Educating for Intellectual Humility and Conviction

DUNCAN PRITCHARD ⓘD

It is argued that two plausible goals of the educational enterprise are (i) to develop the intellectual character, and thus the intellectual virtues, of the student, and (ii) to develop the student's intellectual self-confidence, such that they are able to have conviction in what they believe. On the face of it, however, these two educational goals seem to be in tension with one another, at least insofar as intellectual humility is a genuine intellectual virtue. This is because intellectual humility seems to require that one does not have conviction in one's beliefs. It is argued that this tension can be avoided so long as we have the right account of intellectual humility in play. This enables us to understand what educating for intellectual humility might involve, and how it might co-exist with the educational development of a student's intellectual self-confidence.

A PUZZLE

Let us begin with a puzzle. For the purposes of this essay, I will take it as obvious that at least one of the roles of education is to instill good character traits into the student. Relatedly, I take it that this entails that educational practices ought to help students develop their *virtues*—i.e., those character traits that constitute excellences of character. If that is right, then it follows that one of the roles of education is to develop the student's *intellectual* character, and thus her intellectual virtues specifically. Indeed, one might plausibly argue—or, at least, I have argued elsewhere anyway—that the overarching epistemic role of education is to develop intellectual character and thus the intellectual virtues.[1]

Here is another goal of education that we would surely find compelling, which is to enable students to have self-confidence, and thereby to have the strength of their convictions. We do not want our students to be wracked with self-doubt, nor do we want them to be the kind of people who are willing to change their minds at the drop of a hat (or, perhaps worse, at the first sign of any resistance to their opinions, such as in their peer group). Just as the virtues are held to be important components of a good life, so we might reasonably imagine that self-confidence and conviction also play a role in this regard. Indeed, we might plausibly contend that self-confidence

and conviction are *pre-requisites* for leading a virtuously good life. As we might put the point, how could one manifest virtues while in the grip of self-doubt?[2]

Here is where we get the puzzle, for is not *humility* a virtue? It certainly looks like one. It is hard, for example, to imagine an ideally virtuous person who lacks such a trait. It also has the right structural properties to be a virtue. Humility seems to be the kind of trait that one needs to cultivate, for instance. One is not born humble, except in the purely descriptive sense of having a humble origin; rather one becomes humble because one has been raised appropriately (or has trained oneself to be humble). Like other virtues, humility is thus acquired and maintained in a distinctive fashion. Moreover, like other virtues, humility lies on a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. The arrogant person lacks humility, and so exhibits a vice of deficiency. But one can also be excessively humble, by debasing oneself continually and unnecessarily, and that would be a vice of excess. In any case, in what follows we will grant the claim that humility is a virtue.[3] If that is right, then it surely ought to follow that *intellectual humility* is also a virtue.[4]

But does not intellectual humility stand precisely in opposition to self-confidence and conviction? Indeed, is not manifesting self-confidence and conviction the kind of thing that the intellectually arrogant, and thus intellectually viceful, person does? Relatedly, if there is this tension between, on the one hand, intellectual humility as an intellectual virtue, and, on the other hand, self-confidence and conviction, then how is the educator to coherently educate for both? Must they sacrifice one of these goals at the altar of the other? If so, which one? Or is there a way of reconciling these goals of education?

In this paper I will be arguing for the latter resolution. As we will see, in order to do this we need to have the right conception of intellectual humility (and thus humility *simpliciter*) in play, as the puzzle in effect trades on erroneous (albeit widely held, as we will see) conceptions of this notion. Once we understand the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility correctly, then the puzzle will disappear and it will be clear how an educator can—indeed, should—consistently aim for the educational goal of developing intellectual character while also instilling within students a healthy level of self-confidence.

