiting the limits of Chinese and non-Chinese can we begin to get at both the complexity of a Chineseness that incorporates Han and non-Han alike and, crucially for the purposes of Critical Han Studies, at the degree to which notions and practices of Hanness are both locally articulated and entangled in other matrices of difference.

In this vein, there are interesting resonances between early work on the China-Tibet borderlands and the first anthropological ventures into the studies of complex societies in Africa. Writing roughly at the same time as Gluckman and Fortes, the missionary and Chicago-trained anthropologist Robert Ekvall penned an important early work, *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibet Border*. Ekvall’s work is, on the whole, surprisingly relevant to contemporary inquiries. Interestingly, the criteria he employs to distinguish between the cultural groups whose relations he seeks to map are composite and do not conform precisely to apparent ethnoracial boundaries. Livelihood and geography in his mapping are as important as “ethnic” distinctions in coordinating the relative position of various social groups. The four groups on which he focuses are the Chinese, the Chinese-speaking Muslims, the sedentary Tibetans, and the nomadic Tibetans. Ekvall is thus interested in “cultural relations” not just between people who would now be classed as members of separate *minzu*, but, compellingly, between peoples who would now be classed as members of the same
“ethnic” grouping. As a result of this approach, Ekvall is able to take stock of the unexpected convergences and divergences that emerge in practice. Writing before the contemporary minzu-based classificatory framework had been put in place, Ekvall can show contemporary scholars of “other Chinas” one way out of the comfortable prism/prison of minzu studies.59

Ekvall does not attempt to approach the matter in a comprehensive way. Instead of attempting to describe the relationships between all these groups, Ekvall focuses on four key relationships—“arbitrarily limiting the discussion to four aspects of cultural interaction which are not only the most important ones but differ sharply in kind and degree.”60 The four relationships he describes are those between

1. The Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems (descendants of Arabs)
2. The Chinese and Sedentary Tibetans
3. The Moslems and the Nomadic Tibetans
4. The Nomadic and Sedentary Tibetans

These relationships can be indicated graphically as a rectangle, with the four groups at the corners and the relationships indicated by lines which form the sides [see Fig. 11.1].

Ultimately Ekvall describes these relations as characterized by, in his words, (1) “segregation and hostility”; (2) “‘infiltration’ of the sedentary Tibetans by the Chinese”;61 (3) “trade and mutual diffusion of traits”; and (4) “differentiation or super- and subordination, respectively.”62

In his analysis Ekvall is quite careful to stress the strategic nature of
the reductionism of the method he is practicing: “We must remember that the words similar and dissimilar represent two extremes, and all the facts that we label one or the other may lie, in reality, at any distance from those two extremes and may, in addition, show infinite variations of both kind and degree.” Of religion he writes, “When we say the Chinese and the Tibetans have the same religion we mean that because of mutual tolerance, the differences in their beliefs have no fundamental effect on the cultural relationship between the two groups.” Yet Ekvall’s project belies this caution. Returning to his rationale for selecting the four relationships on which he focuses, he writes, “I am arbitrarily limiting the discussion to four aspects of cultural interaction which are not only the most important ones but differ sharply in kind and degree.” For him, the importance of the four relationships lies precisely in the clarity of the difference between them. The distinctiveness of the four ideal typical relationships is itself an artifact of the analytic framework of culture contact or cultural relations (a point that was not, to be sure, lost on Gluckman). The analysis of group contact is, of course, premised on and to a degree productive of a heightened sense of distinction—in order to measure contact, one has to start with discrete groups, after all. Ekvall’s analytic focus on interrelations is thus both a departure point and a cautionary tale.

In my own work, I attempt to cast doubt on the coherence of received notions of collective identity and on the discreteness of preexisting groups—and to highlight the importance of paying as much attention to the diagonals as to the sides of Ekvall’s quadrilateral. Especially since the founding of the PRC and the institution of centralized control over the formerly restive border regions of Gansu and Amdo, the relationships, both material and ideational, between sedentary Tibetans and Hui and between Han and Tibetan nomads have increasingly come to the fore. In addition, as this chapter has detailed, despite officially sanctioned and touristic constructions of Xiahe as a quintessentially Tibetan place and of different minzu as separate, distinct, and the basis for iron-clad social distinctions, one can trace at least provisionally the emergence of something approaching a local market culture that turns on the ability to speak the local dialect of Tibetan fluently. In all this I don’t mean to imply that language has trumped minzu or other axes of difference or that this provisional local sensibility is not shot through with its own sorts of dire conflicts but instead seek to highlight the ways in which an overweening attention to either the isomorphism of Hanness and Chinese culture or to minzu as the silver bullet that can explain everything can blind us to the subtler and more tenuous forms of community that can emerge at minzu’s edges. It is in such emergent forms of community that
Han and non-Han find themselves interacting in emergent units of common participation.

