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## A LIFE WITHOUT AFFECTS AND PASSIONS: KANT ON THE DUTY OF APATHY

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An apathetic life is not the sort of life that most of us would want for ourselves or believe that we have a duty to strive for. And yet Kant argues that we have a duty of apathy, a duty to strive to be without affects (*Affecten*) and passions (*Leidenschaften*). But is Kant's claim that there is a duty of apathy really as problematic as it sounds? I shall seek to answer this question in the negative by, in sections one to four, investigating Kant's account of affects and passions. There I will show that an affect is a short-lived eruption of feeling that temporarily robs you of your capacity for reflection and a passion is a persistent inclination that is so motivationally powerful that it makes governing yourself on the basis of reasons very difficult or even impossible. Finally, in section five, I shall defend the duty of apathy against internal and external critiques. While Kant's distinction between affects and passions has been examined before,<sup>1</sup> albeit more briefly than I do so here, the duty of apathy itself has not yet received the detailed defence that it deserves given its central importance to Kant's understanding of virtue. However, I will not be seeking to give a complete account of either Kant's theory of virtue (including inner freedom) or the role of emotions in Kant's critical philosophy as a whole since this would require another paper.<sup>2</sup> The aim here is to investigate the duty of apathy specifically as it relates to affects and passions and, by focusing on the details of this duty, to shed some new light on these broader issues.

Kant's distinction between affects and passions, on which the duty of apathy is based, first appears in preliminary form in Kant's Latin oration, *On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body* (1786). The first detailed published version of this distinction, which Kant follows without significant amendment in his later works, appears in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790). The distinction reappears in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793) and plays an important role in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798). But the clearest illustration of the significance that this distinction has for Kant can be found by examining his account of virtue in *The Metaphysics of Morals*. There Kant defines virtue as an "aptitude" of a person's "will" to "determine oneself to act through the thought of the law."<sup>3</sup> This aptitude is the "the capacity and considered resolve to withstand ... what opposes the moral disposition *within us*."<sup>4</sup> It is thus a type of fortitude which constitutes a state of "character" which is "noble" and this requires "being one's own *master* in a given case ... and *ruling* oneself ... that is, subduing one's affects and *governing* one's passions."<sup>5</sup> Kant calls this requirement the "duty of *apathy*" and this duty forbids "him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations." But affects and passions are, respectively, feelings and inclinations which are so powerful that they govern us. Therefore the duty of apathy requires that we strive to be in a state free from both affects and passions.<sup>6</sup> But

what are affects and passions?

## 1. WHAT IS AN AFFECT?

Affects are sudden, strong, powerful, and short-lived storms of feeling, or internal motion, against which we are passive. Affects are thus “momentary, sparkling phenomenon”, like a “tempest” which “quickly subsides.”<sup>7</sup> But an affect is not merely momentary, it is also powerful. An affect is “rash, that is, it quickly grows to a degree of feeling (*Grade des Gefühls*) that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtlessness [or imprudence] (*unbesonnen*)).”<sup>8</sup> Kant elaborates: “it is *not the intensity of a certain feeling* that constitutes the affected state, but the lack of reflection in comparing this feeling with the sum of all feelings (of pleasure or displeasure).”<sup>9</sup> As such, it is not the strength or power of the feeling per se that turns a feeling or emotion into an affect proper, but whether or not that eruption of feeling temporarily robs you of your capacity for *reflection* on that feeling. Clearly not every feeling or emotion reaches “the strength of an affect.”<sup>10</sup> This explains why Kant says that in “a violent, suddenly aroused affect (of fear, anger, or even joy), the human being is ... *beside himself* ... he has no control over himself.”<sup>11</sup> We are *beside* ourselves because we are robbed of the power to reflectively control ourselves. But because an affect is only temporary it “does [only] a momentary damage to freedom and dominion over oneself.”<sup>12</sup>

This implies that “every affect is blind, either in the choice of its end, or, even if this is given by reason, in its implementation; for it is that movement of the mind that makes it incapable of engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to determine itself in accordance with them.”<sup>13</sup> An affect is blind because it does not allow for *reflection* on what ends are worth pursuing or what means to those ends are best. For example, to help someone from the *affect* of sympathy would be to help them *right away* under the *sudden* influence of an *overpowering feeling* without even the capacity for a moment’s *reflection* as to how best to help them. This is different to the case in which an emotion or feeling of sympathy prompts you to reflect, or leaves you able to reflect, on whether to or how best to help another.

To fill out this account of affects we shall need to look in detail at the many examples of affects that Kant gives in the texts, noted above, in which he makes the distinction between affects and passions. In *On the Philosophers’ Medicine of the Body* Kant lists joy, indignation, astonishment, and fear and hope (such as people experience in games of chance) as affects and notes that during the “sports and jests of conversation ... the enthusiasm and exertion of the conversationalists rises to the limits of an affect.” These affects or “inward motions of the mind” can be “healthful”, “provided they do not reach the point of enervating it [the mind],” since they “produce a good deal of stimulation that can help the ailing body.”<sup>14</sup>

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant notes that affects of the “courageous sort” include anger and “enraged” despair and affects of the “yielding kind” include despondent despair.<sup>15</sup> “The emotions (*Rührungen*) that can reach the strength of an affect” include both the “brave” and “tender” emotions, where tender emotions are affects which involve a “tendency” to “oversensitivity”, such as a “sympathetic pain that will not let itself be consoled.”<sup>16</sup> We are told “sorrow (not dejected sadness) can be counted among the vigorous affects if it is grounded in moral ideas, but if it is grounded in sympathy ... it belongs merely to the mellowing affects.”<sup>17</sup> Gratification, that which “pleases in the sensation”, “can rise to the level of an affect.”<sup>18</sup> In games of chance “the affects of hope, of fear, of joy, of anger, of scorn ... are so lively that as a result the entire business of bodily life, as an inner motion, seems to be promoted, as is proved by the cheerfulness of mood that is generated.” In this case “the affect ... moves the viscera and the diaphragm” and promotes “the feeling of health.”<sup>19</sup> Kant also lists laughter, longing, astonishment, and admiration as affects.<sup>20</sup> In *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant lists the affects of enthusiasm, which he calls sympathy for what is good, and anger, which he contrasts with the passion of hatred.<sup>21</sup>

Kant’s most detailed account of the affects is in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. There Kant defines an enthusiast as a visionary who habitually fails to compare his imaginings with the laws of experience and “does so with affect.”<sup>22</sup> “Dementia accompanied by affect is *madness*,”<sup>23</sup> and “madness accompanied by  *fury*