HOW NOT TO THINK ABOUT INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

Before turning to intellectual humility, specifically, let us step back a little and consider the nature of the virtue of humility more generally. Given that, as we just noted, humility is opposed to the vice of arrogance, it is tempting to think that it must involve a *downgraded*, and hence inaccurate, assessment of oneself in the relevant respects (e.g. of one's abilities and achievements).[5] This certainly seems to be closest to our everyday conception of humility, in that on this conception the genuinely humble do not merely behave *as if* they have a downgraded conception of themselves (which is compatible with this being a mere pretence), but rather they really do imagine that they

are somehow 'lesser' than they in fact are (think, for example, of the stories of the humility shown by certain saints).

Such a conception of humility as a virtue is problematic, however, since it implies that the virtuous subject ought to have *inaccurate* beliefs about herself. (Remember in this regard that the humble person on this conception is not merely acting as if she has a downgraded conception of herself, but that she really does think less of herself in this way). But how can virtue demand inaccuracy? Notice that on this account of the virtue of humility, having an accurate conception of oneself in the relevant respects would constitute a vice!

Indeed, we can bring this point into sharper relief by letting such an account of the virtue of humility carry over into an account of intellectual humility specifically. The idea would now be that one is required to have a downgraded, and hence inaccurate, conception of one's intellectual/cognitive abilities and achievements specifically. But how could it be that an intellectual virtue—a character trait that is specifically geared towards the epistemic good—is *constituted* by inaccuracy in this way? Moreover, as before, having an accurate conception of one's intellectual/cognitive abilities and achievements would now constitute an intellectual vice, which on the face of it seems absurd.

If we think that inaccuracy and virtue—intellectual virtue at any rate—cannot go hand-in-hand in this manner, then how might we tweak the proposal to accommodate this fact? There are two main ways one might be tempted to go, but neither is particularly appealing on closer analysis. One idea could be to argue that she who manifests the virtue of humility is merely required to act *as if* she has a downgraded conception of herself in the relevant respects, while at the same time in fact having a broadly accurate conception of herself in this regard. The same would go, *mutatis mutandis*, for manifestations of the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility.

That would evade the problem in hand, since there is now no demand for inaccuracy in one's beliefs being a requirement for virtue, much less intellectual virtue. But the inherent tension in the idea that a genuine manifestation of virtue should demand inaccuracy in one's beliefs is here merely replaced with a new inherent tension along the same general lines. For is not the idea that a genuine manifestation of virtue should require pretence of this fashion *prima facie* implausible? It seems to suggest that there is something inauthentic, if not simply deceitful, about the practices of the virtuous subject. Indeed, this account generates a very similar problem to that faced by the previous proposal, in that it now follows that someone who transparently acts in ways that manifest what she in fact believes about herself—i.e. who is not pretending to have a downgraded conception of herself—would be on this view be manifesting a vice, and that seems very counterintuitive.

This problem becomes even more marked once we turn our attentions to intellectual humility specifically. Given that intellectual virtues are directed towards the intellectual goods, how can they be compatible with a manifestation of intellectual virtue that constitutively demands pretence on one's part that will inevitably mislead others as to what one truly believes about

oneself? Similarly, how could it be that someone who does not mislead others in this fashion, or otherwise pretends to be other than they are in this regard, would thereby be manifesting an intellectual vice, which is what this view seems to entail?

With this in mind, one might think that one can capture what drives the folk conception of humility without having to appeal to either inaccuracy or pretence. Perhaps it is enough that one simply recognises one's limitations and failings, and thereby takes due ownership of them? That is, one might argue that our natural state is one in which we tend to *over*estimate ourselves (e.g. our achievements, the level of our abilities, and so on), in which case there is room for the humble to be those who set themselves apart from the crowd by cultivating the trait of being humble, and thereby forming a more accurate conception of themselves, one that they actively embrace (i.e. rather than rail against).[6] If that is right, then it suggests a conception of the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility such that one recognises one's specifically cognitive limitations and failings, and hence one takes ownership of this more accurate picture of one's cognitive agency (i.e. as before, by being content to embrace these limitations). Indeed, just such an account of intellectual humility has arguably been the dominant account in the recent literature, with variations of this view proposed by a number of prominent authors.[7]