I have attempted in this chapter, through the juxtaposition of several cases, to demonstrate the ways in which the terrain of human diversity in the PRC in general and the dynamics of Hanness in particular go far beyond *minzu* politics. *Minzu*, now in the guise of ethnicity, is, in practice, one of many factors that can be brought into conjunctural constellation in the service of reckoning difference. Yet if we, as scholars, wish to gain some purchase on the workings of inclusion and exclusion in various Chinese contexts, we need to bring ethnicity’s *entanglements* into sharp focus and in doing so push our analysis beyond simplistic minority/majority distinctions while remaining attuned to continuing structural inequalities that sometimes work in an idiom of *minzu*/ethnicity but just as often exceed or crosscut such typologies. Minority and majority, Han and Tibetan, city dweller and peasants alike are swept up together, albeit differentially, within national developmentalist projects. In this light, Critical Han Studies as an emergent field of inquiry cannot be only about the Han or only about *minzu* (or ethnoracial distinction more generally) if it is to capture a nuanced picture of the dynamics of belonging and exclusion in the Chinese world.
INTRODUCTION

I wish to thank my co-organizers and coeditors James Leibold, Stéphane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, all of the participants in the Critical Han Studies conference, and the members of the Stanford University community who helped us make the conference a reality (please refer to the volume acknowledgments for a more complete list). With regard to the present introduction, I would like to thank Alex Cook, Matthew Sommer, Hwa-Ji Shin, Gordon Chang, Yumi Moon, Sean Hanretta, Robert Crews, Allyson Hobbes, and Laura Stokes for reading an early draft and for providing extremely helpful comments and criticisms. Further thanks go to members of the Stanford course “Han Chinese and the Global White: The Construction of Ethnoracial Majorities, East and West,” including Matthew Boswell, Yan Cao, Lance Cidre, Yudru Tsomu, and Albert Wang. Special thanks as well go to participants in my winter 2008 course “Race and Ethnicity in East Asia,” including Eric Vanden Bussche, Michael Elgan, Rachel Zimet, Jon Felt, Amy Soo Young Yang, Kelsey Grode, Drew Camarda, Howard Tan, Lisa Wong, Marshall Bennett, and Roxana Blanco. At the University of Washington, I would also like to thank Stevan Harrell, Madeleine Yue Dong, Patricia Ebrey, R. Kent Guy, Lindsay Butt, Annette Bernier, Jaya Conser Lapham, Michelle Kleisath, and Gladys Jian Ge for their insightful feedback during my visit in 2009.


11. The authors, it should be noted at the outset, were not required to make explicit connections between Han and white in their work, although a number did. Rather, each author draws upon his or her own disciplinary perspective, including history, anthropology, comparative literature, and cultural studies.


21. The closest we have to an attempt to pose and answer this question is an argument made by Dru Gladney. Gladney suggests, but does not pursue in any thorough way, the idea that the novel concept of the Han Nationality was a “brilliant attempt” by figures such as Sun Yat-sen “to mobilize other non-Cantonese, especially northern Mandarin speakers, and the powerful Zhejiang and Shanghaiese merchants, into one overarching national group pitted against the Manchu and other foreigners threatening China during the unstable period following the Unequal Treaties.” See Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 1 (1994): 99.
25. See Teng, this volume. Analogous questions have been posed in other East Asian contexts, as in Robert Fish’s study of “mixed-blood” Japanese. Focusing on the phenomenon of biracial identity in Japan, Fish investigates the ways in which it subverts Japan’s discourse of homogeneity. See Robert A. Fish,

26. See Teng, this volume.

27. See Teng, this volume.


32. Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). See chapters 1 and 5.


34. See Elliott, this volume.

35. Xu Jieshun, Xueqiu: Han minzu de renleixue fenxi (Snowball: An
Anthropological Analysis of the Han Nationality) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1999).


37. See Xu, this volume.


41. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China,” 98. This view of Han, it bears pointing out, has since been picked up by other scholars. In his examination of Chinese nationalism, for example, Suisheng Zhao echoes this argument that “the creation of an ethnic Han identity goes back only to the late nineteenth century.” See Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 21–2.


45. Edward Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 291. This subversive discourse of minzu found its way into late Qing native-place textbooks as well. For a fascinating recent study, see May-bo Ching, “Classifying Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Late Qing Native-Place Textbooks and Gazetteers,” in The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China, ed. Tze-ki Hon and Robert Culp (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 55–77.

46. See Chin, this volume.
48. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation.
50. See Tapp, this volume.
51. See Tapp, this volume.
52. Fei Xiaotong, “Plurality and Unity in the Configuration of the Chinese People,” Tanner Lecture, Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 15 and 17, 1988); Xu Jieshun, Xueqiu.
53. See Xu, this volume.
56. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 12. Whereas Eriksen is referring specifically to ethnicity in this passage, I consider the observation relevant to all nonethnic forms of identity as well, which also depend upon such relationships for their emergence, constitution, and stabilization.
58. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 12 n. 2.
63. Techniques of indirect or differential self-identification are by no means limited to Han, it is important to note. Manchu Qing representations of “barbarian” regions of the empire could also serve as a means of reasserting and reinscribing the civilizational superiority of the center or ruling regime. See Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel
Notes to Chapter 1  /  263

Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

66. See Elliott, this volume.
67. See Elliott, this volume.
68. See Elliott, this volume.
70. See Vasantkumar, this volume.
71. See Vasantkumar, this volume.