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(*rabies*), [is] an affect of anger (toward a real or imaginary object).<sup>24</sup> “Anxiety and confusion between hope and joy” are affects which are part of “the play of opposed affects by which the conclusion of” a theatrical piece “advances the life of the spectators” through having “stirred up motion within [them].”<sup>25</sup> “Compassion with the misfortune” of one’s “best friend” can be an affect.<sup>26</sup> Exuberant joy “which is tempered by no concern about pain,” overwhelming sadness “which is alleviated by no hope”, and grief “are affects that threaten life.”<sup>27</sup> Fright, astonishment, anger, shame, and anxiety are all listed as affects. “Laughing with affect is a *convulsive* cheerfulness” and “weeping accompanying the *melting* sensation of a powerless wrath against fate or other human beings” is an affect.<sup>28</sup> Courage can be an “affect”, as opposed to “genuine bravery (strength of virtue)” which is “aroused by reason.”<sup>29</sup> Laughing and crying are affects by which “health is promoted mechanically by nature,” and anger is an affect which can also be a “fairly reliable aid to digestion.”<sup>30</sup>

Many affects are clearly sudden and automatic responses to surprising stimulus which elude conscious control, at least initially. Fright, for example, “is merely a *state* and accidental disposition, dependent for the most part merely on bodily causes, of feeling not prepared enough against a suddenly arising danger.”<sup>31</sup> Kant gives the following example of fright: “when the unexpected approach of the enemy is announced to a commander who is in his dressing gown, this can easily stop the blood in the ventricles of the heart for an instant.”<sup>32</sup> Kant also notes that affects cause (or coincide with), not only physiological changes, but also characteristic facial expressions. For this reason it “is difficult not to betray the imprint of an affect by any [facial] expression,” since even “painstaking restraint in gesture” or “tone” will betray the presence of the affect that one tries to conceal.<sup>33</sup> Kant hypothesises that certain characteristic “gestures,” which are expressions of different affects, are “established by nature” because they are common to human beings of all cultures and climates.<sup>34</sup>

However, some “physical feelings are *related* to the affects” but are not affects, such as “shuddering,” “shivering,” “dizziness and even *seasickness*.”<sup>35</sup> Although Kant is not explicit about this, presumably the reason that he thinks that shivering, shuddering, dizziness, and seasickness are *mere* feelings that cannot be affects is that these are not *intentional* states, states directed *at* something.<sup>36</sup> A person is startled *by* something, angry *at* someone, and so on. As such, different affects and emotions are not characterised simply (or even) in terms of feeling different, but instead (or also) in terms of different intentional objects. For example, for Kant the object of astonishment is something whose novelty exceeds expectation, whereas the object of admiration is something that astonishes us even when the novelty is lost,<sup>37</sup> although both probably *feel* more or less the same. This is part of Kant’s approach to thinking of affects and emotions both from a “*physiological* point of view,” in terms of the internal motions of blood and fluids, and also “*psychologically*,” in terms of a person’s feelings and intentional states such as desires and inclinations.<sup>38</sup>

At one point Kant suggests that emotions and affects are felt responses to things which “gratify” and “please in the sensation” or “pain” and displease in the sensation. This explains why our judgments and emotions do not necessarily coincide and thus why emotions cannot *be* judgments. Kant explains:

A sensation can even displease the one who feels it (like the joy of a needy but right-thinking person over the inheritance from his loving but tightfisted father), ... a deep pain can still please the one who suffers it (the sadness of a widow at the death of her praiseworthy husband), ... a gratification can in addition please (like that in the sciences that we pursue) or a pain (e.g. hatred, envy, or vengefulness) can in addition displease us.<sup>39</sup>

Judgements and emotions (as well as affects) do not necessarily coincide because what we approve or disapprove of in judgment “rests on reason” (Kant calls it “satisfaction in rational judging (*Vernunftbeurteilung*)”), whereas what gratifies or pains in sensation “rests only on the feeling or the prospect (whatever its basis might be) of a possible state of well- or ill-being.”<sup>40</sup> But what we *feel* bears on our well- or ill-being may or may not coincide with a conception of well- or ill-being which we rationally approve of.

This divergence between emotions/affects and judgments allows Kant to explain how a “right-thinking” person can feel the affect of joy when hearing of his father’s death. He feels joy because of the inheritance he will receive, which he needs very much because of his father’s “tightfisted” nature, even though he rationally disapproves of feeling joy on such an occasion. In this case the person’s affect tracks a felt understanding of his well-being, of what is important to him, whereas his rational judgment tracks the justifiable and appropriate emotional response in such circumstances. Of course, judgment and feeling also converge when we rationally approve of our pain, as in the case of the widow who approves of her grief at the loss of her husband, and when we rationally approve of our gratification, as in the case of the person who approves of the pleasure they get from their scientific achievements.

## 2. CONTROLLING THE AFFECTS

Since affects are not themselves failures of willing for which we are directly responsible they are not vices, but merely a lack of virtue. Kant explains:

Reason says [in regard to affects], through the concept of virtue, that one should *get hold of* oneself. Yet this weakness ... coupled with the strength of one’s emotions (*Gemüthsbevegung*) is a *lack of virtue* and, as it were, something childish and weak, which can indeed coexist with the best will (*besten Willen*).<sup>41</sup>

An affect is not the sign of a corrupt or ill will. This is because an affect is something that happens *to you*, not something that *you do*. But while we are not responsible for having individual affects, we are responsible for any failure to cultivate a noble character as required by the duty of apathy, and failure on this front is not compatible with the best will.

However, our feelings do not necessarily follow our rational judgments, and thus simply revising our judgments won’t necessarily change our feelings. But we can gain some control over our affects through practices of habituation and reinforcement. While Kant is well-known for claiming that a duty to have feelings is “an absurdity”,<sup>42</sup> since we cannot feel things at will, this is perfectly compatible with there being a duty to habituate ourselves to have, or not have, certain feelings, because habituation is a matter of will. As such, it is not morally bad on an *individual occasion* to have inappropriate feelings, such as a lack of sympathy for your friend’s loss,<sup>43</sup> since what you feel on any particular occasion is not a matter of will. But it is morally bad not to have attempted to cultivate appropriate feelings through habituation and reinforcement.