This proposal certainly fares better than the idea that one should have a downgraded conception of oneself, or the related claim that one should have an accurate conception of oneself but merely act as if one has a downgraded conception of oneself regardless. This is because it is not committed the idea of (intellectual) virtue demanding either inaccuracy in one's beliefs or pretence about what one believes, both of which we noted above were problematic in this regard, particularly as regards the virtue of intellectual humility. Relatedly, this account is not committed to claiming that manifestations of accurate belief about oneself, or behaviour which honestly displays what one in fact believes about oneself, are thereby expressions of vice, as the former two accounts entailed. Indeed, on the present view one can think of the relevant (intellectual) vices of excess and deficiency in terms of, respectively, overestimating one's (intellectual) achievements and abilities and underestimating one's (intellectual) achievements and abilities.

Unfortunately, this account of the virtue of humility, and thus intellectual humility, is problematic in other ways. This is because it does not capture the essentially other-regarding aspect of humility. Imagine, for example, someone who is completely brilliant at everything she does—and far superior to everyone else—and she knows it. On this proposal, this person could be fully aware of the very limited nature of her cognitive failings compared to everyone else, take full ownership of those cognitive failings (small as they are), and yet nonetheless act in superior ways to those around her. For example, she might (privately at least) belittle the abilities and achievements of those she works with, look down her nose at others, make fun of how useless they are at various tasks compared to her, and so on. On this account, such arrogance would be entirely compatible with the manifestation of the virtue of humility, since this behaviour would be firmly

rooted in our subject's entirely accurate conception of herself. And yet such manifestly arrogant behaviour is surely deeply incompatible with the virtue of humility; indeed, as we saw above, it is the very vice of deficiency that is associated with this virtue.

The same applies if we extend this account to intellectual humility. Someone who is intellectually brilliant, and knows full well that they are, can own their cognitive fallibility and cognitive limitations (such as they are), whilst nonetheless acting in superior ways to those around them. For example, they might play (harmless) intellectual games with people for their own amusement, or simply feel a warm smug feeling whenever they engage with their intellectual inferiors. This would surely be to manifest intellectual arrogance, which is the vice of deficiency that corresponds with the virtue of intellectual humility. And yet given that they clearly are intellectually superior to those around them, acting in this way would be entirely compatible with them owning their intellectual limitations.

One might respond to such cases by arguing that although there is vice in play, it is not viceful behaviour that has anything to do with the manifestation of (intellectual) humility. So, for example, one might claim that the vice in play in each case concerns a separate virtue like kindness (insofar as that is a genuine virtue; I take no stand on this here). If that were right, then one could argue that the individuals in both of these cases are manifesting the virtue of (intellectual) humility, it is just that they are failing to manifest other virtues that they ought to have.

But I do not think that this is at all plausible as a response to the difficulty in hand. For one thing, as we noted above, the behaviours being exhibited by our viceful agents seem precisely to concern a specific deficiency with regard to the virtue of (intellectual) humility. These behaviours are explicitly arrogant, after all. Moreover, remember that viceful behaviour can be viceful with regard to more than one vice, just as virtuous behaviour can be virtuous with regard to more than one virtue. So there is nothing amiss in the idea that our individuals are manifesting behaviour that is both arrogant and unkind, just as there can be virtuous behaviour that is both, say, courageous and just.