Chapter 1


CHAPTER 11


3. The People’s Republic is formally a tongyi duominzu guojia, commonly rendered in English as a “unified multiethnic country.” There are problems with this translation, however. First, minzu and ethnic are imperfect equivalents at best. Minzu, variously translated as “race,” “nationality” (in the Stalinist sense), or “ethnicity,” entered Chinese from Japanese in the late nineteenth century. It in turn is thought to have entered Japanese as a translation of the German das volk. Rather than view minzu as simply the Chinese instantiation of a universal social category called “ethnicity,” I side with Stevan Harrell, “Ethnicity, Local Interests and the State: Yi Communities in Southwest China,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 3 (1990): 515–48, who considers its translation problematic and leaves it in the Chinese. Tapp, this volume, argues strongly for the incommensurability of the two terms. Yet I disagree with his assertion based on Lemoine’s work that minzu “is a category that has nothing to do with (what is often understood as) ethnicity.” Neither the position that minzu is after all just ethnicity in another guise nor its opposite allows us to gain analytic purchase on the significance of the trend in recent years toward translating minzu as ethnicity.

The latter is also a problematic concept, especially given the sharp divide in Chinese minority studies between those scholars influenced by Mark Elliott’s work on the Manchu who assert the pan-temporal utility of ethnicity as an organizing concept and those scholars who follow Pamela Crossley’s approach to ethnicity, which links it to the nation-state as a political form with a specific history and territorial span. I count myself in the latter camp in no small part because I think that assuming a priori that we are talking about ethnicity in some recognizable form in, say, the eighteenth-century Qing empire, may tend to obscure the ways in which the forms of groupness then in common circulation, while in some facets similar to ethnicity in the contemporary world, diverged in important ways from ethnicity as we know it. Thus I find the approach advocated by Chin, this volume, particularly productive. “I do not,” she writes, “—as others have productively done—provide a universal definition of ethnicity in order to assess its currency in, or availability for, Chinese antiquity. Nor do I present an evolutionary account of a peculiarly Chinese notion of ethnicity. Rather, I examine competing ideas that have animated the antiquarian’s minzu, zuqun, or ethnos—ideas that may have taken the name ethnicity or ethnic group but that at other times, or simultaneously, may have been interpreted or translated as race, culture, or nation.”


7. Harding’s formulation highlights the implicit majority/minority resonances of “China Proper” and its others. “‘China Proper’ referred to those areas that were directly controlled by the central administrative bureaucracy. For most of the Qing dynasty, it consisted of the nineteen provinces primarily populated by Han Chinese. In contrast, “Outer China” or the “[Chinese] dependencies referred to other areas, primarily peopled by ethnic minorities, that were under the suzerainty of the Chinese state and whose subordination was ensured by force if necessary. During the Qing, these included Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet”; see Harry Harding, “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations, and Reservations,” China Quarterly 136 (Dec. 1993), 662.

8. Mette Hansen, Frontier People: Han Settlers in Minority Areas of China (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 12.

9. Melissa Brown’s brilliant, if theoretically eccentric, comparative work on the aborigines of Taiwan and the Tujia of Hubei highlights the constructedness and ongoing negotiation of boundaries between minority and majority communities. According to Brown, the Tujia communities of which she writes were classed as minorities in the context of the ethnic identification project of the 1950s (minzu shibie) despite self-identifying as Han, in large part because their cultural practices seemed foreign to the metropolitan Han doing the identifying. Brown, in turn, notes, devastatingly, “Ironically, the very cultural basis that PRC officials apparently used to classify Tujia as non-Han in the 1950s suggests that, at the turn of the twenty-first century, Taiwanese should
be classified as more Han than most Han in the PRC”; see Brown, *Is Taiwan Chinese?* 169.


15. For Hartigan, the ultimate relationality of markedness is a crucial point:
“The key point—often neglected by theorists of whiteness—is that all of this is relational; you cannot just refer to a category as generically marked or unmarked. White racialness can be marked in one domain and unmarked in another” (Hartigan, Racial Situations, 291 n. 47).

16. Hartigan draws on Virginia Dominguez’s definition of racialization: “the process whereby ‘differences between human beings are simplified and transformed into Difference . . . ’ This process, associated with objectifications of people of color, reduces individuality to the point where only racialness matters. . . . Whites too are subjected to racialization” (Hartigan, Racial Situations, 13).

17. Giersch, this volume, writes compellingly of the historical emergence of Han as an “ethnic” category in a context, Qing colonial Yunnan, in which Han as a group were not (yet) locally hegemonic. See, for example, his discussion of David Atwill’s treatment of the violence between various native-place-based groups and Hui at the Baiyang mines in 1821.


19. This phrase is Anna Tsing’s. “An out-of-the-way place is, by definition, a place where the instability of political meanings is easy to see. The authority of national policies is displaced through distance and the necessity of reenactment at the margins.” Anna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 27.


23. Hartigan is careful not to reduce race to class: “When I stress the role of class . . . I am not asserting that race can simply be reduced to class as some theorists argue. Rather, I emphasize how racial categories and conflicts are consistently textured by class distinctions.” Hartigan, Racial Situations, 15.