Kant takes beneficence to be an important example where habituation is at work. He argues that if “someone practices it [beneficence] often and [has] success in realizing his beneficent intentions, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped.”<sup>44</sup> By *acting* to benefit others you can gradually *habituate* yourself to have *feelings* of love for others. Another of Kant’s favourite examples of habituation is that of polite social interaction. Through becoming accustomed to *treating* people with respect and love in polite social intercourse you can gradually habituate yourself to *feel* respect and love for others.<sup>45</sup> In this way you can cultivate yourself to have the feelings *appropriate* to your duties to other persons. Similarly, Kant argues that we should not avoid places where the poor are to be found, or shun sickrooms and debtor’s prisoners, in order to “cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feeling in us” as an indirect means “to sympathy based on moral principles *and the feeling appropriate to them* [my italics].”<sup>46</sup>

While it is often noted that Kant sees feelings of sympathy as indirectly valuable means, though unreliable ones, to beneficence based on principle, what is not usually noted is that Kant also sees feelings of sympathy as *appropriate emotional responses* to the suffering of others. In general, for Kant feelings can be not merely motivational backup for a will which is not reliably moved by considerations of reason alone, but also appropriate responses on the part of sensibility to principles, people and situations. This is clearest in the case of the feeling of respect for the moral law which is an appropriate emotional response to consciousness of that law.<sup>47</sup> In the same way, love and respect for others and oneself, compassion, sympathy, and moral feeling are all appropriate

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emotional responses to the absolute worth, grounded in universal principles, of rational persons. We have a duty to cultivate and strengthen these feelings through a process of habitual reinforcement. But while we can make progress in this regard, this practice cannot ensure that we *never* have inappropriate feelings.

As well as habituation, which involves general patterns of feeling, Kant also examines the power we have to intentionally strengthen individual feelings into affects or to intentionally fail to prevent this. For example, Kant talks of a person who “lets [my italics] a lively sympathy even for *what is good* rise into an affect.”<sup>48</sup> How does one let this happen? Kant’s clearest example of this process is that of a rich man whose servant “clumsily breaks a beautiful and rare crystal goblet.” If this man “were to compare this loss of *one* pleasure with the multitude of *all* the pleasures that his fortunate position as a rich man offers him” then he “would think nothing of this accident.” However, if he “now *gives himself over completely* to this one feeling of pain ... then it is no wonder that, as a result, he feels as if his entire happiness were lost.”<sup>49</sup> Kant’s point is not that the rich man should not *feel* the loss of his prized goblet, but that he should not intentionally *give himself over completely* to this one feeling. The rich man’s happiness has not been ruined and to feel that it has is to be *insensitive* to the many other pleasures and opportunities that his wealth affords him.

But what of the case where we have lost, not a goblet, but a life-partner or child? In that case it would be appropriate to feel immense grief. Kant cautions, not against feeling grief, but against “the grief that someone broods over intentionally, as something that will end only with his life.” Such a person “has something *pulling on his mind* ... [But] what cannot be changed must be driven from the mind.”<sup>50</sup> The problem is not with this person feeling grief, but his *intentional brooding* on this *one* feeling to the extent that it becomes an overpowering sorrow that will end only with his life. His happiness may indeed be ruined, but there are other things of value besides his happiness, such as the dignity and happiness of other persons, and he should not completely and permanently neglect these valuable things, even in feeling.

Kant is sensitive to the role that imagination and conscious attention can play in both intensifying and diminishing the strength and duration of feelings.<sup>51</sup> This concern leads Kant to focus “on the power of the human mind to master its morbid feelings merely by a firm resolution.”<sup>52</sup> The method for mastering these feelings involves drawing our attention away from the offending feeling. Kant gives the example of someone suffering a feeling of “uneasiness” who “goes on, despite this claim of his inner feeling, to his agenda for the day ... he leaves his oppression (which is then merely local) in its proper place ... and turns his attention to the business at hand.”<sup>53</sup> In this example the man does not brood over his feeling or imagine all the illnesses that it could be a sign of. Instead he carries on with his agenda and does not turn a *local* feeling, one among others, into a *global* feeling or affect which masks the importance of everything else. This represents Kant’s general “Stoic remedy of fixing my thought forcibly on some neutral object” in order to divert “attention from” some sensation, which has the result of dulling the force of that sensation.<sup>54</sup> However, Kant recognises that not *all* feelings can be mastered directly by this method.<sup>55</sup> Further, many affects, such as anger at being poked in the back, are immediate and automatic bodily responses to surprising stimuli. They are not the result of anything we intentionally *do*, such as brood on a feeling, and so cannot be prevented by this method.

Finally, Kant also recognises that preventing and controlling affects will be easier for some people and harder for others due to differences in *temperament*, with the phlegmatic person in particular having the “support of nature” when it comes to fulfilling the duty of apathy.<sup>56</sup> Kant thinks, on the basis of the humoral physiology of his day, that the constitution of a person’s “blood mixture” and other fluids is the primary determinant of his or her temperament. This leads him to hypothesise that there are exactly four “simple temperaments” which result from four types of blood mixtures, heavy, light, cold, and hot.<sup>57</sup> The light-blooded sanguine is particularly susceptible to affects but, due to their thoughtlessness, is unlikely to develop passions. The hot-blooded choleric is susceptible to both affects and passions, especially ambition. The heavy-blooded melancholic and the cold-blooded phlegmatic are both less susceptible to affects, but due to their thoughtfulness and persistence are susceptible to passions.

### 3. WHAT IS A PASSION?

Kant defines a passion as “a sensible *desire* that has become a lasting inclination.”<sup>58</sup> While affects are *temporary* and a species of *feeling*, passions are *lasting* and belong to the *faculty of desire*. However, although passions, along with inclinations and desires, belong to the faculty of desire, they are not desires but very strong inclinations.<sup>59</sup> A desire is an intermittent and temporary source of motivation, whereas an inclination is a habitual desire. An example of a desire is a temporary thirst for water. Once satisfied, the desire disappears. An example of an inclination is a standing and persistent desire to care for someone you love. But how does a passion differ from an inclination? Kant defines passions as “inclinations that make all determinability of the faculty of choice by means of [rational] principles difficult or impossible.”<sup>60</sup> Elsewhere Kant says that “above inclination” there is “another level of the faculty of desire, *passion* ... or an inclination that excludes mastery over oneself,”<sup>61</sup> and an “inclination that can be conquered only with difficulty or not at all by the subject’s reason is *passion*.”<sup>62</sup> A passion therefore is an inclination which is so motivationally powerful that it makes governing yourself on the basis of reasons very difficult or even impossible.