Furthermore, notice that although we described the cases such that there was, arguably anyway, other viceful behaviour on display, such as unkindness, it is far from obvious that this is essential to such cases. What is key to these examples is just that the individuals concerned, despite owning their cognitive failings and limitations, are nonetheless completely self-regarding. With that in mind, we can easily conceive of such cases where no other vices are on display. Perhaps, for example, our protagonists simply keep reminding others of their (intellectual) achievements, and of their own (intellectual) superiority, but without any malice or unkindness on display. Indeed, we can even imagine that they have the good social sense not to behave in ways that might annoy others, but are secretly self-regarding, in that they are focused on their own (intellectual) superiority nonetheless, even despite this being hidden by their outward behaviour. That would suffice to determine that one is not (intellectually) humble, but rather arrogant (albeit secretly perhaps). The upshot is that merely owning one's failings

and limitations, cognitive or otherwise, is not enough to manifest the virtue of (intellectual) humility.[8]

INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY RECONSIDERED

So how, then, are we to understand humility, and thus intellectual humility, if not along the problematic lines just described? I think that we can learn from the difficulties facing these other proposals in order to work out what the right account should be. Let us recap on what we have discovered so far. First, that the virtues, especially the intellectual virtues, cannot constitutively involve inaccuracy. Second, that the virtues, perhaps especially the intellectual virtues, cannot constitutively involve pretence, deceit or inauthenticity. Third, that mere ownership of one's (intellectual) failings and limitations does not suffice for (intellectual) humility, as one could satisfy this requirement while nonetheless being completely self-regarding in ways that are incompatible with (intellectual) humility.

Putting all this together, what we want is an account of (intellectual) humility that involves an accurate conception of oneself in the relevant respects, involves no pretence, deceit or inauthenticity, and which excludes the kinds of self-regarding traits that were allowed on the 'self-ownership' account of (intellectual) humility. I claim that what is key here is that humility, and thus intellectual humility, is an essentially *other*-regarding virtue. What I mean by this is that humility involves the essentially other-directed dispositions of, for example, respecting other people's abilities and achievements, being genuinely open to criticism of one's actions, being willing to respectfully listen to other people's opinions, and so on. In contrast, humility is inconsistent with one having those characteristic dispositions that are involved in excessive *self*-regard, such as conceit, arrogance, haughtiness and so on. Similarly, intellectual humility will involve the intellectual equivalents of these characteristically other-regarding dispositions, such as being open to points of view different from one's own, being willing to change one's mind if necessary, being willing to further reflect on the soundness of one's beliefs if called upon to do so, and so on.[9]

Note that it is important to such dispositions—in keeping with the manifestations of virtues more generally—that they are grounded in the right kinds of motivational states. In order to properly manifest these essentially other-regarding dispositions, the dispositions need to arise out of a genuine concern and respect for others; this cannot be mere play-acting. Acting as if one respects other peoples' opinions, when in fact one secretly does not respect other peoples' points of view, is not to manifest an essentially other-regarding disposition in the sense that interests us here. Accordingly, when, for example, the intellectually humble listen carefully to the opinions of others, reflect on them, and engage with others accordingly, in a spirit of joint intellectual enterprise, then this is not a pretence on their part, but a manifestation of genuine intellectual respect for the other party (even if, as we will see in a moment, that other party is by all accounts their intellectual inferior).

This way of thinking about intellectual humility not only excludes pretence in relevant respects but is also not in conflict with the intellectual goal of accuracy. For example, one might accurately recognise that one is better informed about the topic in hand to those around one, and yet nonetheless exhibit this virtue. Recognising this intellectual superiority, after all, need not prevent one from being suitably respectful to other people's viewpoints. Now one might initially be puzzled by this line. For if one really does accurately recognise one's intellectual superiority, then why would one be respectful of the opinions of one's intellectual inferiors? Put another way, insofar as one does behave in respectful ways towards their opinions, then is not one simply humouring them, such that this is really a kind of pretence on one's part, rather than genuine intellectual respect?

This complaint misunderstands the nature of an other-regarding virtue like (intellectual) humility. It is inevitably the case that one might well not learn very much from an engagement with someone who is an intellectual inferior with regard to the topic in hand. Even this possibility should not be discounted, however, particularly in the educational context that interests us. The teacher, after all, is often in a situation of being intellectual superior to her pupils with regard to the teaching subject matter at hand. And yet, as all teachers will recognise, it is not uncommon that in trying to explain difficult new material to those unfamiliar with it that one gains a new insight into that topic (for example, as when the pupil asks an unexpected question which makes one look at the topic in a new way).