24. I use “ethnoracial” here to signal the degree to which even as any natural basis for race has been dismissed, culture and ethnicity have become naturalized or biologized. Scholars such as Visweswaran, “Race and the Culture of Anthropology,” have argued that culture/ethnicity plays a role in the discourse of contemporary anthropology roughly identical to that played by race in the social science of the long nineteenth century (approximately 1850–1950). In other words, ethnicity and culture have simultaneously been naturalized, dehistoricized, and assimilated to physical appearance and geographic location to provide a convenient, commonsense index of radical difference and/or rationale for exclusion. Also see Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack; Pred, Even in Sweden; and Verena Stolcke, “Talking Culture,” Current Anthropology 36, no. 1 (1995): 1–24, on cultural racism in contemporary Europe.


34. Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic, 11–12.
35. Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic, 296. In this vein, Beth Notar cites the cultural geographer Doreen Massey’s work as generative, noting that “she proposes we consider places as ‘articulated moments in networks of social relations,’ where each place is a unique point of . . . intersection” (quoted in Beth Notar, Displacing Desire [Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006], 8).
37. Many people I talked to whose jobs involved dealing with tourists had horror stories about dealing with Israelis. The only other nationalities who came in for such uniform criticism were Pakistanis and the French.
39. This is not entirely true. There are at least some Tibetans who profess no religion, and there are also followers of Bön in the region who are looked upon with the same mixture of fear and distrust by average Tibetans as that with which Urban Han view Tibetan nomads.
40. Ekvall, Cultural Relations, 33.
41. Says Wenhe of his childhood on the Ganjia grasslands, “I grew up poor. You know if we had fields we could farm, if we had sheep like the Tibetans, we could herd (fangmu), but we didn’t have either, so we had to take what work we could get. I had to learn Tibetan as a kid because in Tibetan places like Ganjia and Sangke [both traditionally pastoralist areas], what else are you going to do?”
42. For a discussion of the term’s rise to prominence, see Andrew Kipnis, “Suzhi: A Keyword Approach,” China Quarterly 186 (2006): 295–313, who notes, “The slippage between singular and plural forms of suzhi facilitates the types of hierarchical discourse that require moving from one of the many specific qualities of an individual, such as the way she is dressed, her accent, her table manners or her score on a particular test to an overall judgment of her capital Q Quality” (304). Other explorations of suzhi in contemporary China include Ann Anagnost, “The Corporeal Politics of Quality (Suzhi),” Public Culture 16, no. 2 (2004): 189–208; and Yan Hairong, “Neoliberal Governmentality and Neohumanism: Organizing Suzhi/Value Flow through Labor Recruitment Networks,” Cultural Anthropology 18, no. 4 (2003): 493–523; Yan Hairong, New Masters, New Servants: Migration, Development and Women Workers in China (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). Lamentably, none of these texts deal in any substantive way with intersections between minzu politics and suzhi politics.

44. See Webb Keane, “Public Speaking: On Indonesian as the Language of the Nation,” *Public Culture* 15, no. 3 (2003): 503–30, on the possible publics of national languages.


49. Indeed after the violent confrontations between Tibetan protesters and paramilitary police in March 2008, all bets are off as to the future contours of pan-ethnic regional identity.


53. Max Gluckman’s discussion of social situations has interesting resonances with Hartigan: “As a starting point for my analysis I describe a series of events as I recorded them on a single day. Social situations are a large part of the raw material of the anthropologist. They are the events he observes and from them and their inter-relationships he abstracts the social structure, relationships, institutions, etc., of that society. By them, and by new situations, he must check the validity of his generalisations” (*Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand*, 2). Lyn Schumaker, *Africanizing Anthropology: Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making of Cultural Knowledge in Central
Notes to Chapter 11


55. Fortes, “Culture Contact as a Dynamic Process,” 62.

56. Interestingly, there is a direct line from the work of Fortes and Gluckman to the concept of ethnicity that Mark Elliott has employed in his important recent works on the Manchu. Fredrik Barth, whose work has been such an inspiration for Elliott (see especially Elliott, “Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners,” for a detailed elaboration of the concept; also Giersch, this volume), was himself primarily inspired to focus on the salience of boundaries by the work of Gluckman and Edmund Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954) (Fredrik Barth, personal communication, Nov. 5, 2005). We must remember that Barth’s work (most crucially his edited volume Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference [Boston: Little, Brown], 1969) is not without its flaws. Hale reminds us that most of Barth’s interpreters “stopped short of bringing the reproduction of ethnic identity into analytical balance with the constitutive impact of structural inequalities. Instead, once relations between the group and ‘the outside’ have been recognized as unequal and the external constraints of subordination have been taken into account, the premise of bounded cultural production has given license for a return to community level particularism, albeit in a transformed and more sophisticated guise” (Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 203). This passage uncannily captures some of the problems with recent China minorities studies.


58. I am unsure of the exact details of the connections between Ekvall and the early theorists of culture contact, but he does seem to have participated in the University of Chicago’s Divisional Seminar in Race and Culture Contacts at some point in the mid- to late 1930s. Others who participated in this seminar included Malinowski, Robert Redfield, Robert Park, Radcliffe-Brown, and Isaac Schapera (though it is unclear whether they were all there at the same time). The work of both Malinowski and Schapera appears in Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa. On Ekvall’s participation, see the foreword to Cultural Relations. On others’ participation, see Clifford Wilcox, Robert Redfield and the Development of American Anthropology (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 74 n. 36. On Schapera, see www.lib.uct.ac.za/mss/index.php?html = /mss/newaids/BC1168.HTM&msscollid = 43, accessed June 21, 2010.