By emphasising that passions are desire-like and not feeling-like, Kant means to account for the persistent nature of passions. Although a passion is a species of desire and not a feeling, a passion is often connected with feelings, including affects. A person who, for example, maintains a passionate hatred for his rival over a long period of time does not always *feel* hatred, even though his passion, his hatred, does not wax and wane but remains persistent. Of course, his passion may also give rise to, or be connected with, intermittent *feelings* of hatred when, for example, he sees his hated rival in the street. Further, being persistent and not temporary, passions do not tend to cause (or involve) characteristic facial expressions and bodily movements in the way that affects do. This is why Kant calls affects “honest and open”, whereas passions are “deceitful and hidden.”<sup>63</sup>

To get a fuller understanding of Kant’s account of the passions we need to turn to his examples of passions. Outside of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* Kant mentions only a few passions, such as hatred, vindictiveness, “visionary rapture”, envy, “addiction to power” and avarice.<sup>64</sup> In *Anthropology* Kant tells us that grief and shame are passions, although shame is only a passion if it involves “tormenting oneself persistently with contempt.”<sup>65</sup> A “*desire for vengeance*” can be a passion and even when “it seems to have disappeared, a secret hatred, called *rancour*, is always left over.”<sup>66</sup> The permissible desire for justice, which is “based on an idea,” can be transformed into “the passion for retaliation, which is often violent to the point of madness.”<sup>67</sup> What Kant calls the “inclination of delusion” can also become a passion, especially when applied to “*competition* among human beings” in the form of the passionate addiction to the playing of games, including gambling.<sup>68</sup> Even a “good-natured desire”, such as “beneficence, is still ... *morally* reprehensible, as soon as it turns into passion.”<sup>69</sup> The “*social inclination* often becomes a passion.”<sup>70</sup> Finally there is “ambition” which is the “ruling passion” of a person with a choleric temperament.<sup>71</sup>

Kant divides the passions into passions “of *natural* (innate) inclinations and passions of inclination that result from human *culture* (acquired).”<sup>72</sup> The natural passions include “the *inclination of freedom and sex*, both of which are connected with affect.” The acquired passions include the “*manias for honour, dominance and possession*, which are not connected with the impetuosity of an affect.”<sup>73</sup> The manias of culture all involve seeking power and influence over others. Honour aims at influencing others through their *opinion* of you, domination through their *fear* of you, and acquiring possessions allows you to influence others through their self-*interest*.<sup>74</sup> Kant also claims that we should think of passions as *manias* or *addictions* (*sucht*), a point which is clear in the terms Kant uses for the passions for honour (*Ehrsucht*), revenge (*Rachsucht*), and dominance (*Herrschaft*).<sup>75</sup>

While passions are connected with reason, passions are without exception irrational. A passion “takes its time and reflects, no matter how fierce it may be, in order to reach its end.”<sup>76</sup> As such, a passion “can be paired with the calmest reflection” and “can even co-exist with rationalizing.”<sup>77</sup> For example, under the influence of the passion of vengeance I may reason calmly and correctly about the best *means* for revenging myself against my hated enemy. I may even be able to rationalise my end (as opposed to rationally justify it) by telling myself that I

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am seeking justice, not vengeance. But even so, my passion still makes me irrational in at least one of two senses: first, because it makes me imprudent and, second, because my end cannot be rationally justified.

Passions make us imprudent because, due to their overwhelming motivational force, they prevent us from rationally comparing the worth of one inclination with the sum of all our other inclinations. And such imprudence is irrational because Kant takes it to be a principle of “sensibly practical ... reason” that we “not please one inclination by placing all the rest in the shade or in a dark corner.”<sup>78</sup> But a passion is an “inclination that prevents reason from comparing it with the sum of all inclinations in respect of a certain choice.”<sup>79</sup> As such, a person with a passion pursues “*part of*” his happiness as if it were “*the whole*.”<sup>80</sup> Kant’s example of ambition illustrates this point. The “ambitious person” still

Wants to be loved by others; he needs pleasant social intercourse with others, the maintenance of his financial position, and the like. However, if he is a *passionately* ambitious person, then he is blind to these ends, though his inclinations still summon him to them, and he overlooks completely the risk he is running that he will be hated by others, or avoided in social intercourse, or impoverished through his expenditures.<sup>81</sup>

By acting, as a result of his passion, in a way that prevents him from meeting his own conception of happiness, the ambitious person is acting irrationally and imprudently. Whereas affects are *irruptive* motivational states which burst in on our goals and plans, passions work by *hijacking* our goals and plans.

But passions are not only imprudent, they are also, Kant claims, “without exception *evil* as well.”<sup>82</sup> In order to defend this claim Kant needs to show that *all* passions involve disrespecting the absolute worth of persons. One reason to think that not all passions do this is that some passions are directed at things and not at persons and therefore cannot involve disrespecting persons. Kant tries to deal with this case by claiming that passions, unlike inclinations, are “always only desires directed by human beings to human beings, not to things.”<sup>83</sup> But Kant’s own example of the passion or mania for possessions, and in particular for money, is an example of a passion which has a thing as its object, money.<sup>84</sup> Other examples include passions for gambling, drugs and alcohol. Are such passions really immoral?

Some passions are *directly* immoral, such as the passion for domination, because they directly involve disrespectfully using other persons as mere means. However, other passions, particularly those directed at things, such as gambling, drugs or alcohol, are not directly immoral. But they are *indirectly* immoral for the same reasons that passions are imprudent, namely because they blind us to the worth or value of things *besides* our passion. And passions can make us blind not only to things which have prudential value but also to things which have moral value. Things which have moral value include the pursuit of the morally obligatory ends of self-perfection and the happiness of others, as well as the fulfilment of moral duties, including the positive duties of beneficence, gratitude and sympathy (not to mention the duty of apathy itself). But a person under the sway of a passion, even one not directly immoral, will tend to be *insensitive* to moral value and therefore will tend to be negligent in the pursuit of morally obligatory ends and in the fulfilment of positive moral duties. For this reason passions, without exception, make us immoral, either directly or indirectly, as well as imprudent.

## 4. CONTROLLING THE PASSIONS

Kant notes that since passions are different to affects, they require a different “method of prevention” and a different “cure.”<sup>85</sup> However, for a person *currently* under the sway of a passion, prevention is already too late and there is no straightforward cure. This is because a passion is such a powerful and persistent inclination that it can “be conquered (*bezwingliche*) only with difficulty or not at all by the subject’s reason.”<sup>86</sup> A passion “prevents [or hinders] (*verhindert*) reason from comparing it with the sum of all inclinations in respect to a certain choice,”<sup>87</sup> and it is therefore an “inclination that excludes (*ausschließt*) mastery over oneself.”<sup>88</sup> However, there are

preventive measures you can undertake to stop your inclinations from turning into passions in the first place, as well as methods for slowly weaning yourself off existing passions.