But even if we grant that the possibility of learning something from this engagement with the less informed subject has been discounted, this does not undermine the importance of manifesting intellectual humility. For the whole point of this being an other-regarding virtue is that it is not to be evaluated in terms of one's own intellectual gains in manifesting it. Rather, it should be evaluated in terms of how manifestation of this virtue intellectually benefits others.[10] I think the best way to capture this thought is to conceive of intellectual humility as being rooted in a genuine intellectual *concern* for others. One wants them to enjoy intellectual goods, and so one wishes to engage with them to help them to acquire such goods. This last point is very important, since it reminds us that the strategies in play here are not merely instrumental. It could well be, for example, that the most effective way to get people to have lots of true beliefs is to simply tell them what is what. But having genuine intellectual concern for others is not just about ensuring that they maximise their true beliefs but also about how they get to the truth. That is why the intellectually humble do not merely tell others what to believe, even when they are clearly the better informed, but rather seek instead genuinely to intellectually engage with others to help them to see the truth for themselves. They want others to appreciate the truth as they do, and not merely passively accept what others tell them. Again, think of the good teacher in this regard. At least where there is time to do so, she would surely prefer to facilitate students in the difficult process of learning for themselves, rather than simply 'cramming' them with facts.[11]

For our purposes, what is absolutely crucial about the account of intellectual humility that we have set out is that it is entirely compatible with

sticking to one's guns, even in the face of disagreement from those around you. Of course, it is not compatible with *always* sticking to one's guns in the light of disagreement, as that would indeed be dogmatism. But in cases where one is legitimately confident of one's judgement—where one knows that one has special expertise or knowledge that those around one lacks, say, or where this is simply a topic that one knows one has put a due level of thought into—then having the conviction of one's opinions is entirely compatible with one not being dogmatic or intellectually arrogant. The key thing is that what makes one intellectually arrogant, and thus lacking in intellectual humility, is not the inward conviction that one has in one's opinions, but rather one's outward behaviour towards others and the under-lying values that it represents. In particular, one can have the courage of one's convictions and yet nonetheless behave in ways that express a genuine intellectual respect and concern for others. There is thus no essential tension between intellectual self-confidence and intellectual humility.[12]

THE PUZZLE RESOLVED

We are now in a position to resolve the puzzle with which we began. Recall that the puzzle arose because it seemed that two key epistemic goals of the educator—that of educating for intellectual self-confidence and that of educating for intellectual virtue, including intellectual humility—were in conflict with one another. But we have seen that these epistemic goals are not essentially in conflict at all, in that when intellectual humility is properly understood then it is entirely compatible with having the courage of one's convictions where that is epistemically appropriate, and thus with being intellectually self-confident. There is thus no reason why the educator cannot both develop a student's intellectual virtues and also her intellectual self-confidence.

Indeed, notice that from an educational point of view how difficult it would be to educate for intellectual humility on some of the conceptions of this notion that we have critiqued, at least insofar as the educator is trying to develop the intellectual character of her students. The latter goal, after all, will involve developing their concern for the truth, and thus establishing good practices for getting to the truth. That will put a premium on accuracy, in contrast to a conception of intellectual humility that essentially involves inaccuracy. It will also put a premium on sincerity in the intellectual realm, in contrast to a conception of intellectual humility that essentially involves pretence.

The conception of intellectual humility that involves embracing one's fallibility fares better on this score, since as we saw above it involves no essential appeal to inaccuracy or pretence. But it is still in tension with having a good intellectual character, since it is compatible with someone who is aware of their intellectual superiority and acting accordingly. In educating for intellectual self-confidence and intellectual humility with this account of the latter in play, one is in danger of creating students who exhibit dismissive attitudes to those less knowledgeable than they are, and hence being intellectually arrogant in the process. Indeed, one would expect that

the goal of enhancing their intellectual self-confidence will, if anything, make this tendency all the worse.