59. Mueggler does something similar in the introduction of Age of Wild Ghosts, but ends up, I think, underplaying the significance of minority status in people’s daily lives. While I find Mueggler’s frustration with ethnicity as
the defining lens of minzu studies salutary, I am less than convinced by the assertion that this inspires: “In this sense, Zhizuo might be seen as just one more locale in the vast and diverse landscape of rural China, neither typical nor unique, neither marginal nor central” (Mueggler, *Age of Wild Ghosts*, 18).


61. Interestingly, he suggests that in the 1920s and 1930s the result of this infiltration was the Tibetanization of Han in-migrants rather than the Hanification of local Tibetans, which characterizes the contemporary situation.


64. Ekvall, *Cultural Relations*, 33.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baiyue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baihua zhongguo lishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baixing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban ge Zhongguoren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijingren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beiren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beiyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendiren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bentuhua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijiao Hanhua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijiao xianshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bianjiang kaogu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu yu Hua tong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunmeishugi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Boda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Jianshan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Liankai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chide tai luan le</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiyou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuzhong benguoshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunjie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Han</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Hanzu minzu zhuyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Hanzu zhuyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da minzuzhuyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datongshu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayitong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dao bianjiang qu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinglun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongfang nüzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongfang zazhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duo minzu de guojia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duoyuanshuo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duoyuan yiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duoyuan yiti geju</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fanxin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fanzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan Hua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fangmu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fangyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fei wo zulei, qi xin bi yi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fei Xiaotong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fengsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fengyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu Sinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganzhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongxiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gudai minzu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gu Jiegang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gugan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guxiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong sheng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guigen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizheng ren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Guocui  
Guojia  
Guomin  
Guoren  
Guoshi dagang  
Guozu  
Gushibian

Han’er  
Han Fan bu qi  
Hanfu yundong  
Hanhua  
Hanjian  
Hanjun  
Hanmin  
Han minzu  
Hanren  
Hanren jie  
Hanren pengyou  
Han renzhong  
Hanshui  
Hansu  
Han Suyin  
Han tu guanbing  
Han wang  
Hanwen  
Hanxue  
Hanyu  
Hanzhong  
Hanzu  
Hao Hanren  
He Ailing  
He Bingsong  
He Dong/Ho Tung  
He er butong  
Heji cuoza zhi zu  
Hemu  
Hexie Shehui  
Hen nanting  
Ho-si-man/Heshiwen  
Hu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Pinyin</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hufu</td>
<td>胡服</td>
<td>Hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hua</td>
<td>华</td>
<td>Hu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huaqiao</td>
<td>华侨</td>
<td>Huaren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huaren</td>
<td>华人</td>
<td>Huaxia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hua-Yi yi jia</td>
<td>华夷一家</td>
<td>Hua-Yizhi bian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huayi</td>
<td>华裔</td>
<td>Huayi Yingguoren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huayi Yingji</td>
<td>华裔英籍</td>
<td>Huayi Yingji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huazu</td>
<td>华族</td>
<td>Huai Hanren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai Hanren</td>
<td>坏汉人</td>
<td>Huangbai hezhong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangbai hezhong</td>
<td>黄白合种</td>
<td>Huangdi zisun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangdi zisun</td>
<td>黄帝子孙</td>
<td>Huang Zunxian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Zunxian</td>
<td>黄遵宪</td>
<td>Huiguan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huiguan</td>
<td>回馆</td>
<td>Huiguo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huiguo</td>
<td>回国</td>
<td>Huijia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huijia</td>
<td>回家</td>
<td>Hunxue’er</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunxue’er</td>
<td>混血儿</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimi</td>
<td>羁縻</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiazu</td>
<td>家族</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jian Bozan</td>
<td>剪伯赞</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jian Dan</td>
<td>简单</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Zhiyou</td>
<td>将智由</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiefang ribao</td>
<td>解放日报</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiemeng</td>
<td>结盟</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin</td>
<td>金</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinbu</td>
<td>进步</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jindai minzu</td>
<td>近代民族</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingxue</td>
<td>经学</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiuguo</td>
<td>救国</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juhe</td>
<td>聚合</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junzi</td>
<td>君子</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kang Youwei</td>
<td>康有为</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaoguxue</td>
<td>考古学</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kejiaren</td>
<td>客家人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemin</td>
<td>客民</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keren</td>
<td>客人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keren</td>
<td>客人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kezhang</td>
<td>客长</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character List</td>
<td>Chinese Character</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kezhong</td>
<td>客众</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lai Xiru</td>
<td>赖希如</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laoban</td>
<td>老板</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laojia</td>
<td>老家</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Dongfang</td>
<td>黎东方</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lihai</td>
<td>厉害</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ji</td>
<td>李济</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lishi renwu</td>
<td>历史人物</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liyi lianjie</td>
<td>礼仪廉洁</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liangmin</td>
<td>良民</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Qichao</td>
<td>梁启超</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Siyong</td>
<td>梁思永</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liao</td>
<td>辽</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin Huixiang</td>
<td>林惠祥</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liuguan</td>
<td>流官</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liumin</td>
<td>流民</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Shipei</td>
<td>刘师培</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Yizheng</td>
<td>刘诒征</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long de chuanren</td>
<td>龙的传人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longshan</td>
<td>龙山</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu</td>
<td>虏</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Maode</td>
<td>陆懋德</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lü Simian</td>
<td>吕思勉</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lü Zhanyu</td>
<td>吕振羽</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luohou</td>
<td>落后</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manyi</td>
<td>蛮夷</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mei shenme teshu de</td>
<td>没什么特殊的</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menggu gongzuo</td>
<td>蒙古工作</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjian</td>
<td>蒙奸</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao Fenglin</td>
<td>缪凤林</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miaojiang</td>
<td>苗疆</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miaoman</td>
<td>苗蛮</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>民</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minjia</td>
<td>民家</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minren</td>
<td>民人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsu</td>
<td>民俗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minzu</td>
<td>民族</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minzu qingxu</td>
<td>民族情绪</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minzu shibie</td>
<td>民族识别</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minzu tuanjie
Minzuxue
Minzu yishi
Minzu zhengce
Minzu zhuyi
Muti