In discussing one method of cure and prevention Kant argues that “nothing is accomplished by using force against sensibility in the inclination; one must outwit them and ... surrender a barrel for the whale to play with, in order to save the ship.” Kant’s example of this is overcoming an “inclination toward idle rest” by “playing with the fine arts, but most of all through social conversation.”<sup>89</sup> Whereas in dealing with affects we need only shift our focus from the feeling and wait for it to subside, in dealing with passions we need, because of the persistence of inclinations, to actively *re-engage* our sensibility. The best way to deal with a nagging inclination or passion is therefore to actively engage in enjoying *other* pleasures or interacting socially with *other* people. Kant’s passionately ambitious person might, for example, focus on enjoying the pleasures of social interaction, which he also values, in order to gradually lessen the force of his ambition. A second method involves the long-term habituation of our desires and inclinations so that they correspond with our rational judgments. The process for doing this is the same as the process used for feelings and affects, that is, to *act* as you judge that you ought to and, eventually, this will (to some extent) mould your desires and feelings in line with this.<sup>90</sup>

Kant is keenly aware of the way that social pressures can create new desires and gradually reinforce these until they reach the strength of a passion. For this reason Kant lays most blame for the growth of passions on social conditions. He writes:

It is not the instigation of nature that arouses what should properly be called the *passions* ... He is poor (or considers himself so) only to the extent that he is anxious that other human beings will consider him poor and will despise him for it. Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these, assail his nature, which on its own is undemanding, *as soon as he is among human beings*.<sup>91</sup>

Here Kant details how social pressures, combined with our predisposition to humanity (the predisposition to want our worth as a person publically recognised by others), can habituate us into passions for status, power and possessions, as well as promoting passionate envy, ingratitude, and malice.<sup>92</sup> For this reason Kant argues that moral progress against the passions also requires social progress. To work toward this outcome we need, Kant argues, to promote the formation of a voluntary “*ethical community*” which will be, negatively, free from the social pressures which habituate us into acquiring the cultural passions and, positively, encouraging of virtue.<sup>93</sup> Just as certain social conditions can create new passions, different social conditions can help us to overcome passions or never acquire them in the first place. This reminds us that the battle we fight against the passions is never one we fight in isolation.

## 5. DEFENDING THE ARGUMENT FOR THE DUTY OF APATHY

A common way of contrasting the dispute between Aristotelians and Stoics in regard to the passions is to say that the former think that we should *moderate* our passions and the latter think that we should *extirpate* the passions. Given Kant’s claim that we have a duty of apathy, a duty to strive to be free from affects and passions, it seems that his position is closer to that of the Stoics than the Aristotelians. But, as should be clear by now, this is misleading. While Kant does think that we should seek to extirpate our affects and passions, a task which he also thinks that it is impossible to bring to a stable conclusion, he does not think that we should or can extirpate our feelings, emotions, desires, and inclinations. What we should seek to be without are very strong, sudden, and over-powering feelings, that is affects, and very strong, persistent, nagging, and over-powering inclinations, that is passions. We should seek to avoid such immoderate feelings and inclinations since they temporarily (in the case of affects) interfere with and persistently corrupt (in the case of passions) the exercise of our inner freedom. Put like this, Kantian apathy looks more like an Aristotelian moderation view than a Stoic extirpation view.<sup>94</sup>

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But is Kant's defence of the duty of apathy sound? Kant's core argument for the duty of apathy runs as follows:

Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason's) control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond [but includes] forbidding him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of *apathy*); for unless reason holds the reins of government in its own hands, his feelings and inclinations play the master over him.<sup>95</sup>

The duty of apathy follows from the negative command of inner freedom that we not be governed *by* our feelings and inclinations. The positive command is that we *govern ourselves* on the basis of reason, and when we do this we are positively free and thereby exercise (or actualise) our autonomy.<sup>96</sup> But affects and passions are, respectively, feelings and inclinations which, because of their extreme motivational force, make it impossible (or at least very difficult) to govern ourselves. Affects and passions therefore tend to govern us. But we have a duty to avoid being governed by our feelings and inclinations, and therefore we have a duty to strive to be without affects and passions. The duty of apathy therefore follows from Kant's account of freedom and, since this account constitutes a core component of his underlying moral theory, that underlying moral theory positively commits Kant to the duty of apathy.

Simply *having* desires, inclinations, feelings, and emotions does not in itself involve the misuse of, or prevent the proper exercise of, our rational faculties of self-government. This is because these motivational states do not *force* us to do anything. They simply *prompt* us to consider various courses of action. This leaves us free to choose whether or not to act as we are prompted to.<sup>97</sup> As such, it is not a negative requirement of inner freedom that we have *no* sensible motivating states, no feelings or inclinations, but only that we have no states that we *cannot* govern and therefore which govern us. And affects and passions are precisely those sensible motivating states which we *cannot* (or only with great difficulty) govern. This is why we ought to strive to be without them and them alone.

More positively, not only is there no duty to be without governable sensible motivating states (i.e. feelings and inclinations), but it would be both wrong and harmful to want to, or attempt to, extirpate these. Kant argues that the "natural inclinations" are not the "enemy" since they "merely lack discipline." Indeed "*considered in themselves* natural inclinations are *good*, i.e. not reprehensible, and to want to extirpate them would not only be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well; we must rather only curb them."<sup>98</sup> Indeed, the feelings and inclinations which arise out of what Kant calls our predisposition to the good are natural motivational states which are positively directed "*to the good*."<sup>99</sup> They motivate us to preserve and maintain ourselves, to seek sexual relations and care for our offspring, to seek community and social interaction with other human beings, to pursue our own happiness, to want to gain worth in the opinion of others, and to be susceptible to considerations of reasons alone.

Since these sensible motivational states are directed to the good it would be blameworthy to even *want* to be rid of them.<sup>100</sup> These sensible motivational states are directed to the good because they help us to survive as natural beings, which we have a duty to do, given the role they play in alerting us to needs and dangers and motivating us to meet and avoid these respectively. Additionally, without these sensible motivational states we could not form any conception of happiness, because without our inclinations and feelings we would lack the material out of which to develop one. But a world without happiness would be a world that lacked something of great value.<sup>101</sup> Further, social feelings and inclinations, along with a desire for social recognition, can play an important role in moralising our natures and directing us toward moral ends.<sup>102</sup> Finally, being sensibly receptive to rational considerations, in the form of the susceptibility to act out of "simple respect for the moral law" alone, is central to all of morality for Kant.<sup>103</sup>

However, sensible motivational states carry two dangers. The first is that they may tempt us to act otherwise than as we ought to. But this is not the fault of the inclinations or feelings themselves, but of our own *will* (*Willkür*).<sup>104</sup> Since we maintain our capacity to exercise rational control over our motivational states, it must be

that we *wilfully* fail to properly exercise that capacity. This is evidence, Kant argues, of our radical self-chosen propensity to evil, that is, our dispositional *willingness* to (at least sometimes) choose otherwise than as we ought to when it suits us.<sup>105</sup> The second danger is that those motivational states should prove to have a force that is too strong or powerful to be overcome (or at least without great difficulty) by our will. This can occur in two ways: either because we are subject to a strong emotion or feeling which temporarily robs us of our powers of rational reflection, or because we are subject to a persistent and overwhelming inclination which makes the proper exercise of self-government impossible (or very difficult), that is, when we are subject to affects or passions. Since affects and passions, each in their own way, make being rational impossible (or at least very difficult), it follows that we ought to strive to be without affects and passions *insofar as they disrupt the exercise of rational self-government*.