I want to close by noting how important it is that we are able to resolve this puzzle for our educational practices. For I think that now, more than ever before, it is vitally important to develop citizens who have both the courage of their convictions, when epistemically appropriate, while also exhibiting the intellectual respect for others that we have seen to be characteristic of intellectual humility. It is the latter that is so lacking in our current public life, where political discourse is often little more than name-calling and mudslinging. Here conviction has been allowed to drown out intellectual humility, with devastating results.

But it is important to recognise that the problem is not conviction itself, as if this difficulty would be resolved by everyone being doubtful of what they believe. Conviction can be epistemically appropriate, in which case it should be on display, and not hidden. What is key is to recognise that one can display one's conviction in ways that are entirely intellectually respectful of others, and thus compatible with intellectual humility. That is what we need to strive for in public life: conviction where it is epistemically appropriate and manifested in ways that express intellectual humility. But for that to happen we need to educate the next generate to realise that they do not need to choose between conviction and intellectual humility. Properly understood they should rightly strive for both, and it is part of the job of the educator to help facilitate their success in this regard.[13]

Correspondence: Duncan Pritchard, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, 85 Humanities Instructional Building, Irvine, CA 92697–4555, USA.
Email: dhpritch@uci.edu

NOTES

1. See, especially, Pritchard, 2016b; see also Pritchard, 2013, 2014b, 2018b. For a useful overview of the literature on the epistemic aim(s) of education, see Robertson, 2009.
2. The idea that self-confidence and conviction are pre-requisites of a virtuous life, while *prima facie* plausible, is not without its problems. For example, could one lead a virtuous life which embodies a thoroughgoing scepticism, of the kind one finds in Pyrrhonian thought? Pyrrhonian scepticism was clearly thought of by its practitioners as an ethical stance, in the sense that the route to *eudemonia* was via sceptical doubt. Of course, the larger question is whether such a sceptical ethical stance is compatible with a virtue-theoretic account of *eudaimonia*, at least given the rationalistic commitments presupposed in the latter. But there are some interpretations of Pyrrhonian sceptical doubt where it retains very similar commitments. See especially Perin, 2010; see also Pritchard, forthcoming b and c. In any case, it would clearly take us too far afield to get into these issues here.
3. Most commentators would accept this claim, but for some pushback in this regard, see Bloomfield, 2017a, 2017b.
4. In what follows, I am going to take this entailment to be straightforward. That said, in conversation both Paul Bloomfield and Michael Lynch have suggested to me that there might be good reasons why the entailment does not hold—e.g. that one could regard 'intellectual humility' as very much a term of art, and hence a notion that might cut free from our folk conception of humility altogether.
5. Driver, 1989, for example, argues that ignorance of certain propositions is vital for the development of some virtues. Being aware that one is modest, for instance, can be a barrier to sustaining one's

modesty. See also Brennan, 2007, for a related proposal (though here it is not inaccuracy as such but rather holding oneself to higher standards than one would ever hold others to).

6. Interestingly, the idea that it is normal to overestimate one's abilities and achievements has significant support in the psychological literature, where it is known as the phenomenon of *illusory superiority*. For a useful summary of some of this research, see Hoorens, 1993. See also Dunning and Kruger, 1999, for a famous discussion of a related bias in the specifically cognitive realm.

7. See, especially, the hugely influential *limitations-owning* account of intellectual humility offered by Whitcomb *et al.*, 2017. See also Hazlett, 2012, and the *doxastic* proposal offered by Church, 2016. The latter differs from the former in some interesting ways, though they are not relevant for our current purposes. For a useful discussion of these differences, see Barrett and Church, 2016.