Nanfang dushi Bao
Nanren
Nanyue
Nanzu
Naozi hen jiandan
Neidi
Ningju hexin

Ouya
Ouya hunxue
Ouya hunxue de Zhongguo nüzi

Putonghua

Qi
Qimeng
Qipianle ni
Qian Mu
Qianshen
Qian shi tamen de pengyou
Qianshi Hanren
Qingming Jie
Qingqing baibai huangdi zhi zisun
Qingzhen
Qun
Qun zhuyi

Ran‘gan (Särbi term)
Renleixue
Renmin
Renzhong
Renzhongxue
Rong Di zhitai
Ronghe
Ru zhongguo bantu
Rui Yifu

San duo
Semu
Shaguotun
Shan hai jing
Shaoshu minzu
Shaoshu minzuhua
Shiji
Shijie Huaren wenxue
Shitou buneng dang zhentou,
Hanren buneng zuo pengyou
Shizu
Sichuanren
Sifa xingzheng bu
Sima Qian
Sixiang
Siyiguan
Sobokushugi
Songzu
Suzhi
Suibian bu ting hua
Sun Yat-sen

Tamen naozi hao
Tangren
Tangren jie
Tianxia
Tiaodunren
Ting women de anduo Zangyu
juede hen shufu
Torii Ryûzô
Tongyi duominzu guojia
Tubing
Tulian
Turen
Tusi
Tuoba (Tabgach)

Wai
Waidiren 外地人
Waiguoren 外国人
Wailai 外来
Wailaishuo 外来说
Waizu 外族
Wangben 忘本
Wang Chuanxie 王传燮
Wei 魏
Weishenme suoyoude Zhongguoren buxing? 为什么所有的中国人不行?
Wenhua 文化
Wenhua shamo 文化沙漠
Wenyanwen 文言文
Weng Wenhao 翁文灏
Women da Hanzu 我们大汉族
Women meiyou wenhua, meiyou jianshi 我们没有文化，没有见识
Women Zangzu zui bu xihuan de shi Huizu 我们藏族最不喜欢的是回族
Wuhu luanhua 五胡乱华
Wuji 无稽
Wuzu gonghe 五族共和
Xiguan 习惯
Xilaishuo 西来说
Xinan shaoshu minzu 西南少数民族
Xia 夏
Xiahe 夏河
Xia Zengyou 夏曾佑
Xianbei (Särbi) 鲜卑
Xiansheng 先生
Xiangtu 乡土
Xiao buluo 小部落
Xiaoren 小人
Xin dalu 新大陆
Xinxian xueye 新鲜血液
Xin xuetong de hunru 新血统的混入
Xing 性
Xing ji xionghan 性极凶悍
Xiong Shili 熊十力
Xu Bingchang 徐炳昶
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Characters</th>
<th>Pinyin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhanzai Hanren de fangmian</td>
<td>站在汉人的方面</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td>章</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Binglin</td>
<td>章炳麟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Qiyun</td>
<td>章其昀</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xuguang</td>
<td>张旭光</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhendan</td>
<td>震旦</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhina</td>
<td>支那</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhizhu</td>
<td>支族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhong</td>
<td>中</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhong</td>
<td>种</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo</td>
<td>中国</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo benbu</td>
<td>中国本部</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo de Youtairen</td>
<td>中国的犹太人</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo minzu shi</td>
<td>中国民族史</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo minzu</td>
<td>中国民族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo mingyun</td>
<td>中国命运</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguoren</td>
<td>中国人</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguoren de xue</td>
<td>中国人的血</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguoren de xuetong</td>
<td>中国人的血统</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo renmin</td>
<td>中国人民</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo renzhong kao</td>
<td>中国人种考</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo renzhong xitong</td>
<td>中国人种系统</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongguo xin</td>
<td>中国心</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonghua</td>
<td>中华</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonghua da di</td>
<td>中华大地</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonghua guozu</td>
<td>中华国族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonghua minzu</td>
<td>中华民族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonglei</td>
<td>种类</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongtu</td>
<td>中土</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongyang dianshitai</td>
<td>中央电视台</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongyuan</td>
<td>中原</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongzu</td>
<td>中族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongzu de ouxiang</td>
<td>种族的偶像</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou Guanghu</td>
<td>周光湖</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou Yutong</td>
<td>周予同</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuti</td>
<td>主体</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuxia</td>
<td>诸夏</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zixiang</td>
<td>自相</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zizhi bang</td>
<td>自治邦</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zongjiao butong</td>
<td>宗教不同</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zongzu</td>
<td>宗族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zou Rong</td>
<td>邹容</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zu</td>
<td>族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuguo</td>
<td>祖国</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulei</td>
<td>族类</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuqun</td>
<td>族群</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuqun lilun</td>
<td>族群理论</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuxian</td>
<td>祖先</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zui gulao de minzu</td>
<td>最古老的民族</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuozhuan</td>
<td>左传</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Bello, David A. “To Go Where No Han Could Go for Long: Malaria and the Qing Construction of Ethnic Administrative Space in Frontier Yunnan.” Modern China 31, no. 3 (July 2005): 283–317.