One way to try to avoid this conclusion would be to argue that affects and passions are not states that make the exercise of rational self-government impossible (or at least immensely difficult). But this response will not work because Kant *defines* affects and passions as states which make the exercise of rational self-government impossible (or at least immensely difficult). Perhaps the worry is that Kant is wrong to think that we *are* ever subject to feelings or inclinations (whatever we call them) that are so strong that it is impossible (or very difficult) to rationally govern ourselves in the face of them. But this would be a very hard claim to defend as it would involve explaining away phenomena, such as fits of rage (an affect) and overpowering addictions (a passion), which clearly seem to belong to this category.

Thus far we have only considered an internal critique of Kant's duty of apathy. In contrast, the external critic is happy to grant that Kant's underlying moral theory commits him to the duty of apathy. But, so the worry goes, the so-called duty of apathy is not really a duty at all. This is because, the external critic claims, it is not morally obligatory to strive to be without affects and passions. Since Kant's moral theory commits him to this duty there must be something wrong with his moral theory. But why think that there is no duty of apathy? Of course, if we start from some alternative moral theory, such as utilitarianism, we may think either that there is no duty of apathy at all or that sometimes, depending on the overall consequences, there is no duty to rid ourselves of certain affects or passions. However, the Kantian will not be moved by this since they will reject the alternative moral starting point of such arguments. As such, what we are after here is an external argument that starts out from what is, for the Kantian at least, a (more or less) uncontentious moral starting point and arrives at the conclusion that it is problematic to claim that there is a duty of apathy. Is there such an argument? To tackle this question we shall break up the duty of apathy into its two parts, the duty to be without affects and the duty to be without passions.

While Kant's view of the affects is nuanced, his condemnation of the passions is unequivocal: "no human being wishes to have passions."<sup>106</sup> However, many people seem to want to have passions. A person might, for example, be *passionate* about protecting rainforests, and we would normally take this to be a good thing, or at least not morally wrong. But there is nothing wrong on Kant's account with a passion in *this* sense. In *this* sense a passion is something that we care very deeply about, not something that makes us utterly irrational by placing all our *other* cares into a dark light. For example, the passionate gambling addict allows his passion (in Kant's sense) to ruin his marriage, break up his family, put him in a state of poverty, destroy his friendships, and so on. Who would *want* a passion in this sense? In contrast, someone who cares very deeply about protecting rainforests may devote a great deal of her time and energy to this cause. But she does not ignore all her *other* cares and duties. She does not let her passion for rainforest conservation ruin her marriage, career and friendships, or stop her from fulfilling her duties.<sup>107</sup> While such a person is *passionate* about rainforest conservation, this does not constitute a *passion* in Kant's sense. The duty to be without passions does not require that we not care very deeply about things, only that we not care irrationally about them.

But at what point does caring about something turn into a passion or mania (*Sucht*)? At the point where the inclination becomes so strong that we cannot control it and it thereby makes us irrational in the double sense of being imprudent and immoral. This means that there will not always be a clear line between an inclination and a passion, because there is not always a clear line between inclinations which we can and cannot control.

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However, it is not simply acting irrationally or immorally that is a sign of the presence of a passion because our practical irrationality is often due to our wilfulness and the radical corruptness of our disposition. But when we have a passion we are not *badly* governing ourselves in regard to our ends, we are not governing ourselves at all. This is why passions also make us imprudent and not just immoral.

To illustrate this point consider Bernard Williams' famous example of *Gauguin*. Gauguin abandons his family for the sake of his art. Ignoring issues of historical accuracy, Williams imagines a Gauguin "who is concerned about these claims [of his family] and what is involved in their being neglected (we may suppose this to be grim), [but nevertheless] ... opts for [a life devoted to painting]."<sup>108</sup> Gauguin is torn between two things that he cares about and, since he thinks that they are mutually exclusive, he opts, on reflection, for one over the other. This case is unlike my example of the passionate gambler. The passionate gambler is not opting, on reflection, for a life of gambling over keeping his family. Offered the choice he would, unlike Gauguin, choose his family over gambling. But he is simply pushed along by his passion for gambling and this ends up costing him his family. It is one thing, like Gauguin, to decide on reflection that, all things considered, one end is worth pursuing at the expense of all others. It is another thing to, like my passionate gambler, be compelled by the strength of your inclination to ignore other ends that, all things considered, you think that you ought not to ignore.

Of course we could imagine another version where Gauguin *is* simply pushed by his passion for painting to abandon his family. It might be that some people might even *want* a passion if it gives them the unrelenting drive needed to achieve success in some worthwhile field, such as painting or science, even if it costs them dearly in other areas of their lives. After all, not all passions obviously ruin your life in the way that a passion for gambling does. For example, a person who is passionately ambitious, or has a passion for money or dominance over other persons, may well lead what we regard, superficially at least, as a successful life. But such a person will fail to live prudently and morally because they will fail to govern themselves both in terms of their *own* conception of a good life (imprudence) and on the basis of the absolute worth of the humanity in themselves and others (immorality). While an inclination can lead us to govern ourselves in terms of a conception of our own good that is at odds with morality, only a passion prevents us from governing ourselves *even* in terms of a conception of our own good. And what good reason could we have for wanting to *persistently* lose control over ourselves in this way?

Even if Kant is right about the passions, is he also right about the affects? What is wrong with occasional bouts of intense affect, such as moments of overpowering joy? While it might be good to be without some affects on some occasions, can it really be that we should strive to *always* be without *all* affects? Further, given that Kant recognises that affects sometimes have both prudential and health benefits, is it really morally required that we strive to be without even prudential and health-promoting affects? Of course, we need to keep in mind that not all emotions and feelings have the force of an affect and, when they do not, there is no duty to be without them. Further, an affect is not simply a *strong* feeling, but a feeling which temporarily causes you to lose control of yourself and which makes reflection impossible. Still, even granting all this, might there not be moments when it would be good, or at least not wrong, to want to have affects?