8. Interestingly, the most developed defence of this approach to intellectual humility—found in Whitcomb *et al.*, 2017—does not even consider this kind of problem, even though it covers a compendium of potential issues facing the view. The reason for this is that its consideration of potential difficulties facing the proposal turns on what it regards as the alternative conceptions of intellectual humility that are available. But it fails to recognise the appeal of the positive account of intellectual humility that we will be looking at in the next section (see also endnote 9).

9. See Roberts and Wood, 2003 and 2007, for two important defences of this approach. See also Tanesini, 2016, Priest, 2017, and Pritchard, 2018a and 2019. Note that in their influential defence of the 'owning one's limitations' account of intellectual humility, Whitcomb *et al.*, 2017 effectively ignore this proposal since they mischaracterise it as the view that one should be disposed to have a 'low concern for one's own intellectual status and entitlements' (p. 6). But this is at most a *consequence* of the view, rather than the view itself. Indeed, given that this way of characterising the position is so egocentric, it is arguably not even that. In any case, what is key to the position is rather that it is grounded in an intellectual concern for others, something that Whitcomb *et al.*, 2017 completely miss.

    Note too that on this proposal intellectual humility will entail open-mindedness, a cognitive trait which is itself often said to be an intellectual virtue. Indeed, one might be tempted as a result to treat these two intellectual virtues as simply manifestations of a single general virtue. I think that this would be a mistake, however, as one can be open-minded without thereby being intellectually humble. For example, if one has heard the case for a certain opposing position before, then it is consistent with the demands of open-mindedness that one dismisses it out of hand and declines to listen to it presented again. But intellectual humility might well require one to listen, out of one's respect for the other person's opinions. For some recent discussions of open-mindedness, see Baehr, 2011, Pritchard, 2019, and Riggs, 2010.

10. Indeed, it is arguable that it is not just specifically intellectual benefits that count in this regard, but non-intellectual benefits to others too. For example, in intellectually respecting others one will contribute to their self-esteem, but this looks very much like a non-intellectual good. For our current purposes, however, I will set this complication to one side.

11. One might be tempted to ask at this juncture why, if this is so, intellectual humility counts as an *intellectual* virtue specifically? Are not intellectual virtues to be evaluated purely in terms of intellectual goods like true belief? The first thing to note here is that it is in fact quite common for intellectual virtues to also promote non-intellectual goods, just as many moral virtues also promote intellectual goods. (Think about the virtue of courage in this regard, which could be specifically intellectual, or specifically moral, or both). But even setting this complication to one side, I think the objection is based on a crude way of understanding a concern for truth, as if this could simply be measured in terms of counting true propositions believed. In fact, I think we need a much richer conception of what desire for the truth is if we are to capture what is most important about our epistemic practices (for example, what constitutes good inquiry). I explore these issues in a number of places but see especially Pritchard, 2014a, 2016a, 2016c, and forthcoming.

12. This point is important to understanding why non-concessive treatments of the epistemology of peer disagreement are not in tension with the demands of intellectual humility, as many commentators (often tacitly) suppose. See Pritchard, 2012, 2018a and 2019 for further discussion of this issue. Note too that this point is particularly important given the difficulties that plague conciliatory approaches to the epistemology of peer disagreement, as defended by Christensen (2007), Elga (2007), and Feldman (2007). For example, that they seem to entail that one needs to be concessive about the very truth of concessive approaches to the epistemology of peer disagreement, given that

disagreement about the epistemology of peer disagreement is rife—though see Elga, 2010, for a defence of concessive approaches in this regard.

13. Special thanks to David Bakhurst for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. This paper has benefitted from two grants awarded by the Templeton Foundation, both of them for projects hosted at the University of Edinburgh's *Eidyn* research centre. These are: (i) the 'Virtue Epistemology, Epistemic Dependence and Intellectual Humility' project, which was itself part of the wider 'Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility Project' hosted by Saint Louis University; and (ii) the 'Intellectual Humility MOOC' project.

REFERENCES

Baehr, J. (2011) The Structure of Open-Mindedness, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 41.2, pp. 191–213.