Cai Meibiao. “Han minzu xingcheng de wentsi.” In Han minzu xingcheng wenti taolunji (Collected discussions on the formation of the Han minzu), edited by Fan Wenlan, 39–43. Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1957.


Chen Liefu. “Yingmeiri zai taipingyang de zhengba yu woguo guofang” (The
competition among Britain, the United States, and Japan on the Pacific Ocean and Chinese national defense). New Asia 1, no. 3 (1930): 79–86.
Cheng, Irene. Clara Ho Tung: A Hong Kong Lady, Her Family and Her Times. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1976.
———. Intercultural Reminiscences. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University, 1997.
Clarke, Samuel R. Among the Tribes in South-west China. Taipei: Ch‘eng Wen, 1970.
Crossley, Pamela, Helen Siu, and Donald Sutton. Introduction to Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, edited


Fang Baohan. “Bianjiang tunken lun” (Discussion on frontier land reclama-


———. “The Yao Wars in the Mid-Ming and Their Impact on Yao Ethnic-


———. “Plurality and Unity in the Configuration of the Chinese People.” Tanner Lecture, Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 15 and 17, 1988.

———. *Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju* (The Pattern of Plurality and


Gongyang zhuan Yin gong yuan nian (Gongyang Commentary, Duke Yin Year 1).
——. *Qin Han fangshi yu Rusheng* (Masters of Techniques and Classicists during the Qin–Han Period). Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chubanshe, 2005.


Guo Yu—Lu Yu shang (Discourses of the States—Discourses of Lu, vol. 1).


Hall, Peter. *In the Web*. Wirral: P. Hall, 1992.

*Han Fei Zi: Wu Du* (Five Vermin).
*Han shu—Dong Zhongshu zhuang* (History of the Han—Biography of Dong Zhongshu).
Han, Mansheng. “Fanren de jinji” (Taboos of the savages). *New Asia* 4, no. 2 (June 1932): 133–35.
Harrell, Stevan. “Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State: Yi Communities in


——. The Character of Races: As Influenced by Physical Environment, Natural Selection, and Historical Development. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1924.
——. West of the Pacific. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925.


Jin shi juan 4 Xizong ben ji (History of the Jin, vol. 4: Records of Xizong).


——. “Presidential Address: ‘The Peoples of Asia’: Science and Politics in the


Li Dali. “Shanghai guangzhou jianwenlu” (Records from a journey through Shanghai and Guangzhou). *Kaifang zazhi* (Open Magazine) (August 2007).


Li Ji. “Xiyincun shiqian de yicun” (Prehistoric fossils of Xiyin village). *Qinghua xuebao yanjiu yuan congshu* 3 (1927).


Lin Meicun. Sichou zhi lu kaogu shiwu jiang (Fifteen Talks on Silk Road Archaeology). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006.


Liu, Josie. “In a Search for Cultural Identity, Clothes Definitely Maketh the Han.” South China Morning Post, September 10, 2005.


Long, William. “Weishenme Guangdongren bu kan Yangshi” (Why Cantonese
Bibliography


Lufu zouzhe (Grand Council Copies of Palace Memorials). Beijing: Number One Historical Archives.


Ma Ruhang and Ma Dazheng, eds. Qingdai de bianjiang zhengce (Frontier Policy of the Qing Dynasty). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994.


Mair, Victor. Review of Written and Unwritten: A New History of the Bud-


*Mengzi—Liang Hui wang shang* (Mencius: King Hui of Liang, vol. 1).

Ming Taizu shi lu juan 53, Hongwu san nian liu yue ding chou (True Records of the Founding Emperor of the Ming, vol. 53: 6th Month of the 3rd Year of Hongwu).


Pearce, Scott, Audrey Spiro, and Patricia Ebrey, eds. Culture and Power in the


Schaberg, David. “Travel, Geography, and the Imperial Imagination in Fifth-Century Athens and Han China.” Comparative Literature 51, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 152–90.
Schmalzer, Sigrid. The People’s Peking Man: Popular Science and Human


Shiji—Huozhi liezhuan (Records of the Historian—Biographies of Profiteers).