But wanting to be in a state of affect seems to stand in the same relation to inner freedom as wanting to be in a state of slavery stands to outer freedom.<sup>109</sup> In both cases we hand over the role of governing ourselves to someone or something else, and that is incompatible with the dignity of our humanity. But, unlike slavery, a state of affect is only temporary. Does that matter? No, since *while* you are under the sway of an affect you cannot choose to exit that state *at will* and, during that time, the affect might govern you by making you *do* something *rashly*. And wanting to be in such a state seems to be incompatible with properly valuing the absolute worth of your humanity.

But not every affect is the same and not every affect is likely to result in rash action. It is not surprising that Kant's chief example of an affect is anger, because anger *can* easily lead to the sort of rash action which, on reflection, you would not have chosen and regret having done. But what about other affects? Under the sway

of the affect of sympathy you suddenly hug your grieving friend, under the sway of joy you jump up in the air, under the sway of sorrow you weep uncontrollably, and so on. These actions and bodily movements are spontaneous *expressions* of your affects and on reflection you may not regret having expressed them. Indeed, to be always trying to stifle such expressions seems both harmful and wrong. Does the duty of apathy require this? Must every action go through the filter of rational reflection, even spontaneously jumping with joy?

I think that Kant's answer to these questions is, or should be given his broader theory, in the negative. This is because the *moral* importance of, for example, jumping with joy is negligible. This consideration leads Kant, in the very section in which he defends the claim that "virtue necessarily presupposes apathy", to warn against the "fantastically virtuous who allows *nothing to be morally indifferent* ... and strews all his steps with duties, as with mantraps ... Fantastic virtue is concern with petty details which, were it admitted in the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue into tyranny."<sup>110</sup> While Kant's examples of fantastic virtue involve making a moral issue of whether "I eat meat or fish, drink wine or beer, supposing that both agree with me,"<sup>111</sup> given that this warning occurs in the context of Kant's discussion of apathy, it is reasonable to suppose that Kant is also thinking about feelings and affects when he issues this warning. Indeed, the very point underlying the warning against fantastic virtue is that, of course, not every action and bodily movement should be made into a moral issue. A concern with the morality of, for example, jumping with joy, a fantastic concern to ensure that *every* action or bodily movement *always* goes through the filter of rational reflection, no matter how insignificant, is a form of self-tyranny, not reasonable self-government.

Kant's primary moral concern is not with sudden affective responses to our environment, such as jumping back with fear, or with the sort of spontaneous expression of emotional states in our face and voice which is essential to proper social interaction. What Kant is morally concerned with is virtue and noble character. This is why apathy is not about a "lack of feeling" or "subjective indifference with respect to objects of choice", but about a *rational* engagement with value. As such, apathy is different "from indifference because in cases of moral apathy feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling only because respect for the law is more powerful than all such feelings together."<sup>112</sup> Moral feelings are indicative of "taking an interest" (or disinterest) in an action or its effects *because* it is morally demanded (or forbidden).<sup>113</sup> Moral feelings are therefore based on sensitivity to a particular sort of value, namely moral value, including the absolute worth of persons. A person with properly cultivated moral feelings will not *feel* (or feel strongly) the force of her emotions when they prompt her to do something that is morally forbidden because she will be more emotionally sensitive to the higher worth to which her moral feelings are appropriate responses.

The duty of apathy is therefore a duty which aims at preventing very powerful subjective states from making us insensitive to things we judge rationally to be of most value. The person who is sensitive to what is of most value does not get *carried away* about the worth of any *one* good in isolation from other goods. They do this by cultivating their moral feelings, habituating themselves to have emotions and desires which are in accordance with their rational judgments, and controlling and limiting (where possible) strong feelings and inclinations by employing the techniques outlined in previous sections. This is all part of the virtuous agent's "considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice."<sup>114</sup> Such an agent has engaged in reflection about what is worth doing and, as a result, has a practical commitment to her own happiness within moral bounds, to the pursuit of the obligatory ends of self-perfection and the happiness of others, and to the fulfilment of her moral duties. The virtuous agent is concerned with strong, sudden, temporary gusts of feeling *only insofar as these are likely to actively interfere with these practical commitments*. Where they do not have any bearing on these commitments, the virtuous agent knows that she need not worry about them, morally speaking.

Once we properly appreciate this point, the intuitive concerns that motivate the external critic of the duty of apathy lose much of their force. For example, Patricia Greenspan questions "the familiar ideal" of apathy on the grounds that "the emotions may often be useful to us ... for instance, in social communication – as long as we can control their consequences."<sup>115</sup> But Kantian apathy requires, not the sort of detachment which Greenspan finds problematic, but the sort of self-government which she finds appealing.

### 6. CONCLUSION

The virtuous agent is keenly aware that the activity of self-government must not descend into tyranny and an exaggerated concern with petty details. Practical wisdom is required to achieve this practised and ready awareness of what bears on the dignity of persons, oneself and others, and what does not. Seeking to prevent affects from interfering with this firm commitment to virtue and the proper execution of this commitment is something that we have a duty to do. It is the duty of apathy. But that duty does not require a petty and tyrannical concern with all feelings, even all affects, and the spontaneous expression of these in actions, such as jumping with joy, which do not interfere either with the commitment to virtue or its proper execution. Nor does that duty require that we not care deeply about things, but only that we remain capable of governing ourselves in terms of what we care about. The duty of apathy is therefore not about preventing the spontaneous expression of emotional states, stopping the movement of healthy internal motions, or hindering deep affective engagement with those people and things we care most about. The duty of apathy is about preventing powerful internal states from hindering a *rational* responsiveness, in both action and feeling, to moral worth, and other forms of value. Affects and passions are those sensible motivational states that are of moral and pragmatic concern because they are so motivationally powerful that they interfere with such a rational engagement with value. The duty of apathy is the duty to develop a noble character by striving to be without these sensible motivational states just insofar as they interfere with the commitment to, and disrupt the proper exercise of, rational self-government.