Barrett, J. and Church, I. (2016) Intellectual Humility, in: E. L. Worthington, D. E. Davis and J. N. Hook (eds), *Handbook of Humility: Theory, Research, and Applications*, (London, Routledge, 2016), pp. 62–75.

Bloomfield, P. (2017a) Humility Is Not A Virtue, in: M. Alfano, M. Lynch, and A. Tanesini (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility* (London, Routledge).

Bloomfield, P. (2017b) Virtues as Excellences, unpublished manuscript.

Brennan, J. (2007) Modesty Without Illusion, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 75.1, pp. 111–128.

Christensen, D. (2007) Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News, *Philosophical Review*, 116.2, pp. 187–217.

Church, I. (2016) A Doxastic Account of Intellectual Humility, *Logos & Episteme*, 7.4, pp. 413–433.

Driver, J. (1989) The Virtues of Ignorance, *Journal of Philosophy*, 86.7, pp. 373–384.

Dunning, D. and Kruger, J. (1999) Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77.6, pp. 1121–1134.

Elga, A. (2007) Reflection and Disagreement, *Noûs*, 41.3, pp. 478–502.

Elga, A. (2010) How to Disagree About How to Disagree, in: R. Feldman and T. Warfield (eds), *Disagreement* (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 175–186.

Feldman, R. (2007) Reasonable Religious Disagreements, in: L. Anthony (ed.), *Philosophers Without Gods* (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 194–214.

Hazlett, A. (2012) Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility, *Episteme*, 9.3, pp. 205–223.

Hoorens, V. (1993) Self-Enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison, *European Review of Social Psychology*, 4.1, pp. 113–139.

Perin, C. (2010) *The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).

Priest, M. (2017) Intellectual Virtue: An Interpersonal Theory, *Ergo*, 4.16, https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.016

Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming a) Ignorance and Inquiry, *American Philosophical Quarterly*.

Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming b) Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism, in: J. Vlasits and K. M. Vogt (eds), *Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).

Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming c) Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* as Pyrrhonism in Action, in: N. de Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds), *Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at Things from the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (Dordrecht, Springer).

Pritchard, D. H. (2012) Disagreement, Scepticism, and Track-Record Arguments, in: D. Machuca (ed.), *Disagreement and Scepticism* (London, Routledge), pp. 150–168.

Pritchard, D. H. (2013) Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 47.2, pp. 236–247.

Pritchard, D. H. (2014a) Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good, in: J. Matheson and R. Vitz (eds), *The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social* (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 112–129.

Pritchard, D. H. (2016a) Epistemic Axiology, in: M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (eds), *Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals* (Berlin, DeGruyter), pp. 407–422.

Pritchard, D. H. (2016b) Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education, in J. Baehr (ed.), *Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology* (London, Routledge), pp. 113–127.

Pritchard, D. H. (2016c) Seeing It For Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy, *Episteme*, 13.1, pp. 29–42.

Pritchard, D. H. (2018a) Intellectual Humility and the Epistemology of Disagreement, *Synthese*, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5.

Pritchard, D. H. (2018b). Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education, *Metaphilosophy*, 49.3, pp. 328–349.

Pritchard, D. H. (2019) Disagreement, Intellectual Humility, and Reflection, in: W. Da Silva Filho (ed.), *Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology* (Dordrecht, Springer).

Riggs, W. (2010) Open-Mindedness, *Metaphilosophy*, 41.1, pp. 172–188.

Roberts, R. C. and Wood, W. J. (2003) Humility and Epistemic Goods, in: M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds), *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 257–279.

Roberts, R. C. and Wood, W. J. (2007) *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).

Robertson, E. (2009) The Epistemic Aims of Education, in: H. Siegel (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education* (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 11–34.

Tanesini, A. (2016) Intellectual Humility as Attitude, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 96.2, pp. 399–420.

Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J. and Howard-Synder, D. (2017) Intellectual Humility: Owning our Limitations, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 94.3, pp. 509–539.