Shiji—Li Si liezhuan (Records of the Historian—Biography of Li Si).

Shiji—Yin (Records of the Historian—Yin).
———. “The Bluish Tinge in the Halfmoon; or, Fingernails as a Racial Sign.” In *Neither Black nor White Yet Both: Thematic Explorations of Interracial


———. “The Eurasian as Biracial Icon: Chinese-Western Interracialism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century.” Unpublished manuscript.
Tian Xiaofei. “The Cultural Construction of North and South.” In Beacon


———. *Du Tongqian Lun* (Commentary on *Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government*). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975.


Wei shu — gaozu ji (History of the Wei—Records on the Founder).


Xinhua. “Woguo wancheng fuwen diaocha: Zhonghua minzu zigu jiushi yi


Xue Fucheng. Chushi Ying, Fa, Yi, Bi siguo riji (Diary in Four Countries: Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium). Taipei: Wenhui chubanshe, 1966–67.


Yao Shaohua and Jin Zhaozi. Chuzhong benguoshi (Junior Middle School History). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1933.


Yin, Weilian. “Yingfa junshi xiade Xianluo” (Siam under British and French influence). New Asia 1, no. 5 (February 1931): 71–84.

[Yin, Weilian, ed.] “Fabu niding yifan kenbian banfa” (The Judicial Department planned on migrating criminals to reclaim wastelands in the frontiers). In “Yiyuejian bianjiang dongfang dashiji” (Major frontier and Oriental affairs during the last month) sec., New Asia 6, no. 3 (September 1933): 161–62.

Yongzheng Emperor. Dayi Juemilu (Record of Awakening to Supreme Justice).


Yuan shi juan 6 Shizu ben ji san (History of the Yuan, vol. 6: Third Volume of Records of Shizu).

Yun Zhaoguang. “E’erduosi fengbao.” In Nei Menggu dianying juben xuan (An Anthology of Inner Mongolian Film Scripts), edited by Nei Menggu


———. “Shibu jihua yimin kenzhi: jiangshe dongbei xibei liang yikenju” (The Industrial Department made plans for migration and wasteland reclamation: The Northeastern and Northwestern Migration and Wasteland Reclamation Bureaus will be established), “Yiyuejian” (During the past month) sec., New Asia 3, no. 1 (October 1931): 169.


———. “Zhongguo lishishang zhi hanzai” (The drought in Chinese history:
A verification of Dr. Huntington’s hypothesis. *Shidi xuebao* 3, no. 6 (April 1925): 47–52.


Zizhi tongjian juan 198 Taizong ji (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, vol. 198: Records of Taizong).
Contributors

Uradyn E. Bulag is Reader in Social Anthropology at the University of Cambridge, UK. He is the author of *Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China’s Mongolian Frontier* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

Kevin Carrico is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociocultural Anthropology at Cornell University. He is currently completing an ethnographic study of neotraditionalist groups in contemporary urban China.

Zhihong Chen is Assistant Professor of History at Guilford College. She is currently completing a book on the history of Frontier Studies in Republican China.

Tamara T. Chin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Chicago. She is currently completing a book on the literary imagination of the Silk Road during the Han dynasty.

Mark Elliott is Mark Schwartz Professor of Chinese and Inner Asian History at Harvard University. He is the author of *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford University Press, 2001) and *Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World* (Pearson-Longman, 2009).

C. Patterson Giersch is Associate Professor of History at Wellesley College. He is the author of *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier* (Harvard University Press, 2006).

Stéphane Gros is Researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS–France) and an affiliate of the Center for Himalayan Studies. He is the author of *La part Manquante: Echanges et pouvoirs chez les Drung des confins du Yunnan* (Société d’ethnologie, 2011).

James Leibold is Senior Lecturer at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
Thomas S. Mullaney is Assistant Professor of Chinese History at Stanford University. He is the author of *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (University of California Press, 2011).

Nicholas Tapp is Chair of Sociology at East China Normal University and former Professor in Anthropology at the Australian National University. He is the author of *Sovereignty and Rebellion: The White Hmong of Northern Thailand* (Oxford University Press, 1989) and *The Hmong of China: Context, Agency, and the Imaginary* (Brill, 2002).

Emma J. Teng is the T. T. and Wei Fong Chao Professor of Asian Civilizations and Associate Professor of Chinese Studies at MIT. She is the author of *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Harvard University Press, 2004).

Eric Vanden Bussche is a Ph.D. candidate in Chinese History at Stanford University. He is currently completing a study on the significance of Yunnan and the Sino-Burmese border in Chinese state building from 1886 to 1960.

Chris Vasantkumar is Luce Junior Professor of Asian Studies and Anthropology at Hamilton College. At present he is writing a historical critique of the anthropology of money.

Xu Jieshun is Dean of the Anthropology Research Institute and Director of the Han Studies Center at Guangxi University for Nationalities. He is the author and editor of several publications on the Hanzu, including *The Historical Development of the Hanzu* (Sichuan Nationalities Press, 1992).