Finally, some may worry that the duty of apathy, as I have defended it here, is an uninteresting truism. Kantians should welcome this worry. After all, Kant is not trying to invent morality from scratch, but to provide, by and large, a rational foundation for common sense morality.<sup>116</sup> The more general worry that this paper has been addressing is that Kant's views on the role of emotions and desires in a moral life are highly problematic and at odds with common sense morality. Insofar as I have shown, at least in regard to the duty of apathy, that this is not the case, the argument here has achieved its goal.<sup>117</sup>

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## NOTES

1. See, for example, Marcia Baron, *Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Maria Borges, "Physiology and the Controlling of Affects in Kant's Philosophy," *Kantian Review* 13, no. 2 (2008); Lara Denis, "Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy," *Kantian Review* 4 (2000); Stephen Engstrom, "The Inner Freedom of Virtue," in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Paul Guyer, *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); Nancy Sherman, *Making a Necessity of Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kelly D. Sorensen, "Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions," *Kantian Review* 6 (2002). While Denis' paper focuses on apathy, her discussion largely ignores the role of passions. Engstrom covers some similar territory but his account of apathy is too brief. Guyer agrees that we have a duty to rid ourselves of affects and passions but, wrongly, thinks that "Kant does not have very much to say about how we can actually do that" (140).
2. See, for example, Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Anne Baxley, *Kant's Theory of Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Patrick Frierson, *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3. Immanuel Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals," in *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:407. Hereafter MM.
4. MM, 6:380.
5. MM, 6:407.
6. In the quoted passage from the last paragraph of XV Kant implies that the "duty of *apathy*" concerns both affects and passions since he explicitly refers to both *feelings* (to which affects belong) and *inclinations* (to which passions belong) which govern us. However, in the next section Kant refers to "moral apathy" as the "absence of affects" only without referring to passions (MM, 6:407-09). In one text Kant says that apathy "consists in freedom from ... passions" alone, which he then differentiates from affects (PMB, 15:940), and in another text, without however mentioning apathy or affects, Kant says that we must "clear away the passions" (LP, 9:486). As such, Kant is not completely clear whether the duty of apathy is supposed to cover *both* affects and passions. But since he thinks that there is a duty to be without both and since his definition of apathy as freedom from being governing by both feelings and inclinations implies both, I will take the duty of apathy to imply freedom from both affects and passions. A similar claim is made in Engstrom, "The Inner Freedom of Virtue", 310. See Immanuel Kant, "On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body," in *Anthropology, History, and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15:940. Hereafter PMB. And Immanuel Kant, "Lectures on Pedagogy," *Anthropology, History, and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9:486-87. Hereafter LP.
7. MM, 6:407-09.
8. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7:252. Hereafter AP.
9. AP, 7:254.
10. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:273. Hereafter CJ.
11. AP, 7:166.
12. AP, 7:267.
13. CJ, 5:272.
14. PMB, 15:940, 949.
15. CJ, 5:272.
16. CJ, 5:273.
17. CJ, 5:276.
18. CJ, 5:331.
19. CJ, 5:331-32.
20. CJ, 5:178, 272, 332.
21. MM, 6:409.
22. AP, 7:202.
23. AP, 7:203.
24. AP, 7:220.
25. AP, 7:232.
26. AP, 7:253.
27. AP, 7:254.
28. AP, 7:255.
29. AP, 7:257-58.
30. AP, 7:260-61.
31. AP, 7:255.

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32. AP, 7:256.
33. AP, 7:300-01.
34. AP, 7:301.
35. AP, 7:263-64.
36. See John Deigh, "Primitive Emotions," in *Thinking About Feeling*, ed. Robert C Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 9-15.
37. CJ, 5:272.
38. AP, 7:286.
39. CJ, 5:331.
40. CJ, 5:331.
41. MM, 6:408.
42. MM, 6:401.
43. As Denis claims: Denis, "Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy," 63-4
44. MM, 6:402.
45. AP, 7:282; MM, 6:473.
46. MM, 6:457. My italics.
47. Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason," in *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5:73. Hereafter CPR.
48. MM, 6:408-09. My italics.
49. AP, 7:254.
50. AP, 7:236.
51. PMB, 15:939, 944.
52. Immanuel Kant, "The Conflict of the Faculties," in *Religion and Rational Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7:98.
53. "Conflict", 7:104.
54. "Conflict", 7:106-07.
55. "Conflict", 7:112.
56. "Conflict", 7:254; CJ, 5:272.
57. AP, 7:286-87.
58. MM, 6:408.
59. Note that a *desire* is just one type of incentive, along with inclinations and passions, that belong to the *faculty of desire*. As such, the faculty of desire is broader than just desires.
60. CJ, 5:272.
61. Immanuel Kant, "Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason," *Religion and Rational Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:29. Hereafter R.
62. AP, 7:251.
63. AP, 7:251-52.
64. CJ, 5:272, 275; MM, 6:408, 426; R: 6:93-94.
65. AP, 7:255.
66. AP, 7:270.
67. AP, 7:271.
68. AP, 7:275.
69. AP, 7:266.
70. AP, 7:277.
71. AP, 7:289.
72. AP, 7:267.
73. AP, 7:268. See also R: 6:93-94.
74. AP, 7:272.
75. AP, 7:266.
76. AP, 7:252.
77. AP, 7:265.
78. AP, 7:266.
79. AP, 7:265.
80. CpR, 5:73.
81. AP, 7:266.
82. AP, 7:267.
83. AP, 7:268.

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84. This is why, unlike the manias for honour and dominance, Kant says that the mania for possessions is “not always morally reprehensible.” AP, 7:274.
85. AP, 7:251.
86. AP, 7:251.
87. AP, 7:265.
88. R, 6:29.
89. AP, 7:152.
90. MM, 6:402.
91. R, 6:93-4.
92. See: Paul Formosa, “Kant on the Radical Evil of Human Nature,” *The Philosophical Forum* 38, no. 3 (2007).
93. R, 6:94.
94. See also: Lara Denis, “Kant’s Conception of Virtue,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Sherman, *Making a Necessity of Virtue*.
95. MM, 6:408.
96. On the relationship between inner freedom and autonomy see: Engstrom, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue.” Also see Guyer’s account of autonomy as autocracy in: Guyer, *Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom*, 136-41.
97. MM, 6:213.
98. R, 6:57-58.
99. R, 6:26-28.
100. However in the *Groundwork* Kant says that “it must be the universal wish of every rational being to [want to] be altogether free from them [the inclinations].” Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” in *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:428. This expresses a negative sentiment toward the inclinations which is incompatible with Kant’s later view that it is blameworthy to even *want* (or wish) to extirpate the inclinations. I suspect that Kant changed his mind on this point as a result of developing the distinctions, which postdate the *Groundwork*, between *Wille* and *Willkür* and between passions and inclinations. These distinctions allow Kant to say that every rational being must wish to be free, not of inclinations in general, but of *passions* in particular.
101. CpR 5:110-11.
102. See: Paul Formosa, “Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good,” *Kantian Review* 15, no. 1 (2010).
103. R, 6:27.
104. R, 6:57-59.
105. See: Formosa, “Kant on the Radical Evil of Human Nature.”
106. AP, 7:253.
107. Of course we could imagine a conservationist who develops a passion for conversation or a gambler who keeps his gambling under control and so does not develop a passion.
108. Bernard Williams, *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 23.
109. MM, 6:406.
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117. I would like to thank this journal’s two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

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